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Introduction
This thesis contains three essays belonging to different strands of empirical macroeconomics
and finance literature. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 investigate the transmissions of uncertainty
shocks in emerging market economies. Chapter 1 studies the impact of financial frictions
on the transmissions of uncertainty shocks. Chapter 2 explores the relationship between
aggregate uncertainty and firms’ access to trade credit while taking the interactive role of
social trust into consideration. Chapter 3 considers the role of social connections in the
transmissions of monetary contraction shocks. Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 are based on joint
work with Sihao Chen and Axel Wogrolly, respectively.
Chapter 1 studies how financial frictions affect the transmissions of uncertainty shocks
in emerging countries. Agents in emerging countries face higher uncertainty in forecasting
economic fundamentals. Uncertainty shocks are important in driving business cycle dynam-
ics in these countries. Besides, financial frictions have been proved to be critical to quantify
the business cycle dynamics in these economies. How important are financial frictions to
characterize the transmissions of uncertainty shocks in emerging countries?
Using a panel of 17 emerging countries, this chapter finds that financial frictions can
amplify the impact of uncertainty on real consumption more than the counterparts on real
GDP. We explain this finding by stressing the role of durable consumption. With an increase
in financial frictions, durable consumption, but not nondurable consumption, declines much
more than output in response to uncertainty shocks. This phenomenon is explained through
the credit channel. An increase in uncertainty is related to a larger increase in real interest
rate in emerging economies with less developed financial systems. Such behaviors will gen-
erate more substantial responses of durable consumption to uncertainty shocks than GDP
and thus explain the larger response of consumption.
Chapter 2 studies the impact of social trust on the transmissions of uncertainty shocks in
emerging countries at the firm level. Social trust can mitigate the impact of market frictions
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which arise due to the difficulties to enforce contracts, which in turn affects the propagations
of macroeconomic shocks. This chapter focuses on how social trust affects the transmissions
of uncertainty shocks in emerging countries.
Using firm-level data from 26 emerging countries, this chapter finds that firms in coun-
tries with higher levels of social trust obtain more trade credit and suffer small drops in their
profitability with an increase in aggregate uncertainty. Besides, those firms in industries
which depend on liquid funds more benefit more from the higher social trust. Our results
are robust if we exclude the impact of other country-level characteristics and use a new
measure of uncertainty shocks.
Chapter 3 studies how social connections affect the transmissions of monetary contrac-
tion shocks. In modern society, corporate senior managers build complex social networks
via the alumni association or other organizations. These social networks can mitigate the
cost of gathering information and enhance trust between parties, which in turn affects the
transmissions of monetary contraction shocks.
Using the pair-level sale data from the U.S., we find that the sales between upstream
and downstream firms decline in response to monetary contraction shocks. However, if the
suppliers and customers are socially connected, the sales reduce less. That is to say, social
connections can reduce the negative impact of monetary contraction shocks on pair-level
sales. This impact mainly comes from the trade credit channel. When the central bank
implements contractionary monetary policies, firms can get less credit from financial insti-
tutions like commercial banks, and they want to get more trade credit from their suppliers.
As with the suppliers, they prefer providing more trade credit to those connected customers,
because they can get more business information via social connections and they think those
customers are more trustworthy.
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Chapter 1
Durable Goods, Financial Frictions
and the Transmissions of Uncertainty
Shocks in Emerging Market
Economies
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1.1 Introduction
In emerging market economies (EMEs), agents face higher uncertainty in forecasting eco-
nomic fundamentals and uncertainty shocks are important driving forces for business cycle
dynamics (Gourio et al., 2015).1 Meanwhile, financial frictions are proved to be critical to
quantify the business cycle dynamics in these economies (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Garc´ıa-
Cicco et al., 2010 and Akinci, 2017). A natural question followed by these arguments is
that how important financial frictions are to characterize the transmission of uncertainty
shocks in EMEs, but this question is rarely discussed.2 This paper studies the relationship
between financial frictions and the impact of uncertainty shocks on real activities, especially
on consumption and output in EMEs.
Using a panel of 17 emerging economies, this paper tests the relationship between fi-
nancial frictions and the transmission of uncertainty shocks. Uncertainty in each country
is measured by the logarithm of the realized aggregate stock market volatility in the corre-
sponding country during each quarter. This measure is simple and available in real time, free
of revisions and sample selections. Financial development is indexed by the ratio of private
credit by banks over GDP. This index is at the yearly frequency, and we transform this
annual measure of financial development into quarterly frequencies by letting the quarterly
value be identical to the annual value in the corresponding year. The higher that ratio is,
the more developed the financial market is, and the lower the level of financial frictions is
in EMEs. The impact of uncertainty shocks is unambiguous: an increase in uncertainty is
associated with a decline in GDP and other real activities.
To exclude the impact of countries’ institutional/cultural features and address the issue
that the current real activities such as GDP are heavily determined by their past levels, we
use a dynamic panel fixed-effect model. The other important issue that may plague our
investigation is that it is difficult to disentangle the effect of financial development on the
1This paper uses the logarithm of the stock return volatility to measure uncertainty like Gourio et al.
(2015). There are alternative measures of uncertainty shocks. For instance, Carrie`re-Swallow and Ce´spedes
(2013) address the impact of global uncertainty shocks (shocks from US) in emerging countries. Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. (2011) use shocks to the volatility of the borrowing premium to explain the volatility of
consumption in emerging economies. This shock is also a second-order one that resembles the shock to the
stock return volatility.
2Using a model with financial frictions and uncertainty shocks, Akinci (2017) discusses the business cycles
in EMEs. However, in her work, uncertainty accounts little for the fluctuations in consumption and output.
With Chilean and US data, Carrie`re-Swallow and Ce´spedes (2013) use an SVAR model to see the differential
impacts of financial frictions on the transmissions of uncertainty shock in developed and emerging countries.
However, they assume uncertainty shocks for both countries are the same and come from the U.S. This may
neglect the impact of uncertainty raised by local factors.
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transmissions of uncertainty shocks from the effect of the changes in GDP or other variables
on financial development. To address this issue, we lag the index of financial development
for one year and study the relationship between the predetermined level of financial devel-
opment and the subsequent impact of uncertainty on real activities. To further identify
the causal influence of uncertainty, we use an instrumental variable strategy that makes use
of countries’ differential exposures to the global oil price as well as U.S. monetary policy.
The identification strategy works well as it passes the first-stage F test and Hansen-J over-
identification test.
This paper mainly has two findings. First, at a higher level of financial frictions, an
increase in uncertainty is associated with a more substantial decline in GDP as well as
consumption. Second, the coefficient on the interaction term of uncertainty and financial
development in the regression of consumption is more pronounced than the counterparts
in the regression of GDP. Moreover, an increase in financial frictions is associated with a
larger decline in the ratio of real consumption to GDP with an increase in uncertainty.
This suggests that financial frictions can amplify the impact of uncertainty shocks on real
consumption more than the counterparts on real GDP. The second empirical finding seems
interesting and different from the corresponding results in developed countries3. Business
cycles in emerging countries are characterized by the so-called “excess volatility of consump-
tion puzzle” (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007), which refers to the relatively larger volatility
of consumption to that of GDP. Our findings can partly contribute to explaining that puz-
zle, as uncertainty shocks are important to account for the business cycle dynamics in EMEs.
We propose durable consumption as a potential candidate to explain our empirical find-
ings concerning GDP and consumption. With an increase in financial frictions, durable con-
sumption, but not nondurable consumption, declines much more than output in response to
uncertainty shocks.4 This implies that durable consumption is a potential source to explain
the differential magnitudes that financial frictions can amplify the impact of uncertainty
on GDP and consumption in emerging countries. Our results are robust to an alternative
measure of dependent variables, financial frictions, and uncertainty.
Countercyclical country interest rate is an important characteristic of business cycles in
emerging markets, and the interaction of countercyclical risk premium and durable goods
3See Carrie`re-Swallow and Ce´spedes, 2013; Mumtaz and Thedoridis, 2014.
4Financial frictions also amplify the negative effect of uncertainty on nondurable consumption in emerging
countries in our empirical analysis. However, the amplifying magnitude between GDP and nondurable
consumption is not clear.
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is the principal channel to explain emerging market business cycle dynamics (Alvarez-Parra
et al. 2013). Financial frictions can strengthen this countercyclical response of real interest
rate to uncertainty shocks, which is a potential channel via which financial frictions amplify
the impact of uncertainty on durable consumption more than that on GDP. Thus, we can
understand the differential amplifying magnitudes of financial frictions on GDP and con-
sumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literatures related
to our paper. Section 3 introduces our dataset, empirical specification and methodology.
Section 4 reports our empirical findings and explains these findings. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Our paper is closely related to Carrie`re-Swallow and Ce´spedes (2013), henceforth CC. Using
an open-economy VAR approach, they find that emerging countries suffer much more severe
falls in investment and private consumption in response to exogenous global uncertainty
shocks compared to US and other developed countries. Furthermore, the credit channel
can account for up to one-half of the increased fall in investment generated by uncertainty
shocks among emerging economies with less developed financial systems. While our paper
also focuses on the impact of financial frictions on the transmission of uncertainty shocks,
it differs substantially in three aspects. First, the real activities we mainly focus on are
different. Our paper concentrates on the transmissions of uncertainty shocks to GDP as
well as consumption and further explain the differential amplifying magnitudes of financial
frictions between them in emerging countries. We link this phenomenon to “excess volatility
of consumption puzzle” and propose durable consumption as a potential source to explain
it. CC, however, pay close attention to the differential responses of investment between
developed and emerging countries. Second, in our analyses, the level of financial frictions
is indexed by the ratio of private credits by banks to GDP, which is time-varying, but not
influenced by the transmission of uncertainty shocks. However, CC regard the credit spread
as the measure of financial frictions and it is affected by uncertainty. Their analyses are
more like our analyses about the real interest rate. Finally, we use the standard deviation
of local stock return as the index of uncertainty shocks which resemble total uncertainty in
Gourio et al. (2015), while the shock in CC is constructed according to VIX index and more
like a global uncertainty shock.
The focus on the transmissions of uncertainty shocks in EMEs links our paper to a recent
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branch of literature that explores empirically and theoretically the transmissions of uncer-
tainty shocks in both developed and emerging countries.5 Among the literature, some of
them specialize in the interaction of financial/credit frictions and uncertainty shocks. Alfaro
et al. (2018), using a partial equilibrium model and a novel instrumentation strategy, find
that financially-constrained firms will reduce investment and hiring more by cutting more
short-term debt and hold more cash when facing higher uncertainty. In an otherwise stan-
dard DSGE model with BGG financial accelerator, Christiano et al. (2014) find that shocks
to the volatility of cross-sectional idiosyncratic capital efficiency are far more important than
the other shocks and can account for 62 percent of the fluctuations in output. They argue
that financial frictions (monitoring cost in BGG) introduce a premium to cover the costs
of default by the entrepreneurs. This premium is high with high uncertainty, leading a low
credit to the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can acquire less raw capital with fewer financial
resources and thus investment falls. Output, consumption and employment fall following this
decline. Akinci (2017) extends Christiano et al.’s work to EMEs. Different from Christiano
et al., uncertainty is modeled as the volatility of intermediate input efficiency in emerging
markets. She embeds a type of financial frictions with a micro foundation in the emerging
market business cycle models and finds that the interaction of uncertainty and financial
frictions is important to characterize the cyclical behavior of real interest rate. Our paper
provides some empirical evidence on this mechanism of the interaction, but further considers
the interaction of uncertainty and financial frictions on durable and nondurable consump-
tion. Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo (2018), following the spirit of Christiano et al.,
compare the transmissions of micro uncertainty shocks as well as macro uncertainty shocks
under different levels of financial frictions. They find that credit frictions can apparently
amplify micro uncertainty shocks because they act through the cost of external debt and
capital demand while macro uncertainty shocks are less affected by credit frictions due to
its transmission via precautionary savings. However, in our paper, we empirically point out
that financial frictions can also amplify the impact of macro uncertainty.
Our paper is also related to A´lvarez-Parra et al. (2013), who firstly argue that the in-
teraction of durable consumption and financial frictions is vitally important to characterize
the business cycles in EMEs. During economic expansions, for instance, consumers take
advantage of the lower interest rate by borrowing more in order to increase the stock of
5To name a few: Bloom et al. (2007); Bloom (2009); Asker et al. (2014); Gilchrist et al. (2014); Barrero
et al. (2017); Arellano et al. (2018); Bloom et al. (2018) ; and Bayer et al. (2019) have studied the impact of
uncertainty in developed countries, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2011) and Guorio et al. (2015) in emerging
countries, Mendicino and Zhang (2018) use a small open economy framework but calibrate their model to
Canada.
7
durables as well as capital. Since durable goods are tradable, part of the accumulation of
durables and capital resorts to imports. As a result, net exports fall more and consumption
expenditures and investment increase more during expansions, making consumption more
volatile relative to output. Our paper follows their arguments and provides some empirical
evidence. However, the driving force in our paper is uncertainty shocks. Apart from EMEs,
the durable good channel is also widely used to explain the business cycles in developed
countries. Monacelli (2009), for instance, shows that borrowing constraints, where durables
play a role of collateral assets, help to explain the transmissions of monetary policy shocks.6
Finally, our paper belongs to the literature on business cycles in EMEs, especially on
the “excess volatility of consumption puzzle”. One strand of literature (Neumeyer and
Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006; Garcia-Cicco et al., 2010; Akinci 2017) emphasizes the
importance of interest rate shocks and financial frictions. Once the country spread goes
up, the interest rate cost to finance working capital is higher and firms reduce productions.
Consumers will reduce their consumption partly due to income effect. Our paper provides
an empirical analysis of the financial friction channel to characterize business cycle dynamics
in EMEs but introduces uncertainty shocks as the driving force. We find that the interaction
of uncertainty and financial frictions help to explain the excess volatility of consumption.
1.3 Data, Specification and Methodology
We describe our sample at first, then the empirical specification and methodology we use.
1.3.1 Data
This project focuses on the transmissions of uncertainty shocks in EMEs. Our sample
countries include Bulgaria, Chile, Columbia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Ko-
rea, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Slovenia, Slovakia, Thailand, and
Turkey.7 The sample extends from 1970 Q1 to 2013 Q1.8 However, some series start later
than others. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.1. To see whether the impact
of financial frictions in EMEs is different from that in developed countries, we repeat some
regressions with a sample of developed countries. This sample includes Australia, Austria,
6More research see Mertens and Ravn (2011) and Sterk (2010).
7We use these 17 countries due to data availability. Data for durable and nondurable consumption is only
available in these countries. More emerging countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, can be covered when
we only consider the regressions of real GDP, consumption, investment and trade balance. The results are
consistent with ours.
8As with the Eastern countries, their data starts after 1995Q1.
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Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherland,
New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, UK, and USA. The sample also extends from 1970 Q1 to 2013
Q1. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.2.
Table 1.1
Descriptive Statistics of Emerging Countries
Dep-Vars Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
GDP (in logs and HP filter)*100, Y 0 2.40 -7.94 7.08
Consumption (in logs and HP filter)*100, C 0 3.17 -10.05 9.86
Durable (in logs and HP filter)*100, D 0 8.67 -24.63 20.98
Nondurable (in logs and HP filter)*100, N 0 2.43 -7.45 8.49
C
Y
, % 59.77 6.33 46.94 72.57
Indep-Vars
log(Real effective exchange rate) 4.48 0.20 3.73 4.88
CPI 56.96 32.68 0.15 116.67
log(Volatility) -4.69 0.34 -5.30 -3.62
FD (Private Credit/GDP) 45.03 27.98 2.75 165.86
Note: Our sample countries include Bulgaria, Chile, Columbia, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, South
Africa, Thailand, and Turkey. The definition of emerging economies is according to Morgan
Stanley Strategy Indexes (MSCI). C
Y
the ratio of real consumption to GDP. To understand
the results more directly, the index of uncertainty (log(Volatility)) is normalized to 0 mean
and unit standard deviation in all tables other than Table 1.1 and Table 1.2.
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Table 1.2
Descriptive Statistics of Developed Countries
Dep-Vars Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
GDP (in logs and HP filter)*100, Y 0 1.63 -7.08 11.22
Consumption (in logs and HP filter)*100, C 0 1.49 -8.71 13.24
Durable (in logs and HP filter)*100, D 0 4.95 -21.95 32.46
Nondurable (in logs and HP filter)*100 , N 0 1.09 -6.51 6.75
C
Y
, % 53.78 8.30 30.33 71.43
Indep-Vars
log(Volatility) -4.58 0.40 -5.53 -3.30
FD (Private Credit/GDP) 89.30 41.50 18.53 262.46
Note: Our sample countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, UK,
and USA.
Macroeconomic Data. Real GDP, consumption, investment, export, and import series
in national currency are from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Finan-
cial Statistics (IFS), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
statistics, Eurostat, and Global Financial Data (GFD) other than South Africa. The data
of South Africa comes from Central Bank of South Africa. As those 5 databases mentioned
above are adjusted now and then, some data is missing. Real durable and nondurable
consumption other than Chile, Mexico, Thailand, South Africa, and Turkey are obtained
from OECD and Eurostat. We obtain Chile, Mexico, Thailand, and South Africa’s data
for durable and nondurable from their central banks and Turkey’s data from Turkish Sta-
tistical Institute.9 Those series are quarterly and seasonally adjusted by using Census x12
method. The seasonally adjusted series are then in logs and detrended by HP filter. The
data is winsorized at the 1% level. CPI-based real effective exchange rate (REER) is used
to represent the real exchange rate. Quarterly REER data is from IFS and BIS and also
seasonally adjusted. The data for capital account openness is obtained from Chinn-Ito Fi-
9For durable consumption data of Thailand and Turkey, to get long-term data, we construct durable
consumption by calculating the sum of expenditures on furnishing, household equipment, vehicles, etc.
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nancial Openness Index. Finally, we construct data for the country-level leverage ratio based
on Ferna´ndez and Gulan (2015) and obtain the raw data from COMPUSTAT.
Financial Data. Stock market return and stock market volatility are based on Baker
et al. (2018) who in turn rely on GFD.10 In the empirical work, the logarithm of stock
market volatility serves as the index of uncertainty. The financial development variable is
indexed by the ratio of private credit by banks over GDP and is based on Cˇiha´k(2013) and
the World Bank Open Data. Interest rate comes from Uribe and Yue (2006), Eurostat and
Federal Reserve Banks of St Louis. These data is in logarithm.
1.3.2 Empirical Specification
This paper intends to study the relationship between financial frictions and the transmissions
of uncertainty shocks in EMEs. However, implementing a convincing empirical test raises
some important issues. One of these issues is that institutional/cultural features that may
be correlated with financial development may also influence the transmission of uncertainty
shocks. For example, Beck et al. (2001) find that historically determined legal traditions
shape financial development today. These legal traditions differ across countries and may
regulate the ability of central bank or government to accommodate adverse shocks. We are
able to address this issue by estimating a fixed-effect model with panel data.
The second issue that may plague our investigation is that it seems difficult to disentan-
gle the effect of financial development on the transmission of uncertainty shocks from the
effect of the changes in GDP or other variables on financial development. If higher GDP
creates higher levels of financial development, one might expect to find a positive correlation
between financial frictions and the impact of uncertainty shocks on GDP, even if financial
frictions have no effect on the transmission of uncertainty shocks to GDP. We attempt to
address this issue by lagging the index of financial development for one year. We study
the relationship between the one-year predetermined level of financial development and the
subsequent impact of uncertainty on the real economy in EMEs. In our robustness check,
we assume that the level of financial development is time-invariant and define the ratio of
private credit by banks over GDP in 1998 as the index of financial development for the whole
periods. Nonetheless, neither of our proposed solutions solve this endogeneity problem en-
tirely and we remain cautious in our interpretation. In addition, the other important issue
that affects our investigation is that the variation in country-level stock return volatility may
10As with the countries whose data is not available in Baker et al. (2018), we construct them ourselves.
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be endogenous to GDP as well as other real activities. The most likely source of this endo-
geneity comes from omitted variables because some other country-level shocks may affect the
country-level stock return volatility and the real economy at the same time. This issue may
bias the transmission of uncertainty shocks to the real economy in emerging countries. To
overcome this issue, we exploit countries’ differential exposure to U.S. monetary policy and
energy price to generate the corresponding country’s stock market volatility, and then im-
plement the instrumental variable strategy to identify the transmission of uncertainty shocks.
Finally, the current real activities such as GDP are heavily determined by their past
levels. Thus, we include the one-period lagged dependent variables as controls. Based on
Keele and Kelly (2005), a model with lagged dependent variables is the best choice if history
matters and the process of dependent variable is stationary. After considering the issues
discussed above, we assess the relationship between financial frictions and the transmission
of uncertainty shocks using the following equation:
Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 + β2 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗ FDi,t−1
+β3 ∗ FDi,t−1 + ρYi,t−1 + δ′Zi,t−1 + It + Ii + εi,t
,
where Yi,t denotes the detrended logarithm of real GDP or other indicators of country i in
period t. log(V olatility)i,t−1 is the one-period lagged logarithm of quarterly standard devia-
tion of stock daily returns and serves as the index of one-period lagged uncertainty. FDi,t−1
denotes the predetermined level of financial development11 and is indexed by the ratio of
private credit by banks over GDP lagged for one year. Here, financial frictions are assumed
to increase when FDi,t−1 decreases. The interaction of lagged uncertainty and financial de-
velopment, log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗ FDi,t−1, captures the differential impacts of uncertainty on
GDP or other dependent variables across countries with different levels of financial frictions.
Country fixed effects are included to control for omitted country characteristics. Errors are
clustered at the country and year level. 12 Time fixed effects are also included so as to
capture time trends affecting all countries in the sample.
Zi,t−1 are additional control variables that may help to explain the business cycles in
EMEs. In emerging countries, the openness to the international market is a key factor in
11Although lagged for one year, FDi,t−1 may be not exogenous because sometimes people make decisions
on investment next year but borrow one year in advance. Then GDP next year may affect the private credit
this year
12In some regressions, errors are not clustered due to the low number of groups.
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predicting the economic dynamics. There is a series of literature (Meza and Urrutia, 2011
and Seoane, 2016) addressing that real exchange rate makes a difference in shaping business
cycle dynamics in EMEs. Real exchange rate is thus considered in the empirical specification
as a matter of course. Finally, inflation is another potential candidate that reflects the
fundamental development of the economy. Zi,t−1 = [CPIi,t−1, RERi,t−1, Opennessi,t−1]′ is
the vector of control variables in which CPI and real exchange rate are lagged for one
quarter while the index of capital account openness is lagged for one year. Here, CPIi,t−1
and RERi,t−1 denote the consumer price index and real effective exchange rate for country
i in period t − 1, respectively. Opennessi,t−1 is the one-year lagged Chinn-Ito Financial
Openness Index.
1.3.3 Identification
The identification strategy in this paper depends on the fact that different countries are ex-
posed to global monetary policy and energy price in different degrees to generate exogenous
changes in country-level uncertainty. The idea is that some countries are very sensitive to
US monetary policy (e.g., Korea) because they hold a large amount of U.S. treasury secu-
rities while others not. Thus, when U.S. monetary policy uncertainty rises, country-level
uncertainty increases more in the former group than the latter one. Meanwhile, different
countries have different energy structures, so that changes in oil price volatility generates
differential moves in country-level uncertainty.
This approach is similar to Alfaro et al.’s (2018) identification strategy based on Stone
and Stein (2013). In Alfaro et al.’s work, they instrument firm-level uncertainty by exploit-
ing firms’ differential exposure to energy, currency and policy.
We estimate each country’s sensitivities to oil price and U.S. monetary policy as the
factor loadings of a regression of one country’s quarterly stock return on oil price and U.S
real interest rate. That is to say, for country i, we estimate sensitivities to oil price and U.S.
monetary policy, βpi and β
m
i , as follows:
ri,t = αi + β
m
i ∗ rus,t + βpi ∗ Poil,t + Γ ∗Xt + i,t
where ri,t is country’s quarterly stock return, rus,t is quarterly real interest rate, and Poil,t
is the quarterly change in oil price. Xt is the vector of control variables related to stock return.
As with oil price, we use the global price of WTI and calculate the quarterly implied
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volatility of its monthly change, σoil,t, as the measure of their uncertainty. As with monetary
policy, we construct U.S. real interest rate by dividing effective federal funds rate into CPI
and use Husted et al’s (2017) index, MPUus,t, as U.S. monetary policy uncertainty. The two
composites of sensitivity and uncertainty, ‖βmi ‖log(MPUus,t) and ‖βpi ‖log(σoil,t), are then the
instrumental variables for country-level uncertainty, where the first term in each instrument
is the absolute value of the sensitivity13 we estimate above at the country level. Likewise,
the interaction terms with uncertainty included are instrumented by the interaction of the
same set of oil price exposure and U.S. monetary policy exposure with the rest variables.
For example, the interaction of financial frictions and uncertainty, the main variable we are
interested in, is instrumented by the interactions of financial frictions with ‖βmi ‖log(MPUus,t)
and ‖βpi ‖log(σoil,t).
1.4 Result
This section focuses on how financial frictions propagate uncertainty shocks to the real econ-
omy in emerging countries. Our empirical analyses are based on two steps. We begin by
examining the differential responses of GDP and consumption to uncertainty shocks when
emerging economies face differential financial frictions. Next, we decompose consumption
into durable and nondurable consumption to understand these differential responses.
In addition to the baseline analyses, we also make several important extensions. First,
we check whether our results are robust to an alternative measure of dependent variables,
financial frictions and uncertainty. Next, to further identify how financial frictions affect the
impact of uncertainty shocks on real activities in emerging countries, we extend our empirical
analyses to the real interest rate channel and see how uncertainty shocks are transmitted to
real interest rate at different levels of financial frictions. We then control for real interest rate
in our baseline regressions and see whether the interaction effects of uncertainty and financial
frictions on real activities changes. Finally, our analyses are extended to the interaction of
uncertainty and financial frictions on real investment, trade balance and leverage ratio.
1.4.1 Baseline Results: GDP and Consumption
We first present some preliminary visual evidence. Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between
aggregate uncertainty and GDP and consumption (log and HP filtered) in the low and high
financial development groups, respectively. We can see that both GDP and consumption
13The sensitivity is equal to 0 if it is not significant at the 5% level in the regression above.
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decline more in the lower group as the aggregate uncertainty increases. As with the ratio of
consumption to GDP, Figure 1.2 shows that this ratio also decreases more in the lower group.
Table 1.3 shows the impact of financial friction on the propagations of uncertainty shocks
to GDP and consumption in EMEs using instrumental variable estimations. The left three
columns present the results without additional controls. Column 1 presents the regression
of the detrended logarithm of real GDP, column 2 the detrended logarithm of real consump-
tion, and column 3 the ratio of real consumption over GDP. The rest three columns show
the results with additional controls. We present the OLS regression results in the Appendix
A1.2. Based on the regression results in Table 1.3, we get two important facts concerning the
relationship between financial frictions and the transmissions of uncertainty shocks in EMEs.
First, with an increase in financial frictions, an increase in aggregate uncertainty is as-
sociated with a larger decline in the detrended logarithm of GDP as well as consumption
in EMEs. For example, the positive estimator of the interaction term in column 1, weakly
significant at the 10% level, implies that GDP experiences a 0.18-standard-deviation larger
contraction if the index of financial frictions move from the 25% quantile to 75% quantile
in response a one-standard-deviation positive uncertainty shock. The F-test14 and Hansen-J
p value suggest that the instrumental variables used in the regressions are valid. The am-
plification effect can be further confirmed by the result presented in column 4 where the
coefficient of the interaction term is also positive and weakly significant at 15% level. The
result with respect to GDP is in line with recent studies in developed countries (Gilchrist et
al., 2014; Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo, 2018 and Alfaro et al., 2018).15
Second, the coefficient on the interaction term in the regression of consumption is more
pronounced than the counterparts in the regression of GDP. This finding is robust after we
control for capital account openness, real exchange rate and inflation rate. Moreover, when
we turn to see the regressions of the ratio of real consumption over GDP, the estimators
of the interactions term are positive and significant at the 1% level, while those of the un-
certainty terms are negative and weakly significant at the 10% level.16 These two findings
14As there exist two endogenous variables instrumented, the interaction term and the index of uncertainty,
a more appropriate first-step test may be Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate F test developed by Sanderson
and Windmeijer (2016). Our regressions can also pass this test.
15As with consumption, The situation becomes very tremendous. Our result is inconsistent with some
work(Gilchrist et al., 2014 and Mendicino and Zhang, 2018) where the impact of uncertainty on consumption
is positive, but consistent with some recent literature (Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo, 2018; and
Bonciani and van Roye, 2016).
16To compare the different magnitudes of GDP and consumption, we can also use the difference between
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This Figure shows the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and GDP and consump-
tion. Both GDP and consumption are in logarithm and detrended by HP filter. We call the
observations whose index of financial development is in the upper quantile the high financial
development group (Figure 1.1(b) and 1.1(d)) and the observations whose index of financial
development is in the lower quantile the low financial development group (Figure 1.1(a)
and 1.1(c)). The X-axis is the index of uncertainty and the Y-axis represents GDP (Figure
1.1(a) and 1.1(b)) and consumption (Figure 1.1(c) and 1.1(d)). We exclude country- and
time- fixed effects from uncertainty, GDP and consumption.
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Table 1.3
Benchmark Results
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dep-Var
GDP Consumption CY GDP Consumption
C
Y
log(Volatility)*FD 0.012* 0.025** 0.016*** 0.012† 0.025** 0.013***
(0.0070) (0.012) (0.0056) (0.0082) (0.010) (0.0041)
log(Volatility) -0.16 -1.09* -1.27** -0.53 -1.13* -1.03*
(0.26) (0.65) (0.62) (0.38) (0.64) (0.54)
FD 0.11* 0.24** 0.15*** 0.11 0.23** 0.13***
(0.066) (0.11) (0.054) (0.077) (0.099) (0.040)
Openness 0.0038 0.086 -0.012
(0.048) (0.10) (0.097)
CPI 0.014 -0.0042 0.012
(0.029) (0.035) (0.019)
RER 0.0063 0.034* 0.010*
(0.012) (0.018) (0.0058)
1st Dep-Val 0.70*** 0.63*** 0.86*** 0.76*** 0.65*** 0.88***
(0.063) (0.077) (0.020) (0.028) (0.072) (0.024)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-Step F-test 1 4.20 7.39 7.56 5.82 6.25 6.17
First-Step F-test 2 2.20 3.18 3.39 2.30 2.60 2.49
Hansen-J P-Value 0.29 0.21 0.64 0.36 0.53 0.50
Observations 1,286 1,213 1,213 1,146 1,134 1,134
Group 17 17 17 17 17 17
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; † p < 0.15. Heteroscedastic-
ity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. The table
presents the IV estimators for the empirical models: Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 + β2 ∗
log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗ FDi,t−1 + β3 ∗ FDi,t−1 + ρYi,t−1 + δ′Zi,t−1 + It + Ii + εi,t. The first three
columns present the IV estimation results without additional controls (capital account openness,
inflation and real exchange rate) and the rest three do with additional controls. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the detrended logarithm of real
GDP, consumption and the ratio of real consumption over GDP. FD denotes one-year lagged ratio
of private credit by banks over GDP and log(Volatility) is the logarithm of one-quarter lagged the
average of quarterly standard deviation of stock daily returns and serves as the index of uncer-
tainty. Openness, CPI and RER denote Chinn-Ito financial openness, consumer price index and
real effective exchange rate respectively. The different number of observations between GDP and
consumption reflects the fact that consumption data for some countries is not available.
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This Figure shows the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and the ratio of con-
sumption to GDP. We call the observations whose index of financial development is in the
upper quantile the high financial development group (Figure 1.2(b)) and the observations
whose index of financial development is in the lower quantile the low financial development
group (Figure 1.2(a)). The X-axis is the index of uncertainty and the Y-axis represents the
normalized ratio of consumption to GDP. We exclude country- and time- fixed effects from
uncertainty and the ratio.
are quite appealing, as they document a fact that financial frictions amplify the impact of
uncertainty on consumption more than the counterparts on GDP in EMEs. To be more
concrete, provided that the financial frictions increase by 1 percentage points, consumption
experiences a 0.024 percent larger contraction in response a one-standard-deviation positive
uncertainty shock, while GDP declines by 0.012 percent more. This fact is different from
the existing studies in developed countries such as US, no matter empirical ones (Carrie`re-
Swallow and Ce´spedes, 2013; Mumtaz and Thedoridis, 2014) or quantitative (Cesa-Bianchi
and Fernandez-Corugedo, 2018; Bonciani and van Roye, 2016). It is also different from our
own regression results with respect to developed countries. The first three columns in Ap-
pendix A1.1 repeat the regressions of the same empirical specification without additional
controls using a sample of developed countries. The interaction term loses its significance in
the regression of detrended logarithm of consumption. However, we can see that at a high
level of financial frictions, greater uncertainty is associated with a larger decline in GDP,
but a higher increase in the ratio of consumption over GDP. It can be concluded that higher
the detrended logarithm of consumption and GDP as the dependent variable. The interaction of uncertainty
and financial development is also positive and significant, implying that consumption is more volatile than
GDP with higher levels of financial frictions.
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financial frictions appear to be associated with a lower response of consumption to uncer-
tainty shocks relative to that of GDP in developed countries, which is not only consistent
with the existing studies mentioned above, but also opposite to our empirical findings in
EMEs.
Let us go back to the regressions with respect to EMEs. The coefficient on the logarithm
of stock return volatility is weakly significant at the 10% level in the regression of real
consumption. Its absolute value is larger than the counterparts of real GDP in column 1.
As with the regression of the ratio between real consumption and GDP, the coefficients on
the uncertainty term are also negative and significant at the 5% level. These two findings
above imply that the impact of uncertainty on consumption is larger than that on output.
We use the estimation in column 5 as an instance. With a one-standard-deviation increase
in aggregate uncertainty, real consumption decreases by 1.11 percent, and the ratio of real
consumption to GDP decreases by 1.03 percentage points. Business cycle dynamics in EMEs
are characterized by the phenomenon called ”excess volatility of consumption puzzle” which
refers to the fact that private consumption is more volatile than output. Our empirical
finding indicates that the uncertainty shocks with poor financial development can partially
contribute to explaining this puzzling phenomenon.
1.4.2 Baseline Results: Durable and Nondurable Consumption
We propose durable consumption as a potential source to capture the amplification role of
financial frictions in propagating uncertainty shocks and generating a larger response of real
consumption than the counterparts of real GDP. Durable consumption expenditures, similar
to investment, respond much more to shocks, such as TFP and financial shocks, in the pres-
ence of higher financial frictions. There are also a series of literature that documents that
financial frictions can amplify the impact of uncertainty on investment on a large scale.17 A
natural inference is that financial frictions can significantly amplify the impact of uncertainty
shocks on durable consumption like real investment. In an attempt to test the role of durable
consumption, we conduct exercises on both durable and nondurable consumption with the
same empirical specifications. The question is similar: to what extent financial frictions can
amplify the impact of uncertainty on both durable and nondurable consumption?
Figure 1.3 presents some preliminary visual evidence. It shows the relationship between
aggregate uncertainty and durable and nondurable consumption (log and HP filtered) in the
17See Gilchrist et al.(2014) and Alfaro et al. (2018)
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This Figure shows the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and durable and non-
durable consumption. Both durable and nondurable consumption are in logarithm and
detrended by HP filter. We call the observations whose index of financial development is in
the upper quantile the high financial development group (Figure 1.3(b) and 1.3(d)) and the
observations whose index of financial development is in the lower quantile the low financial
development group (Figure 1.3(a) and 1.3(c)). The X-axis is the index of uncertainty
and the Y-axis represents durable (Figure 1.3(a) and 1.3(b)) and nondurable consumption
(Figure 1.3(c) and 1.3(d)). We exclude country- and time- fixed effects from uncertainty,
durable and nondurable consumption.
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Table 1.4
Benchmark Results
1 2 3 4
Dep-Var
Durable Nondurable Durable Nondurable
log(Volatility)*FD 0.057* 0.016* 0.058** 0.016†
(0.030) (0.0098) (0.028) (0.010)
log(Volatility) -1.65 -0.76 -1.86 -0.67
(1.41) (0.52) (1.70) (0.70)
FD 0.53* 0.15* 0.54** 0.15†
(0.28) (0.092) (0.27) (0.098)
CPI 0.094 -0.042
(0.17) (0.052)
RER 0.085** 0.014
(0.040) (0.016)
1st Dep-Val 0.68*** 0.59*** 0.68*** 0.57***
(0.053) (0.10) (0.055) (0.11)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-Step F-test 1 5.66 5.61 5.00 4.89
First-Step F-test 2 3.06 3.15 2.03 2.10
Hansen-J P-val 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.43
Observations 1,062 1,062 1,025 1,025
Group 17 17 17 17
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; † p < 0.15. Heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. This table presents
the results for IV estimations of the detrended logarithm of durable consumption and the detrended
logarithm of nondurable consumption. The empirical specification used is that: Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗
log(V olatility)i,t−1+β2∗log(V olatility)i,t−1∗FDi,t−1+β3∗FDi,t−1+ρYi,t−1+δ′Zi,t−1+It+Ii+εi,t.
The first two columns present the estimation results of the empirical specification without additional
controls and the rest apply the empirical specification with more controls. FD denotes one-year
lagged ratio of private credit by banks over GDP and log(Volatility) is the logarithm of one-quarter
lagged the average of quarterly standard deviation of stock daily returns and serves as the index of
uncertainty. Openness, CPI and RER denote Chinn-Ito financial openness, consumer price index
and real effective exchange rate respectively. The different number of observations between them
and GDP reflects the fact that durable and nondurable consumption data for some countries is not
available.
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low and high financial development groups, respectively. We can see that both durable and
nondurable consumption decline more in the low financial development group as the aggre-
gate uncertainty increases. In line with the regressions of GDP and consumption, we present
the results for empirical specifications with and without controls by applying IV estimation.
The results are shown in Table 1.4. The first two columns present the regressions of the
detrended logarithm of durable consumption and the detrended logarithm of nondurable
consumption without additional control variables, respectively. The rest two present the
regressions with additional controls. Also, we use the results of the OLS estimations as
robustness checks and we show them in the Appendix A1.3.
First, let us concentrate on the results with respect to durable consumption. We use col-
umn 3 as an example and can see that the estimator of the interaction term for IV estimations
is significant at the 5% level and larger than the estimators of the corresponding regressions
for both consumption and GDP.18 We find that the impact of uncertainty on durable con-
sumption will increase 0.058 percent with a 1 percentage point increase in financial frictions,
over 2 times that on consumption and 5 times that on GDP. At a higher level of financial
frictions, durable consumption declines more in response to uncertainty shocks than GDP.
Thus, durable consumption can help to explain the reason why real consumption declines
more than GDP under the interaction of uncertainty and financial frictions in EMEs. The
situations in developed countries are different. In the regressions with a sample of developed
countries, Column 4 in Appendix A1.1 shows that the estimators of interaction terms in the
regressions of durable consumption is not significant. This implies that financial frictions
don’t affect impact of uncertainty on durable consumption less than the counterparts on
GDP.
What about nondurable consumption? The significant estimators imply that financial
frictions also have a negative effect on the impact of uncertainty on nondurable consumption.
However, the coefficients on the interaction of uncertainty and financial development are
much smaller than the counterparts on durable consumption. Equivalently, financial frictions
play an important role in the impact of uncertainty on nondurable consumption as it does in
that on GDP, consumption and durable consumption in EMEs, but nondurable consumption
18To compare the different magnitudes of GDP and durable consumption, we can use the difference between
the detrended logarithm of durable consumption and GDP as the dependent variable. The interaction of
uncertainty and financial development is positive and significant, implying that durable consumption is more
volatile than GDP with higher levels of financial frictions. As with the difference between nondurables and
GDP, the interaction term is not significant. Besides, when we use OLS estimations, the difference between
the estimators of durable and GDP is significant at the 10% level.
22
is not that volatile as durable consumption.
1.4.3 Robustness
In this subsection, we conduct a series of empirical analyses to check whether our baseline
results are robust to alternative measures of dependent variables, financial development and
uncertainty.
Alternative Measure of Dependent Variables
In the baseline results, we remove the trend of the logarithms of time series data by HP-
filter to make them stationary. This subsection exploits another popular method, first order
differencing, to make variables stationary and then explore how financial frictions affect the
transmissions of uncertainty shocks in emerging countries.19 The first difference of the loga-
rithm is equal to the growth rate of the corresponding real activities. The estimation results
can reflect to what extent financial frictions amplify the transmission of uncertainty shocks
to the growth rate of real activities, such as GDP and consumption in emerging countries.
We expect that an increase in uncertainty is associated with a decline in the growth
rate and financial frictions can amplify this negative impact. A positive coefficient on the
interaction term is consistent with our predictions. Table 1.5 displays the effects of financial
frictions on the propagations of uncertainty shocks where Panel A applies OLS estimations
and Panel B IV strategy. IV strategy here works well as it passes the first-step F-test and
Hansen J test. We can see that all the coefficients on the interaction terms are positive
and (weakly) significant other than the one for durable consumption when IV strategy is
applied. Thus, larger uncertainty is associated with a larger decline in the growth rate
of real activities in emerging countries when financial systems become less developed. For
example, in column 1 in Panel B, If financial frictions increase 1 percentage points, GDP
growth rate will experience a 0.028 percentage point larger contraction in response to a
one-standard-deviation positive uncertainty shock.20
19While the objects of using HP filter and first-differencing are both to remove the trend of the logarithms of
time series data, the implications for the regressions of the two types of variables are quite different. When
using the detrended variables by HP filter as the dependent variables in our regressions, the estimations
reflects the interaction of uncertainty and financial frictions on the transitory change of real activities, such
as GDP. However, when first differencing is applied, the dependent variables denote the growth rate of the
corresponding real activities. The change in the growth rate implies a permanent impact.
20Visually, the coefficients of the interaction related to consumption and durable consumption are still
larger than the counterpart of GDP in the OLS estimations, as is same with the baseline results. However,
we can’t say that the interactions on consumption and durable consumption are larger than that on GDP
even if we use a dataset in which the available data for all countries are same.
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Table 1.5
Robustness: Alternative Measure of Dependent Variables
1 2 3 4
Panel A: OLS
GDP Consumption Durable Nondurable
log(Volatility)*FD 0.0085** 0.012** 0.029* 0.012**
(0.0030) (0.0053) (0.016) (0.0046)
log(Volatility) -0.61** -0.66* -1.69 -0.90***
(0.24) (0.37) (1.13) (0.31)
FD 0.065** 0.097* 0.23 0.10**
(0.029) (0.051) (0.16) (0.042)
1st Dep-Val 0.74*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.70***
(0.052) (0.028) (0.028) (0.046)
Country Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.75 0.63 0.68 0.66
Observations 1118 1118 989 989
Group 17 17 17 17
1 2 3 4
Pannel B: IV
GDP Consumption Durable Nondurable
log(Volatility)*FD 0.028** 0.050*** 0.040 0.033*
(0.013) (0.018) (0.049) (0.018)
log(Volatility) -2.02** -3.35** -1.64 -2.05*
(0.94) (1.71) (4.22) (1.11)
FD 0.25** 0.46*** 0.33 0.30*
(0.12) (0.17) (0.48) (0.17)
1st Dep-Val 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.74*** 0.67***
(0.023) (0.030) (0.030) (0.039)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-Step F-test 1 5.37 4.90 4.13 4.46
First-Step F-test 2 2.47 2.59 1.86 2.45
Hansen J P-value 0.73 0.65 0.19 0.85
R2 0.58 0.50 0.68 0.66
Observations 1118 1118 989 989
Group 17 17 17 17
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; † p < 0.15. Heteroscedastic-
ity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. The table
presents the IV estimators for the empirical models: Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 + β2 ∗
log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗FDi,t−1 +β3 ∗FDi,t−1 +ρYi,t−1 + δ′Zi,t−1 + It + Ii + εi,t. Panel A and Panel B
present the OLS and IV regression results respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level. The dependent variables are the growth rate of real GDP, consumption durable and non-
durable. FD denotes one-year lagged ratio of private credit by banks over GDP and log(Volatility)
is the logarithm of one-quarter lagged the average of quarterly standard deviation of stock daily
returns and serves as the index of uncertainty.
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Table 1.6
Robustness: Alternative Measure of Financial Development
1 2 3 4 5
Dep-Var
GDP Consumption C
Y
Durable Nondurable
log(Volatility)*FD 0.0032† 0.0064** 0.0019† 0.022*** 0.0051**
(0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0012) (0.0059) (0.0023)
log(Volatility) -0.24* -0.42** -0.083 -1.27** -0.41**
(0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.49) (0.14)
1st Dep-Val 0.72*** 0.62*** 0.91*** 0.66*** 0.55***
(0.053) (0.091) (0.020) (0.056) (0.11)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.75 0.55 0.97 0.60 0.46
Observations 944 944 944 895 895
Group 17 17 17 17 17
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; † p < 0.15. Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Here
FD is the ratio of private credit by banks over GDP in 1998 and the sample period is 2000-
2013. This table presents the OLS estimation results and applies the main empirical specifi-
cation: Yi,t = β0+β1log(V olatility)i,t−1+β2log(V olatility)i,t−1∗FDi,1998+ρYi,t−1+It+Ii+εi,t.
Errors are clustered at the country level. log(Volatility) is the logarithm of one-quarter lagged
the average of quarterly standard deviation of stock daily returns over the last four quar-
ters and serves as the index of uncertainty. The different number of observations between
GDP, durable and nondurable consumption reflects the fact that durable and nondurable
consumption data for some countries is not available.
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Alternative Measure of Financial Frictions
This paper focuses on how financial frictions affect the impact of uncertainty shocks on
real activities in emerging countries. An appropriate measure of financial frictions is crucial
to our regression results. In this subsection, we want to verify that the estimation result
does not only hold by the measurement of financial frictions used in the baseline analyses.
Here, we propose the level of financial development for each country in 1998 as the financial
development indicator for all periods after 1998 and see the effect of initial financial frictions
on the impact of uncertainty on each real activities across countries by using the sample
after 1998.21 The empirical specification without additional controls becomes
Yi,t = β0 +β1 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 +β2 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗FDi,1998 + ρYi,t−1 + It + Ii + εi,t
We repeat all the OLS regressions of the corresponding dependent variables in the baseline
estimations and the results are present in Table 1.6.
The estimation results are consistent with the baseline results with the new measure of
financial development. First, the coefficients on the interaction terms for GDP, consumption,
durable, and nondurable consumption are all positive and (weakly) significant, implying
the financial frictions can amplify the effects of uncertainty on real activities in emerging
countries. We use the regression of GDP as an example. If financial frictions increase 1
percentage points, the negative impact of uncertainty shocks on GDP will increase 0.0032
percent. Second, the interaction on the ratio of consumption over GDP is still positive
and keep its significance at the 15% level, which implies that financial frictions amplify the
transmission of uncertainty shocks to consumption more than that to GDP. Furthermore,
after decomposing consumption into durable and nondurable consumption, we find that
durable consumption will decline more than GDP in response to uncertainty shocks in a less
developed financial system, while the magnitude between the effects on GDP and nondurable
is smaller. Thus, we conclude that durable consumption is a potential candidate to explain
the puzzling empirical finding that real consumption declines more under the interaction of
uncertainty and financial frictions.
Alternative Measure of Uncertainty
To make sure that our results are robust to different measures of uncertainty, we perform our
last robustness check by replacing our primary measure with an alternative indicator: the
21We use the financial development indicator in 1998 because we can find all the countries’ financial
development in 1998.
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Table 1.7
Robustness: Alternative Measure of Uncertainty
1 2 3 4 5
Dep-Var
GDP Consumption C
Y
Durable Nondurable
log(Volatility)*FD 0.0091*** 0.018*** 0.0049* 0.048*** 0.0089*
(0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.010) (0.0045)
log(Volatility) -0.64** -1.68*** -0.59* -3.85*** -0.88*
(0.20) (0.27) (0.26) (0.73) (0.41)
FD 0.037** 0.074*** 0.026* 0.20** 0.036
(0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.057) (0.021)
1st Dep-Val 0.63*** 0.50*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.70***
(0.11) (0.19) (0.11) (0.017) (0.049)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.72 0.49 0.80 0.68 0.68
Observations 361 361 361 349 349
Group 8 8 8 8 8
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; † p < 0.15. Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Here
log(Volatility) is the quarterly volatility of daily percentage changes in bond yields and serves
as the index of uncertainty. This table presents the OLS estimation results and applies the
main empirical specification: Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 + β2 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗
FDi,t−1 + β3FDi,t−1 + ρYi,t−1 + It + Ii + εi,t. The reduced observations and groups indicate
that the index of uncertainty is not available for some countries.
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quarterly volatility of daily percentage changes in bond yields. The data for this indicator
is obtained from Baker et al. (2018) which in turn reply on GFD.
Also, we repeat all OLS estimations with this measure of uncertainty and Table 1.7 dis-
plays the regression results. They again evidently support our aforementioned arguments.
First, the estimators on the interaction terms for GDP, consumption and durable consump-
tion keep their significance under 1% confidence interval and are positive. These results con-
firm the prediction that financial frictions amplify the transmissions of uncertainty shocks to
real activities in emerging countries. For example, a one-percentage-point increase in finan-
cial frictions is associated with a 0.0091 percent decline in GDP in response to uncertainty
shocks (proxied by a one-standard-deviation increase in the quarterly volatility of daily per-
centage changes in bond yields). Second, we can see that the coefficients on the interaction
terms with respect to the ratio of consumption over GDP are positive and significant, which
further confirms the empirical finding that an increase in financial frictions is related to a
larger decline in consumption relative to GDP in response to uncertainty shocks. What’s
more, durable consumption is proposed as a potential candidate to understand this empiri-
cal finding. With a one-percentage-point increase in financial frictions, durable consumption
reduces by 0.048 percent in response to uncertainty shocks while the impact on nondurable
consumption is not significant.
1.4.4 Real Interest Rate Channel
Ferna´ndez and Gulan (2015) document that the countercyclical country interest rate is an
important characteristic of business cycles in emerging markets. Alvarez-Parra et al. (2013)
emphasize the interaction of countercyclical risk premium and durable goods as the key chan-
nel to explaining emerging market business cycle dynamics. The intuition is straightforward:
during economic expansion period, real interest rate is low and household borrows to finance
their investment as well as the durable goods expenditure. Such behaviors will generate a
large volatility of capital and durable good stock and eventually explain the excess volatility
of consumption. Moreover, it’s expected that financial development matters when lenders
decide the charged premium. In this subsection, we verify the hypothesis that financial fric-
tions strengthen the countercyclical response of interest rate to uncertainty shocks.
Table 1.8A shows the results. We can see the estimators of the interaction term and
uncertainty are jointly significant. The positive estimators of uncertainty imply that interest
rate will increase when uncertainty increases in EMEs. Furthermore, financial frictions can
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Table 1.8A
Interest Rate Channel I
1 2
Dep-Var: Interest Rate
log(Volatility)*FD -0.0096** -0.0089**
(0.0040) (0.0038)
log(Volatility) 1.29*** 1.21***
(0.37) (0.36)
FD -0.033 -0.022
(0.048) (0.046)
Openness -0.38**
(0.16)
CPI -0.053
(0.042)
RER -0.017
(0.013)
Country FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Observations 816 814
Adj −R2 0.86 0.86
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; † p < 0.15. Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. The
table presents the OLS estimators for the empirical models:
Yi,t = β0+β1log(V olatility)i,t−1+β2log(V olatility)i,t−1∗FDi,t−1+β3FDi,t−1+δ′Zi,t−1+It+Ii+εi,t
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are real in-
terest rate. FD denotes one-year lagged ratio of private credit by banks over GDP and
log(Volatility) is the logarithm of one-quarter lagged the average of quarterly standard de-
viation of stock daily returns and serves as the index of uncertainty. Openness, CPI and
RER denote Chinn-Ito financial openness, consumer price index and real effective exchange
rate respectively. The different number of observations between GDP and real interest rate
reflects the fact that interest rate data for some countries is not available.
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Table 1.8B
Interest Channel II
1 2 3 4
Panel A: Dep-Var
GDP Consumption Durable Nondurable
Interest -0.12* -0.21* -0.40* -0.10†
(0.066) (0.11) (0.19) (0.066)
log(Volatility)*FD 0.0023* 0.0030* 0.0076 0.0023†
(0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0060) (0.0015)
log(Volatility) -0.11 -0.25 -0.70 -0.24
(0.091) (0.21) (0.62) (0.20)
FD 0.021 0.031 0.045 0.018
(0.016) (0.020) (0.068) (0.021)
1st Dep-Val 0.71*** 0.61*** 0.63*** 0.53****
(0.040) (0.087) (0.066) (0.12)
Country & Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj −R2 0.78 0.56 0.59 0.60
Observations 816 806 737 737
1 2 3 4
Panel B: Dep-Var
GDP Consumption Durable Nondurable
log(Volatility)*FD 0.0034* 0.0049** 0.011† 0.0032*
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0064) (0.0016)
log(Volatility) -0.27** -0.50** -1.23** -0.38**
(0.12) (0.19) (0.57) (0.16)
FD 0.025 0.037 0.054 0.020
(0.016) (0.020) (0.063) (0.020)
1st Dep-Val 0.72*** 0.62** 0.64*** 0.53***
(0.040) (0.085) (0.064) (0.12)
Country & Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj −R2 0.78 0.55 0.59 0.49
Observations 816 806 737 737
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; † p < 0.15. Heteroscedasticity ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. Panel A presents the
OLS estimation results of the empirical model: Yi,t = β0+Interesti,t+β1∗log(V olatility)i,t−1+β2∗
log(V olatility)i,t−1∗FDi,t−4+β3FDi,t−4+ρYi,t−1+It+Ii+εi,t. Panel B present the OLS estimation
results of the empirical specification: Yi,t = β0 +β1 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 +β2 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗
FDi,t−4 + β3 ∗FDi,t−4 + ρYi,t−1 + It + Ii + εi,t. In this table, we construct a dataset where all data
are available. The main difference in observations comes from the fact that some data for interest
is missing.
30
amplify this impact as the estimators of interaction terms are negative. The results are con-
sistent with what we expect above. Financial frictions can strengthen the countercyclicality
of interest rate in response to uncertainty shocks. It can be concluded that interest rate is a
potential channel to explain the phenomenon that financial frictions amplify the impact of
uncertainty on durable consumption more than the counterparts on GDP. As for developed
countries, the insignificant estimator in column 6 of Appendix A1.1 implies that financial
frictions have little effect on the impact of uncertainty shocks upon real interest rate.
Further, we include interest rate in our regressions, which allows us to parse out the inter-
action of uncertainty and financial frictions conditional on this important channel. Specially,
we consider the following empirical specification:
Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 + β2 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗ FDi,t−4
+β3FDi,t−4 + αInteresti,t + ρYi,t−1 + It + Ii + εi,t
. Interesti,t denotes the real interest rate of country i in period t.
Table 1.8B shows the regression results. We can see, once interest rate is added in
the regressions, the estimators for the interaction term decrease or become insignificant,
which implies that interest rate is an important channel via which financial frictions affect
the transmission of uncertainty shocks in EMEs. The coefficients of real interest rate are
(weakly) significant and negative, implying that real interest rate has a negative impact on
GDP as well as other variables. For example, a one-percent increase in real interest rate
implies an almost 0.12 percentage change in GDP. Thus, if we exclude the impact of real
interest rate, financial frictions will affect the transmissions of uncertainty shocks in emerging
countries less. From the regression on real interest rate, we know that financial frictions can
strengthen the countercyclical response of real interest rate to uncertainty shocks. The
confluence of results reported in this table is thus consistent with the notion that changes
in interest rate are an important part of the mechanism through which financial frictions
amplify the impact of uncertainty.
1.4.5 Other Variables
In the arguments above, one important reason why we consider the durable consumption as
a candidate to explain our empirical findings is that durable consumption is as volatile as
investment. Thus, to support our arguments, it is necessary to check to what extent financial
frictions amplify the impact of uncertainty on investment. A series of literatures finds that
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uncertainty has a considerable negative impact on investment via financial friction channel
(e.g. Gilchrist et al. 2014; Carrie`re-Swallow and Ce´spedes 2013). In this subsection, we
check whether this argument holds using our own sample. What’s more, for consumption
and investment decline more than GDP under the interaction of uncertainty and financial
frictions in EMEs, a direct inference is that greater uncertainty is associated with an in-
crease in trade balance and financial frictions amplify the transmission of uncertainty shocks
to trade balance. Exercises will be conducted to test this inference in this subsection. Finally,
we construct a measure of leverage to explore how financial frictions propagate uncertainty
shocks to leverage ratio, for Ferna´ndez and Gulan (2015) show that the countercyclical lever-
age in EMEs is crucial to explain the interest rate channel.
The results are present in Table 1.9 where the first, middle, and last two columns show the
regressions of investment, trade balance, and leverage ratio, respectively. The regressions
of investment and trade balance apply IV estimations while the counterparts of leverage
use OLS estimations22. The first stage F-test and Hansen J p value suggest that the IV
strategy works well for the regressions of investment and trade balance. The results in this
table evidently support our conjectures. First, financial frictions can amplify the impact of
uncertainty on investment on a large scale23. In column 2, we can see that a 1 percentage
point increase in financial frictions leads to a 0.067-percentage-point decline in the impact of
uncertainty on real investment. Second, the coefficients on the interaction term is negative
and jointly significant with the positive coefficient on the interaction term, which implies that
uncertainty has a positive impact on trade balance and financial frictions can propagate
this positive effect in emerging economies. Finally, we find that leverage ratio becomes
higher in response to uncertainty shocks in emerging countries with a less developed financial
system, for the coefficients on the interaction term are negative and significant in the last
two regressions.
22When apply IV, we find that the estimations of leverage ratio can’t pass the first-stage F-test as well as
Sanderson-Windmeijer multivariate F test. Thus, we think that OLS estimations are more appropriate. In
addition, the 1-period lagged leverage ratio is not included in the regression results we present. However,
the regression results don’t change much other than that the coefficients on the interaction become smaller
and weakly significant under 10% confidence interval.
23Here we don’t show the results with respect to the ratio of real investment to GDP. However, the
coefficients on the interaction in that regression are still positive and significant under 1% confidence inter-
val, implying that financial frictions amplify the impact of uncertainty on real investment more than the
counterparts of GDP, like the case in real consumption and durable consumption.
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Table 1.9
Other Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dep-Var
Investment Investment Trade Balance Trade Balance Leverage Leverage
log(Volatility)*FD 0.062** 0.067*** -0.059*** -0.065*** -0.0025** -0.0025*
(0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.0011) (0.0012)
log(Volatility) -1.59 -2.63** 2.05 2.83* 0.11† 0.12
(1.41) (1.25) (1.53) (1.62) (0.070) (0.079)
FD 0.58** 0.62*** -0.056*** -0.62*** -0.035* -0.035*
(0.23) (0.021) (0.21) (0.20) (0.018) (0.019)
Openness -0.016 -0.098 0.0036
(0.23) (0.23) (0.041)
CPI 0.23*** -0.019** -0.0023
(0.081) (0.078) (0.0096)
RER 0.044 -0.11** 0.0010
(0.039) (0.047) (0.0025)
1st Dep-Val 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.65*** 0.71***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.026) (0.016)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-Step F-test 1 7.19 5.20 6.98 5.13
First-Step F-test 2 3.29 2.12 3.27 2.11
Hansen J P-Val 0.90 0.93 0.69 0.68
Observations 1171 1092 1171 1092 882 869
Group 17 17 17 17 17 17
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; † p < 0.15. Heteroscedastic-
ity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. The table
presents the IV estimators for the empirical models: Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 + β2 ∗
log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗ FDi,t−1 + β3FDi,t−1 + ρYi,t−1 + It + Ii + εi,t Regressions of investment and
trade balance apply IV estimations while those of leverage use OLS estimation. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. FD denotes one-year lagged ratio of private credit by banks over
GDP and log(volatility) is the logarithm of one-quarter lagged the average of quarterly standard
deviation of stock daily returns and serves as the index of uncertainty. Openness, CPI and RER
denote Chinn-Ito financial openness, consumer price index and real effective exchange rate respec-
tively. The different number of observations reflects the fact that data for some countries or periods
is not available.
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper documents that financial frictions play an important role in the transmission of
uncertainty shocks in emerging countries. We measure economic uncertainty and financial
development by the standard deviation of stock market returns and the ratio of private credit
by banks over GDP, respectively. Financial frictions can amplify the impact of uncertainty
on real consumption more than the counterparts on GDP in these countries. This empirical
finding is different from the situation in developed countries where financial frictions affect
the impact of uncertainty shocks on GDP more. Decomposing consumption into durable and
nondurable consumption, we find that financial frictions can amplify the negative impact of
uncertainty on durable consumption more than that on GDP but the impact on nondurable
consumption is not clear, which implies that durable consumption is a potential source
to explain our empirical finding. The countercyclical real interest rate is an important
characteristic of business cycles in emerging markets and we find that financial frictions can
strengthen the countercyclicality of real interest rate. During economy contraction periods
with a high level of uncertainty, interest rate is high and households save and reduce their
investment as well as the durable good expenditure. Such behaviors will generate a larger
decline in durable consumption relative to that in GDP in response to a positive uncertainty
shock and thus a relatively larger decline in consumption to that in GDP. These empirical
findings contribute to explaining the “excess volatility of consumption puzzle” as uncertainty
shocks are proved to be an important factor to account for the business cycles in emerging
economies.
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1.6 Appendix
Developed Countries
In this section we discuss the relationship between financial frictions and the transmissions
of uncertainty shocks in developed countries. As is same with the regression in emerging
countries, we measure uncertainty in each country using the realized aggregate stock market
volatility in that country during each quarter and financial development using the private
credit by banks over GDP. We still use detrended logarithm of real GDP, consumption,
durable and nondurable consumption by HP filter. Our sample includes 17 developed coun-
tries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Netherland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA. The empirical spec-
ification without additional controls and OLS method are applied.
Appendix A1.1 present the regression result with respect to developed countries. The
regressions of the detrended logarithm of GDP and consumption, the ratio of consumption
over GDP, the detrended logarithm of durable and nondurable consumption, and real in-
terest rate are displayed in turn from Column 1 to Column 6. We can see the interaction
doesn’t have a significant effect on GDP or consumption. This implies that countries with
less developed financial systems have a lower ratio of consumption to GDP in developed
countries, which is different from the situations in emerging countries.
After decomposing consumption into durable and nondurable consumption, we find that
the interaction term on durable is still not significant, implying that financial frictions have
little effect on the impact of uncertainty shock upon durable consumption. From the em-
pirical result above, we deduce that financial frictions mainly affect the transmissions of
uncertainty shocks via investment if we simply divide GDP into consumption and invest-
ment in developed countries. Real interest rate in developed countries is acyclical as usual.
We find that financial frictions has little association with the impact of uncertainty shocks
on interest rate.
In conclusion, the effect of financial frictions on the transmissions of uncertainty shock
in developed countries is quite different from that in emerging countries. Financial frictions
mainly affect the impact on investment and thus GDP in developed countries, while in
emerging countries, financial frictions can strengthen the countercyclical response of real
interest rate and thus make households save more and consume less durable goods. This
help to explain the empirical finding that greater uncertainty is related to a larger decline
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in consumption relative to that in GDP at a high level of financial frictions in EMEs and
contribute to interpreting the “excess volatility of consumption puzzle” in EMEs.
Appendix A1.1
Developed Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dep-Vars GDP Consumption C
Y
Durable Nondurable Interest
log(Volatility)*FD -0.00070 -0.0031 -0.0015 -0.0071 -0.0032* -0.016
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.00098) (0.011) (0.0016) (0.011)
log(Volatility) -0.084 0.0039 0.035 -0.15 0.017 0.48
(0.049) (0.065) (0.040) (0.37) (0.051) (0.55)
FD -0.0046 -0.016* -0.0063 -0.039 -0.016** -0.070
(0.0091) (0.0082) (0.045) (0.15) (0.0073) (0.052)
1st Dep-Val 0.76*** 0.77*** 0.95*** 0.72*** 0.76***
(0.040) (0.032) (0.016) (0.038) (0.041)
Country & Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329 1,329
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; † p < 0.15. Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. The
empirical specification is that Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 + β2 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗
FDi,t−1 + β3 ∗ FDi,t−1 + It + Ii + εi,t. The table presents the results of the regressions
by applying OLS estimations with a sample of developed countries. This sample includes
17 developed countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA.
From column 3, we can get that the ratio of consumption over GDP increase in response
to uncertainty shock and the increase in this ratio is higher with a less developed finan-
cial system. This implies that financial frictions can amplify the impact of uncertainty on
consumption less than that on GDP.
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Appendix A1.2
Benchmark Results-OLS
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dep-Var
GDP Consumption CY GDP Consumption
C
Y
log(Volatility)*FD 0.0036* 0.0049** 0.0024** 0.0031** 0.0047** 0.013***
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0041)
log(Volatility) -0.29* -0.42** -0.22** -0.25** -0.41** -1.03*
(0.14) (0.16) (0.076) (0.11) (0.17) (0.54)
FD 0.033* 0.046** 0.024** 0.027 0.041** 0.13***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.011) (0.015) (0.022) (0.040)
Openness 0.011 0.11 -0.012
(0.030) (0.95) (0.097)
CPI 0.0014 -0.033 0.012
(0.028) (0.032) (0.019)
RER 0.0049 0.031 0.010*
(0.013) (0.018) (0.0058)
1st Dep-Val 0.70*** 0.62*** 0.89*** 0.75*** 0.64*** 0.88***
(0.070) (0.082) (0.031) (0.032) (0.078) (0.024)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1286 1213 1213 1146 1134 1134
Group 17 17 17 17 17 17
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; † p < 0.15. Heteroscedastic-
ity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. The table
presents the OLS estimators for the empirical models: Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 + β2 ∗
log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗FDi,t−1 +β3FDi,t−1 + δ′Zi,t−1 +ρYi,t−1 + It+ Ii+εi,t. The first three columns
present the OLS estimation results without additional controls (capital account openness, infla-
tion and real exchange rate) and the rest three do with additional controls. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are the detrended logarithm of real GDP,
consumption and the ratio of real consumption over GDP. FD denotes one-year lagged ratio of
private credit by banks over GDP and log(Volatility) is the logarithm of one-quarter lagged the
average of quarterly standard deviation of stock daily returns and serves as the index of uncer-
tainty. Openness, CPI and RER denote Chinn-Ito financial openness, consumer price index and
real effective exchange rate respectively. The different number of observations between GDP and
consumption reflects the fact that consumption data for some countries is not available.
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Appendix A1.3
Benchmark Results-OLS
1 2 3 4
Dep-Var
Durable Nondurable Durable Nondurable
log(Volatility)*FD 0.015** 0.0041** 0.017** 0.0035**
(0.0060) (0.0016) (0.0068) (0.0016)
log(Volatility) -0.98* -0.37** -1.16** -0.33**
(0.47) (0.15) (0.49) (0.15)
FD 0.13** 0.038** 0.14** 0.031*
(0.053) (0.016) (0.062) (0.016)
CPI 0.044 -0.062
(0.18) (0.048)
RER 0.082 0.013
(0.042) (0.016)
1st Dep-Val 0.68*** 0.55*** 0.68*** 0.56***
(0.056) (0.10) (0.058) (0.12)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,062 1,062 1,025 1,025
Group 17 17 17 17
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1; † p < 0.15. Heteroscedastic-
ity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses. This table
presents the results for OLS estimations of the detrended logarithm of durable consumption and
the detrended logarithm of nondurable consumption. The empirical specification used is that:
Yi,t = β0 + β1 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 + β2 ∗ log(V olatility)i,t−1 ∗ FDi,t−1 + β3FDi,t−1 + δ′Zi,t−1 +
ρYi,t−1 + It + Ii + εi,t. The first two columns present the estimation results of the empirical spec-
ification without additional controls and the rest two apply the empirical specification with more
controls. FD denotes one-year lagged ratio of private credit by banks over GDP and log(Volatility)
is the logarithm of one-quarter lagged the average of quarterly standard deviation of stock daily
returns and serves as the index of uncertainty. Openness, CPI and RER denote Chinn-Ito financial
openness, consumer price index and real effective exchange rate respectively. The different number
of observations between them and GDP reflects the fact that durable and nondurable consumption
data for some countries is not available.
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Chapter 2
Social Trust and Corporate Responses
to Aggregate Uncertainty in
Emerging Countries
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2.1 Introduction
Social trust is a broadly defined concept, and it mainly reflects the extent to which others are
believed to be honest, upright and reliable. It is a “faith in people”. Since Putnam’s (1993)
contributions to the relationship between social capital1 and economic development, there
is a growing body of literature which considers the implication of social trust on economic
performance. Social trust works mainly via two functions: they reduce information asym-
metries and mitigate opportunistic behaviors (Arrow 1974; Flammer 2018). Both of these
two functions can lower the market frictions which arise due to the difficulties to enforce
contracts, which in turn affects the propagations of macroeconomic shocks.2 However, little
evidence has been provided about the link between social trust and macroeconomic shocks.
In this paper, we investigate whether social trust affects i) firms’ access to trade credit
under uncertainty in emerging market economies (EMEs) and ii) firms’ performance under
uncertainty in the context of profitability.3 We focus on uncertainty shocks in EMEs for two
reasons. First, the high level of uncertainty in EMEs4 has been increasingly recognized im-
portant in forecasting economic fundamentals.5 For example, Gourio et al. (2016) find that
aggregate uncertainty is negatively associated with GDP, consumption, investment, etc. The
existing studies demonstrate the impact of uncertainty from a macroeconomic perspective.
The effect of aggregate uncertainty at the firm level, however, is rarely discussed in these
countries. Next, emerging countries display less developed financial systems, which in turn
amplifies the impact of uncertainty shocks via the credit channel (e.g., Carrie`re-Swallow and
Ce´spedes 2013). Thus, the informal financing channel, such as trade credit, plays a vitally
important role in firms’ financial decisions in emerging countries. Social trust is critical for
firms’ incentives to extend trade credit. For instance, Wu et al. (2014) show that firms in
provinces with higher levels of social trust tend to provide more trade credit to their cus-
tomers in China. Social trust may affect the impact of uncertainty on firms’ performance
via the trade credit channel.
1In Putnam’s (1993) argument, the society with a high level of social capital has a greater social trust.
And a higher level of social capital is associated with a higher level of economic development.
2 For example, Gete and Melkadze (2018) find that the aggregate volatility (uncertainty) shocks can be
amplifies by a financial accelerator adopted from Bernanke et al. (1999).
3In this paper, firms’ profitability equals the ratio of earning before interest and taxes to total sales.
4Bloom (2014) documents that developing countries tend to have a higher level of uncertainty. The
concept of emerging and developing countries is not equal. But all the countries contained in our sample
belong to developing countries other than South Korea and Singapore.
5The transmissions of uncertainty shocks in EMEs are a little different from that in developed countries.
For example, Carrie`re-Swallow and Ce´spedes (2013) find that emerging countries suffer much more severe
falls in investment and private consumption in response to an exogenous global uncertainty shock compared
to the U.S. and other developed countries.
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Trade credit, allowing customers to purchase goods and service without immediate pay-
ments, plays a vital role in many forms of transactions. According to the estimations of
the Bank for International Settlements (2014), trade credit implements two-thirds of global
trade around the world. Based on the existing studies, the impact of uncertainty shocks on
trade credit is ambiguous. On the one hand, firms may receive trade credit because their
suppliers want to keep a long-lasting relationship with them (e.g., Cunat 2001) or to reduce
transaction costs (e.g., Ferris 1981). The strong relationship will become more valuable, and
the transaction cost will increase with an increase in aggregate uncertainty. If this is the case,
firms can receive more trade credit from their suppliers in response to uncertainty shocks.
On the other hand, the suppliers bear the risk that their customers will not be able to repay
the trade credit debt in the future. An increase in uncertainty will intensify the risk. This
implies that the suppliers will have fewer incentives to provide trade credit. The net im-
pact of uncertainty shocks on firms’ access to trade credit depends on which effect dominates.
No matter which effect works, higher levels of social trust will help firms to obtain more
trade credit under uncertainty. As with the former effect, firms in countries with higher
levels of trust can get more trade credit because their suppliers are more likely to think they
are trustworthy. For the latter effect, greater social trust can mitigate the suppliers’ concern
that their customers won’t comply with their promise, and thus, won’t reduce the provision
of trade credit that much. Combining the two arguments above, we predict that social trust
facilitates the use of trade credit when the aggregate economy suffers a positive uncertainty
shock.6
The use of trade credit, however, always involves general equilibrium effects. The neg-
ative impact of uncertainty on trade credit could be due to either suppliers’ unwillingness
to extend trade credit or customers’ decreasing demand for such credit. A lot of research
(e.g., Peterson and Rajan 1997) on trade credit presupposes that firms will take on any
credit offered to assume away this problem. Under this presupposition, the use of trade
credit will depend on the suppliers’ willingness. In our analyses, at first, we follow this
presupposition. Then, we relax this presupposition and assume that firms with relatively
high levels of liquidity needs will take on any credit offered. We infer that high-liquidity-
needs firms in countries with higher levels of social trust could receive more trade credit in
6 In some country with a very high level of social trust, firms’ trade credit received will even increase
because social trust can reduce the second effect in large amounts and increase the use of trade credit to
substitute formal channels.
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response to uncertainty shocks than similar firms in countries with lower levels of social trust.
We test our predictions by using a sample of firm-level data across 26 emerging countries
over the years from 1995 through 2013. We use the standard deviation of daily stock market
return as the index of uncertainty for the corresponding country. Following La Porta et al.
(1997), we measure social trust by computing the ratio of the respondents who think “most
people can be trusted” in response to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” in
the World Value Survey. This survey is conducted almost every five years after 1990. We
extend this data to annual frequencies by letting the yearly value of social trust be identical
to the value of the corresponding wave. In our empirical analyses, more firm-level charac-
teristics and country-level factors are controlled.
We find that the key term, the interaction of uncertainty and social trust, enters pos-
itively and is significant at the 1% level. This implies that firms use more trade credit if
they are in countries with higher levels of social trust with an increase in aggregate un-
certainty. It is meaningful to understand the economic magnitude. To see this, we con-
sider a hypothetical “low-trust” country with social trust equal to the 25% quantile (17.6)
and a hypothetical “high-trust” country with social trust equal to the 75% quantile (32.5).
With a one-standard-deviation increase in aggregate uncertainty, compared to firms in the
low-trust country, the growth rate of account payable experiences a 3.58-percentage-point
((32.5-17.6)*0.24) smaller contraction for firms in the high-trust country. This magnitude
(3.58) corresponds to 14.4% of the mean value of the growth rate (24.81). Building on this
analysis, we then explore whether the relationship between social trust and trade credit is
heterogeneous across industries. As trade credit is a type of short-term liquidity resource, its
impact should be more apparent in industries that highly depend on liquid funds. We follow
Raddatz (2006) to construct two measures of industry-level liquidity needs. We find that
no matter which measures of liquidity needs are used, social trust has a significantly larger
impact in the high-liquidity-needs industries. In detail, in the high-liquidity-needs group,
with a one-standard-deviation increase in aggregate uncertainty, the growth rate of account
payable experiences a 5.36-percentage-point smaller contraction for firms in the high-trust-
country. The economic magnitude is larger than that of firms in the low-liquidity-needs
group.
In addition to the informal financing channel, does social trust also encourage firms in
EMEs to obtain financing via the formal channel, such as issuing debt or equity in face
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of a positive uncertainty shock? To address this question, we compute the growth rate of
total debt and equity and use them as the dependent variables, respectively. We find that
social trust doesn’t have significant effects on firms’ access to equity or debt with an increase
in aggregate uncertainty. Even if we divide our sample into two subsamples based on the
industry-level liquidity needs, none of the coefficients on the interaction of uncertainty and
social trust are significant even at the 10% level. From this perspective, social trust mainly
affects firms’ performance through the trade credit channel rather than through raising more
debt or issuing more equity that depends more on formal legal arrangements.
Firms adjust their formal and informal finance to keep their excellent performance. De-
pending on the relationship between social trust and firms’ financing channel in EMEs, does
social trust also affect the impact of uncertainty on firms’ performance? We use firms’ prof-
itability as the representative to explore the relationship between social trust and firms’
performance in face of uncertainty shocks. We find that social trust can actually facilitate
firms’ profitability when the aggregate economy suffers an increase in uncertainty as expected.
Furthermore, consistent with the analyses on trade credit, firms in the high-liquidity-needs
group will benefit more from the higher level of social trust.
2.2 Literature Review
Our paper contributes to the literature studying the impact of social trust in economic life.
The literature can be divided into two parts: the impact of social trust from the macroe-
conomic perspective, such as economic development, and the impact on areas of corporate
finance. Our work belongs to the latter part. Levine et al. (2018) use the same measure
of social trust, but investigate its impact during banking crisis. They find that firms with
higher levels of liquidity dependence suffer small declines in employment and profit in the
presence of banking crisis, if they are in the high-trust countries, because they can get more
trade credit than the firms located in the low-trust countries. Lins et al. (2017) use a differ-
ent measure called corporate social responsibility (CSR) intensity and find that firms with
higher social capital had higher stock returns during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Different
from their view that social trust works during periods of crisis, we find that social trust can
affect the transmissions of uncertainty shocks in emerging countries. As for the relationship
between social trust and economic development, other than Putnam’s (1993) work we men-
tioned, La Parta et al. (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997) provide strong evidence that
trust and civil cooperation significantly affect aggregate economic activities.
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Our paper complements the recent emerging literature on the relationship between un-
certainty and corporate finance. Gulen and Ion (2016) use the economic policy uncertainty
(EPU) index from Baker et al. (2016) to document a strong negative relationship between
firm-level investment and aggregate uncertainty, and this negative relationship is even signif-
icant stronger for firms with higher irreversibility or government spending dependence. Kim
and Kung (2017) use economic and political events as shocks to economic uncertainty, and
find that firms with less re-deployable capital reduce investment more. This result still holds
if they use VIX or EPU instead. Nguyen and Phan (2017) and Bonaime et al. (2018) explore
the impact of aggregate uncertainty on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). They both find that
an increase in aggregate uncertainty will decrease activities related to M&A. We differ these
papers mainly from two perspectives. First, our research concentrates on emerging countries.
Second, we argue a new channel to affect the impact of uncertainty on corporate finance:
social trust.
2.3 Data
This paper focuses on the impact of social trust on the transmissions of uncertainty shocks in
emerging countries. Our sample countries include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Egypt,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippine, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela,
Vietnam, and South Africa. We choose these countries based on the following standards.
First, the country belongs to emerging countries according to Emerging Market Bond Index
(EMBI) operated by J.P. Morgan. Second, we can find its social trust in the World Value
Survey (WVS) for at least one wave. Third, the country selected contains at least five firms,
and each firm has at least three observations in the Compustat-Global. Fourth, we can find
the country’s index of uncertainty proxied by the yearly standard deviation of daily return
in Baker et al. (2018). Fifth, in this paper, we control for some country-level macroeconomic
variables, for example, the capitalization of the stock market, other than uncertainty and
social trust. Thus, we should find these country-level variables in the World Bank dataset
and Penn World Table. In this paper, we exclude China because a considerable number of
China’s publicly listed firms are state-own enterprises (SOEs) and they are highly regulated
by the government. Besides, some countries listed above don’t have the variable used in the
robustness check. We will describe these situations in detail in the section of robustness.
After choosing the countries we used in the sample, we then get the corresponding firm-
level data in the manufacturing sector (SIC 2000-3999) from the Compustat-Global. The
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sample of firms is restricted based on two standards. First, our sample periods extend from
1995 to 2013. Our sample starts in 1995 because one of our control variables, capital control,
begins in 1995. We restrict our sample by 2013 because the index of uncertainty ends in
2013. Second, to reduce the effects of possibly spurious outlines, we follow a conventional
procedure by eliminating the top and bottom 1% value of every firm-level variable, both de-
pendent and explanatory variables included, to clean the data and prevent extreme outliers
from driving the results.
In conclusion, the selection criteria end up with a sample of 5,336 firms, adding up to
47,877 firm-year observations. Each firm on average has almost nine observations.
2.3.1 Social Trust and Uncertainty Measure
We construct the measure of social trust based on the World Value Survey (WVS). The
WVS contains one thematic subsection called social capital, trust and organizational mem-
bership which aims to inspect “People’s beliefs, values and motivations” across countries
over 6 waves.7 Depending on the WVS, we construct the measure of social trust according
to the answer to the following survey question:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to
be very careful in dealing with people?
People who are selected to participate this survey choose one response from three possible
choices: i)Most people can be trusted; ii)You can’t be too careful in dealing with people;
iii)I have no answer. Following La Porta et al. (1997) and Levine et al. (2018), the index
of social trust within one country in the corresponding wave is measured by the ratio of
respondents whose answer is “Most people can be trusted” over the total respondents.
As our firm-level data is at the yearly frequency, we transform the measure of social trust
into annual ones to match the analyses. Given the view that there exists strong persistence
in social trust (e.g., Williamson 2000; Bilodeau and White 2016), we assume that the annual
value of social trust is identical to its value in the corresponding wave. For example, social
trust in 1998 for Argentina is equal to the value of social trust of the wave 1995-1998 in
Argentina. As is shown in Table 2.1, the mean and median of social trust are 23.3 and 24.48,
respectively, with a standard deviation of 11.16. Figure 2.1 shows the average value of social
7The 6 waves are 1981-1984, 1990-1994, 1995-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014.
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Table 2.1
Statistical Descriptions
Mean Min Max Median S.D.
Dependent Variable
growth of Account Payable (%) 24.81 -99.01 755.21 7.65 81.29
Account Payable
(changes)/Costs (%) 1.08 -97.29 52.39. 0.82 10.62
Debt growth (%) 22.41 -100 1328.69 2.34 102.23
Equity growth (%) 12.81 -66.82 431.31 0.33 45.10
Profitability (%) 7.61 -129.33 60.38 7.62 14.11
Independent Variables
social trust 24.56 3 52.1 23.3 11.24
uncertainty 0.015 0.0045 0.042 0.015 0.0055
Other controls
Size 7.67 2.67 15.87 7.10 2.77
Return on Asset 0.098 -0.27 0.37 0.097 0.085
Book Leverage 0.38 0 1.71 0.38 0.26
Inventory/Total Asset (%) 15.60 1.82 31.00 15.95 4.00
Cash Conversion Cycles 93.59 27.69 201.34 90.64 29.93
GDP per capita (log) 8.86 6.01 11.19 8.46 0.97
Financial Development 54.99 8.07 146.17 44.52 31.24
Stock Market Capitalization 68.60 0.41 250.71 61.69 44.22
Growth of Broad Money (%) 8.72 -123.90 56.53 8.83 11.29
Capital Control 0.72 0 1 0.88 0.29
Creditor Rights 2.08 0 4 2 0.69
Anti-self-dealing 0.58 0.08 1 0.58 0.18
trust for each emerging country in our sample. We can see there exist a substantial variation
of social trust across emerging countries. Among all emerging countries contained in our
46
Figure 2.1: Social Trust
This figure presents the average value of social trust for the 26 emerging countries covered
in our sample.
sample, Philippine has the low mean value of social trust, 5.89, whereas Vietnam has the
highest mean value of social trust, 50.7.
In our framework, the changes in uncertainty are the driving force for the adjustment of
corporate financial decisions and thus their outcome. An appropriate measure of uncertainty
is vitally important for our analyses. In some influential work (e.g.,Bloom 2009), stock
market volatility is thought as a suitable measure. This measure is simple and available for
a very long period, free of revisions and sample selections. Baker et al. (2018) show that
this measure is highly correlated other measures of both micro- and macro- level uncertainty,
including cross-sectional firm return, bond yield, exchange rate, and forecaster disagreement.
In emerging economy studies, this measure is also prevalent. Gourio et al. (2015) use this
measure and find that it hurts net capital inflows. In our benchmark analyses, we borrow the
data, cross-country realized stock return standard deviation, from Baker et al. (2018) which
in turn rely on Global Financial Data (GFD). Their data is at the quarterly frequency, and we
transform it into annual frequencies by computing the arithmetic mean of the corresponding
year for each country. We lag this annual index for one year. Table 2.1 reports that the
median and mean of uncertainty are both 0.015 with a standard deviation of 0.0055. In the
results we report, we normalize this index to 0 mean and unit standard deviation.
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2.3.2 Trade Credit Financing
In this paper, we want to emphasize the role of trade credit when the aggregate economy
suffers an increase in uncertainty. Our primary variable of interest is accounts payable (ap)
which captures the amount of services and goods the customer can receive in advance without
immediate payments. This variable is a stock entry on firms’ balance sheet and can be seen
as the total amount of trade credit firms obtain from their suppliers. Thus, the amount
of financing through trade credit equals the change in accounts payable during a particular
period (Levine et al. 2018). Firms’ financing through trade credit is positive if they obtain
more goods and services than the sum of what they pay and the pay-down of the stock
of account receivable, whereas it becomes negative otherwise. We scale firms’ trade credit
financing by the account payable at the beginning of the corresponding period, and use this
ratio as the dependent variable. We can understand this ratio as the growth rate of accounts
payable/trade credit received. The descriptive statistics of the growth rate of trade credit is
reported in Table 2.1. We can see that the median and mean of the growth rate are 7.7%
and 24.8%, respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.81.
2.3.3 Other Firm-level Variables
Trade credit is often thought of as an informal type of firms’ financing. In this paper, to
further understand the impact of social trust on firms’ financing behaviors when they are in
face of an increase in uncertainty, we also examine two measures of formal financing, issuing
debts and equity. As with the former variable, we calculate the total amount of debt by
adding short-term debt (dlc) and long-term debt (dltt). These two items are also stock en-
tries on firms’ balance sheet. To be consistent with our analyses on trade credit, we use the
changes in total debt scaled by the total debt at the beginning of the corresponding period,
i.e., the growth rate of total debt, as the dependent variable. The descriptive statistics of
this variable are reported in Table 2.1. The median and mean values of the growth rate of
total debt are 2.34% and 22.42%, respectively, with a standard deviation of 1.02. As with
equity issuance, we construct it based on Baker et al. (2003). First, we compute the stock
of equity issued by adding the common/ordinary equity (ceq) and deferred taxes (txdb) but
minus retained earnings (re). The new issuance of equity thus equals the changes of the
stock during one period. Still, in line with trade credit and debt, we scale the new equity
issuance by the stock value of equity at the beginning of the corresponding period. The
new dependent variable is the growth rate of equity issued in essence. We also summary
this dependent variable in Table 2.1. The mean and median values are 0.33% and 12.81%,
respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.45.
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Firms adjust their financing behaviors to foster their outcome or performance. To explore
whether social trust plays a vital role in the impact of uncertainty on firms’ performance,
we use firms’ profitability as a representative of firms’ performance. Here, we follow the
common practice to define firms’ profitability as the ratio of earnings before interest and
taxes (ebit) over total sales (sale). We repeat the regressions by using this ratio as the
new dependent variable. The mean and median values of this ration are both 7.6%, with a
standard deviation of 0.15, as is reported in Table 2.1.
Several time-varying firm-level characteristics are considered to have impacts on firms’
incentives to offer trade credit, debt and equity issuing, and thus firms’ profitability. Hence,
these variables should be included as controls in all regressions. First, firms with different
sizes may have different financing strategies, and thus the trade credit received is affected.
We control for firms’ size which is measured by the logarithm of total assets (at). Second,
we also include return on assets to capture firms’ differences in generating earnings and
implementing efficient management. It is measured by the ratio of operating income before
depreciation (oibdp) to total assets. Third, to control for the effect of firms’ capital structures
on trade credit, we include the book leverage ratio in our regressions. Here we follow Alfaro
et al. (2018). It is computed by the ratio of the total debt (the sum of short-term debt (dlc)
and long-term debt (dltt)) to the sum of total debt and common/ordinary equity (ceq). The
statistical descriptions of these controls are also present in Table 2.1.
2.3.4 Industry-level Liquidity Needs
In our central part of analyses, we build on our benchmark results to test an additional
implication that the impact of social trust is heterogeneous across different industries with
different external liquidity needs. Some industries rely on liquid funds more due to some
technical reasons, such as the long production process. Durable good sectors usually have
higher levels of reliance on the availability of liquid funds than the nondurable sectors. Firms
in those industries with relatively high levels of external liquidity needs may have higher de-
mands for trade credit from their suppliers, and thus social trust may have more substantial
impacts.
We follow Raddatz (2006) and use the data from Compustat-U.S. to construct the mea-
sure of liquidity needs. We use U.S. data because the U.S. has one of the most developed
markets in the world, and the variation in liquidity needs across industries mainly reflects
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the technical differences in demands for liquid funds (Rajan and Zingales 1998). In our
analyses, we proxy liquidity needs by the ratio of inventories (invt) to total sales (sale). The
construction process is as follows. First, we calculate the sum of firms’ inventories and sales
over the relevant periods, and then computes the ratio of inventories to total sales. Second,
we use the median level of the distribution of this ratio within the corresponding industry
as the industry-level liquidity needs. In this paper, we divided manufacturing firms into 127
industries based on the three-digit SIC code. In our exercise, we restrict the sample from
1979 to 1995 because the sample we use in the regressions starting from 1995. If the sample
is extended to 2013 and we construct the measure following the same procedures, we find
that the former measure is highly correlated with the latter one. The summary statistics
of industry-level liquidity needs are reported in Table 2.1. The mean and median values of
this variable are 0.16 and 0.17, respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.04. The industry
group, newspapers: publishing or publishing and printing (SIC code 271) has the lowest
value of liquidity needs, 0.018, whereas the industry group, musical instruments (SIC code
391) depends on liquid fund most with the highest liquidity needs, 0.31.
There is a concern that our results are just driven by the particular measure of industry-
level liquidity needs we use. To address this concern, we follow Richards and Laughlin (1980)
to construct another measure of industry-level liquidity needs, the cash conversion cycles, to
check the robustness of our results in our analyses. This measure corresponds to the sum of
the average age of inventories, the average age of accounts payable, and minus the average age
of accounts payable (inventories (invt)/cost of goods sold (cogs)*365 + accounts receivable
(rect)/sales (sale)*365 - accounts payable (ap)/cost of goods sold (cogs)*365). Richards and
Laughlin (1980) document that this measure reflects the periods one firm needs to convert
a dollar of cash disbursements back into a dollar of cash inflow from its regular course of
operations. The longer the time is required, the more one firm depends on liquid funds.
The cash conversion cycles are highly correlated with the ratio of inventories over total sales
(corr(cycles, ratio) = 0.87). The mean and median time to convert the cash disbursement
is 93.6 and 90.6 days, respectively, with a standard deviation of 39.9. The industry group,
petroleum refining (SIC code 291), has the lowest cash conversion time, 27.7 days,8 whereas
the industry group, musical instruments (SIC code 391), needs 201.3 days to convert a
8The corresponding ratio of inventories over total sales for petroleum refining industry is 0.086, ranking
10th among all the 127 manufacturing industry groups. Thus, we can say that petroleum still belongs to
the low liquidity need industry in term of the ratio of inventories to total sales. At the same time, The
industry group, newspapers: publishing or publishing and printing (SIC code 271), needs 34 days to convert
a dollar of cash disbursements back into a dollar of cash inflow. This time periods rank 5th among all the
127 industry groups, implying that the corresponding industry belongs to the low liquidity need industry in
term of the cash conversion cycle.
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dollar of cash disbursements back into a dollar of cash inflow. Thus, the musical instrument
industry is the one depending on liquidity most, whether from the perspective of the ratio of
inventories over sales, or the cash conversion cycle. Finally, in the Appendix, we use another
measure, the ratio of short-term debt (dlc) to total sales (sales), to recheck the robustness
of our results. This measure captures one firm’s ability to pay its current liabilities out of
ongoing income.
2.3.5 Country-level Controls
In this paper, the main concern of our analyses is that our results may just capture the
aggregate time trend that is common to all firms in the corresponding country but poten-
tially affect the trade credit received. For instance, firms may receive more trade credit if
the financial markets of the corresponding country become loosen. To address this omitted
variable bias concern, we control for possible lurking macroeconomic factors that may affect
firms’ access to trade credit explicitly. First, to control for the impact of economic devel-
opment, we add the natural logarithm of time-varying GDP per capita in the regressions.
GDP per capita equals real GDP divided by population according to its definition. We
obtain the latter two variables from the Penn World Table 9.0.9 Second, A large body of
financial literature documents that the development of financial intermediaries and markets
is vitally important for firms’ financing behaviors as well as economic performance (e.g.,
Levine et al. 2000 and Hsu et al. 2014). We add two variables denoting the development
of financial institutions and stock market respectively in our regression equations. The fi-
nancial institution development is indexed by the ratio of private credit by banks and other
financial institutions over GDP, while the stock market development is indexed by stock
market capitalization divided by GDP. Third, we use the growth of liquid liability (broad
money) to denote countries’ time-varying liquid conditions. Those variables mentioned in
the second and third steps come from Global Financial Development operated by the World
Bank. Finally, our research concentrates on the interaction of social trust and uncertainty in
emerging countries. These countries usually implement capital control policies to restrict the
cross-border free capital flow. Thus, we control for the factor representing capital controls.
This variable is from Fernandez et al. (2016). The summary statistics of the macroeconomic
variables are reported in Table 2.1. Some literature shows that country-level characteris-
tics can also affect the transmissions of macroeconomic shocks. For example, Aghion et al.
(2009) provide some evidence that the level of financial development affects the impact of
real exchange rate volatility on productivity growth. To isolate their impacts on the trans-
9Real GDP here refers the expenditure-size real GDP at chain PPPs.
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missions of uncertainty shocks, we interact the proxy for uncertainty with the country-level
characteristics to see whether our results are robust.
Besides the country-level variables mentioned above, one concern in our analysis is that
the high-level social trust may be just a result of the high economic quality, effective legal
systems in enforcing contracts, high trust in government or the good protection of creditors
and shareholders. To exclude the impact of these factors, we should add the interaction
of uncertainty with the overall level of economic institution, the effectiveness of the legal
system in enforcing contracts, the level of people’s confidence in their government, and the
degree to which the formal legal system protects creditors and shareholders in our robustness
check analyses, respectively. The country-level variables mentioned above are obtained from
various sources. The overall level of economic institution comes from Kuncˇicˇ (2014). The
index of the legal system is obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicator operated by
the World Bank. We construct people’s confidence according to WVS from the answer to
the following question:
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence,
not very much confidence or none at all?
We use the ratio of the respondents whose answers are “a great deal of confidence” or
“quite a lot of confidence” to the total respondents as the measure of people’s confidence
in the government. The creditor rights index is constructed by Djankov et al. (2007)
based on countries’ bankruptcy and reorganization law, and it can reflect the degree to
protect creditors from the perspectives of opinion voicing, getting repaid and affecting the
reorganization. The anti-self-dealing index is a measure reflecting the extent to which the
legal systems can protect minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders.
We obtain this index from Djankov et al. (2008).
2.4 Empirical Strategy
This section presents our baseline analyses. We start by examining whether social trust
affects the transmission of uncertainty shocks via the trade credit channel in EMEs. We also
exploit industry-level liquidity needs to check the heterogenous effects of social trust. Next,
we provide four robustness checks to our baseline results. Third, we extend our analyses
to two formal credit channels: debt and equity. Finally, we use firms’ profitability as the
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representative to test how social trust affects firms’ performance under aggregate uncertainty.
2.4.1 Social Capital, Aggregate Uncertainty and Trade Credit Fi-
nancing
Existing studies show that uncertainty shocks have large impacts on firms’ performance.
For example, Gulen and Ion (2016) find a strong negative relationship between economic
policy uncertainty and firm-level investment. These negative effects can be mitigated by
asset re-deployability (Kim and Kung 2017). Besides, Lins et al. (2017) document that
firms with greater social trust suffer smaller drops in stock return, profitability, growth, and
sales per employee during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. In this subsection, we combine the
discussions of social trust and uncertainty shocks together, and test how social trust affects
the transmissions of uncertainty shocks to firms’ trade credit in emerging countries. The
main empirical specification is as follows:
tcgri,c,t = β0 + β1 ∗ Trustc,t ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + β2 ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1
+β3 ∗ Trustc,t + γ ∗ Firmi,t + δ ∗Macroc,t + ui + ut + i,c,t (1)
where tcgri,c,t refers to the growth rate of trade credit received by firm i, in country c, during
period t; Trustc,t represents the value of social trust in emerging country c over the period t;
and Uncertaintyc,t−1 is the index of uncertainty measured by the standard deviation of daily
stock market return for country c in the period t− 1. Firmi,t denotes a set of time-varying
firm characteristics, such as firm size, in the corresponding period. Macroc,t is a vector
of time-variant country-level variables (e.g., GDP per Capita, Financial Development and
Capital Account Openness).
Time fixed effects, ut, are included in the regressions to capture the global time trend that
is common to all firms but potentially affects firms’ access to trade credit. For instance, firms
are less likely to receive trade credit from the multinational suppliers in response to a global
contraction shock, such as US monetary recession shocks. Lin and Ye (2018) provide robust
evidence that global liquidity shocks can affect firms’ incentives to provide trade credit to
their customers even if there exist tight capital controls. Meanwhile, we also include firm
fixed effects (ui) to control for time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics which may
influence firms’ ability to receive trade credit. For example, The firms in our sample come
from different emerging countries, and various countries have various legal systems which can
affect the implementation of the trade credit contract. Firms from countries with imperfect
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Figure 2.2: Social Trust, Uncertainty and Trade Credit
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This Figure shows the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and trade credit received.
We use the total sample and calculate the country-year mean of firm size, return on asset,
book average and the trade credit growth rate. We call the country-year observations
whose social trust is in the upper quantile the high trust countries (Figure 2.2(b)) and
the observations whose social trust is in the lower quantile the low trust countries (Figure
2.2(a)). The X-axis is the index of uncertainty and the Y-axis represents trade credit. We
exclude firm size, return on asset, book leverage, macroeconomic vectors, country- and
time- fixed effects from uncertainty and trade credit received.
legal systems are likely to receive less trade credit from their suppliers. For example, Li,
Zhou, Du and Zhao (2018) find that sound legal systems facilitate the provision of trade
credit significantly in emerging economies. Furthermore, to exclude the effects of law on the
transmissions of uncertainty shocks, we add the interaction of uncertainty and the rule of law
to check the robustness. This will be discussed in detail in the robustness check. Standard
errors are clustered at the country level in our baseline analyses. If we cluster standard errors
at the country and year level, our results keep their significance. We present the results in
Appendix A2.1.
We are interested in the interaction term of uncertainty and social trust, Trustc,t ∗
Uncertaintyc,t−1. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term, β1, captures the differ-
ential responses to positive uncertainty shocks for firms from countries with different levels
of social trust. We expect that social trust facilitates firms’ access to trade credit during
periods of high uncertainty. Thus, a positive coefficient, β1, supports our prediction.
We first present some preliminary visual results in Figure 2.2. We construct two sub-
samples. One is the high-trust group whose social trust is in the upper quantile, whereas
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Figure 2.3: Social Trust, Uncertainty and Trade Credit
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High Social Trust Countries
This Figure shows the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and trade credit received.
We divide our sample into two subsamples based on industry-level liquidity needs. The
observations whose liquidity needs are above the median are assigned into the high-liquidity-
needs group and others are in the low-liquidity-needs group. For each group, we calculate
the country-year mean of firm size, return on asset, book average and the trade credit growth
rate. We call the country-year observations whose social trust is in the upper quantile the
high trust countries (Figure 2.3(b) and 2.3(d)) and the observations whose social trust is in
the lower quantile the low trust countries (Figure 2.3(a) and 2.3(c)). The X-axis is the index
of uncertainty and the Y-axis represents trade credit. We exclude firm size, return on asset,
book leverage, macroeconomic vectors, country- and time- fixed effects from uncertainty and
trade credit received.
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Table 2.2
Benchmark Results
Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.24*** 0.39*** 0.12** 0.33*** 0.17***
(0.065) (0.099) (0.056) (0.093) (0.056)
Uncertainty -6.67*** -9.50*** -4.50** -8.32*** -5.38***
(2.14) (3.22) (1.72) (2.96) (1.75)
Trust -0.16 -0.036 -0.32** 0.042 -0.37**
(0.14) (0.19) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13)
Fixed Effect
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 47,782 24,133 23,649 24,834 22,948
Firms 5,323 2,714 2,609 2,790 2,533
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
F-stat(βH − βL = 0) 9.48*** 4.55**
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents the
regression results of the empirical specification: tcgri,c,t = β0+β1∗Trustc,t∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+
β2 ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + β3 ∗ Trustc,t + γ ∗ Firmi,t + δ ∗ Macroc,t + ui + ut + i,c,t, where
tcgri,c,t refers to the growth rate of account payable by firm i, in country c, during period
t; Trustc,t represents the measure of social trust in emerging country c over the period t;
and Uncertaintyc,t−1 is the index of uncertainty measured by the standard deviation of daily
stock market return for country c in the period t− 1. Firmi,t denotes a set of time-varying
firm characteristics such as firms’ size in the corresponding period. Macroc,t is a vector
of time-variant country-level variables (e.g. GDP per Capita, Financial Development and
Capital Account Openness). ui and ut are firm- and time- fixed effects respectively. Column
(i) presents the results on the full sample. Column (ii) and (iv) show the results on the
high-liquidity-needs group, and Column (iii) and (v) show the results on the results on the
low-liquidity-needs group. Here, the high group means that the ratio of inventories over sales
or the cash conversion cycle is above the median. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses.
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the other is the low-trust group whose trust is in the lower quantile. Figure 2.2(a) presents
the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and the country-year mean of trade credit
financing in the low-trust group, and Figure 2.2(b) presents the high-trust group. We can
see that in the low-trust group, trade credit declines more as uncertainty increases, which is
in line with our conjecture.
The estimation result is shown in the first column of Table 2.2. We can see that the
coefficient on the interaction of uncertainty and social trust is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level. That is to say, with an increase in aggregate uncertainty, firms use
more trade credit if they are in emerging countries with higher levels of social trust. A lot
of literature has documented that country-specific characteristics, such as financial develop-
ment and capital account openness, can affect the transmission of macroeconomic shocks.
To isolate the effects of these country characteristics, we interact the index of uncertainty
with these variables, and add them in equation (1). The result is present in the Appendix
A2.2. Adding those interactions doesn’t alter the sign and significance of the coefficient on
the interaction term of uncertainty and social trust. For a similar reason, we also add the
interactions of uncertainty and firm-level controls in equation (1) to exclude the impact of
firm-level characteristics, such as firm size. The benchmark result still holds, and we show
these results in the Appendix A2.3.
It is meaningful to understand the economic magnitude. To see this, we consider a
hypothetical “low-trust” country with social trust equal to the 25% quantile (17.6) and a
hypothetical “high-trust” country with social trust equal to the 75% quantile (32.5). With a
one-standard-deviation increase in the index of uncertainty (proxied by the one-year lagged
yearly standard deviation of the daily stock return), compared to firms in the low-trust coun-
try, firms in the high-trust country suffers a 3.58-percentage-point ((32.5-17.6)*0.24) smaller
contraction in the growth rate of account payable. This magnitude (3.58) corresponds to
14.4% of the mean value of the growth rate (24.81).
Building on the regression result of equation (1), we then test additional implications of
the point that social trust facilitates firms’ access to trade credit when they suffer uncer-
tainty shocks. Under this view, the impact of social trust on the transmission of uncertainty
shocks is disproportionate. Firms which need more liquid funds will benefit more from the
greater social trust. We test this prediction following three steps. First, we define the level
of liquidity needs as the ratio of inventories scaled by total sales. We construct an industry-
level index of liquidity needs following Raddatz (2006). Next, we divide the observations in
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our sample into two groups according to the index of industry-level liquidity needs. We call
the group whose liquidity needs are above the median level the high-liquidity-needs group
and the other group the low-liquidity-needs group. Third, we repeat the regression of equa-
tion (1), and see whether the coefficient on the interaction term, β1, of the high group is
significantly larger than that of the low group. To see whether our result is robust to a dif-
ferent measure of liquidity needs, we construct another measure, the cash conversion cycles,
henceforth CCC, also following Raddatz (2006). The group with higher CCC needs more
liquid funds. Then we repeat all the three steps described above. A larger coefficient on the
interaction term, β1, for the group with higher CCC is consistent with our prediction.
Also, we present some preliminary visual results in Figure 2.3. First, we divide our
sample into two groups based on industry-level liquidity needs.10 The observations whose
liquidity needs are above the median are assigned into the high-liquidity-needs group, and
others are in the low-liquidity-needs group. For each group, we construct two subsamples.
One is the high-trust group whose social trust is in the upper quantile, whereas the other
is the low-trust group whose trust is in the lower quantile. Figure 2.3(a) shows the rela-
tionship between aggregate uncertainty and trade credit for the group with high trust and
high liquid needs, figure 2.3(b) for the group with low trust and high liquid needs, figure
2.3(b) for the group with low trust and low liquid needs, and figure 2.3(d) for the group
with high trust and low liquid needs. We can see for the high-liquidity-needs group, firms in
the high-trust countries obtain more trade credit than similar firms in the low-trust countries.
We show the regression results in the last four columns of Table 2.2. In column (ii) and
(iii), we use the ratio of inventories to sales as the index of liquidity needs. They provide the
results of the high-liquidity-needs group and the liquidity needs group, respectively. Column
(iv) and (v) use CCC to index liquidity needs. Column (ii) and (iv) show that the coeffi-
cients on the interaction of uncertainty and social trust are positive and statistically at the
1% level among firms in the high-liquidity-needs group. This positive relationship between
social trust and trade credit financing during periods of high uncertainty holds for either
index of liquidity needs. We use the result in column (ii) as an example and still consider
the firms in the low-trust and high-trust countries. When the aggregate economy experiences
a one-standard-deviation increase in aggregate uncertainty, high-liquidity-needs firms in the
high-trust country experiences a 5.81-percentage-point ((32.5-17.6)*0.39) smaller contrac-
tion than similar firms in the high-trust country. Furthermore, we find that the coefficients
on the interaction term in the low-liquidity-needs group are smaller than those in the high-
10In Figure 2.3, we use the ratio of inventories to total sales as the measure of liquidity needs.
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liquidity-needs group. The F-statistics imply that the coefficients on the interaction term
between the two groups are significantly different at the 5% level. This finding is consistent
with our prediction that firms which need more liquid funds benefit more from greater social
trust in face of uncertainty shocks.
If we use the ratio of short-term debts to total sales as the measure of liquidity needs,
our results still hold. We present them in the Appendix A2.4.
2.4.2 Robustness
In this section, we provide some sensitivity analyses to see whether our results are robust,
if we add the interaction of uncertainty with some other country characteristics and use an
alternative measure of uncertainty.
Other Channels
We come across several challenges to identify the impact of social trust on the propagations
of uncertainty shocks to firms’ access to trade credit. The first one is that the high social
trust may be just a result of good economic institutions, effective legal systems in enforcing
contracts, high trust in government, or the good protection of creditors and shareholders.
If this is the case, our results may just reflect the impact of the other country-level charac-
teristics which affect the transmissions of uncertainty shocks. To address this concern, we
control for the interaction of uncertainty and the overall level of economic institution, the
effectiveness of the legal system in enforcing contracts, the level of people’s confidence in
their government, and the degree to which the formal legal system protects creditors and
shareholders, respectively. We use the following empirical specification:
tcgri,c,t = β0 + β1 ∗ Trustc,t ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + β2 ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + β3 ∗ Trustc,t
+β4 ∗ CCc,t ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + γ ∗ Firmi,t + δ ∗Macroc,t + ui + ut + i,c,t (2)
where CCc,t ∈ {Institutionc,t, Lawc,t, GovTrustc,t, CRc, AntiSelfc}. Institutionc,t is the
overall level of country c’s economic institution in period t. Lawc,t measures the effective-
ness of the legal system in enforcing contracts in the country c during the year t. GovTrustc,t
represent people’s confidence in their government in year t for country c. CRc denotes the
strength of the legal rights of creditors. AntiSelfc reflects the degree to which the legal
systems protects small investors from self-dealing by corporate insiders. Other variables are
the same as those in equation (1).
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Table 2.3
Additional Controls I
Panel A: Institution Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.32*** 0.49*** 0.21** 0.46*** 0.21**
(0.088) (0.12) (0.075) (0.12) (0.081)
Uncertainty -10.24*** -14.44*** -7.46*** -14.18*** -7.13**
(3.42) (5.02) (2.51) (4.81) (2.33)
Trust -0.16 0.080 -0.46** 0.12 -0.49***
(0.20) (0.29) (0.16) (0.30) (0.15)
Uncertainty*Institution 0.17 0.033 0.28*** 0.12 0.20*
(0.12) (0.16) (0.092) (0.15) (0.098)
Institution -0.46* -0.46 -0.49** -0.32 -0.62**
(0.24) (0.36) (0.20) (0.37) (0.23)
Observations 34,723 17,426 17,297 17,910 16,813
Firms 4,628 2,348 2,280 2,407 2,221
R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
F-Stat(βH − βL = 0) 7.95*** 7.00***
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table uses the
following empirical empirical specification: tcgri,c,t = β0 + β1 ∗ Trustc,t ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 +
β2∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+β3∗Trustc,t+β4∗CCc,t∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+γ∗Firmi,t+δ∗Macroc,t+ui+
ut + i,c,t, where CCc,t ∈ {Institutionc,t, Lawc,t, GovTrustc,t, CRc, AntiSelfc}. Institutionc,t
is the overall level of country i’s economic institution in period t. Lawc,t measures the
effectiveness of the legal system in enforcing contracts in country c during year t. GovTrustc,t
represent people’s confidence in their government in year t for country c. CRc denotes the
the strength of the legal rights of creditors and AntiSelfc reflects the degree to which the
legal systems protects small investors from self-dealing by corporate insiders. Other variables
are same with those in Table 2.2. The column order of the regressions is same with those in
Table 2.2. Column (i) provides the results on the full sample, column (ii) and (iv) provide
the results of the high-liquidity-needs group, and column( iii) and (v) show the results of
the low-liquidity-needs group. In panel A, we include the interaction of uncertainty and the
overall level of economic institution to exclude the impact of institutional quality. Panel B
exclude the impact of the effectiveness of the legal systems, Panel C the impact of people’s
confidence in their government, Panel D the impact of creditor right protections and Panel
E the impact of the protection on shareholders. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.3 (Continue)
Additional Controls II
Panel B: Law Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.24*** 0.37*** 0.12* 0.33*** 0.15**
(0.065) (0.088) (0.063) (0.085) (0.065)
Uncertainty -6.54*** -9.27*** -4.36** -8.08*** -5.16**
(2.10) (2.72) (1.99) (2.59) (2.03)
Trust -0.096 0.036 -0.25 0.16 -0.35*
(0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.25) (0.19)
Uncertainty*Law 0.039** 0.058*** 0.022 0.055*** 0.024
(0.018) (0.014) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018)
Law 0.0034 0.045 -0.034 0.036 -0.023
(0.059) (0.071) (0.062) (0.066) (0.062)
Observations 43,519 22,024 21,495 22,693 20,826
Firms 5,266 2,688 2,578 2,765 2,501
R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
F-Stat(βH − βL = 0) 10.60*** 5.84**
Panel C: Government Trust
Uncertainty*Trust 0.22*** 0.36*** 0.13* 0.32*** 0.16**
(0.075) (0.11) (0.064) (0.11) (0.060)
Uncertainty -6.54*** -9.41*** -4.77** -8.42** -5.33***
(2.32) (3.21) (1.81) (3.09) (1.88)
Trust 0.034 0.35 -0.14 0.46** -0.22
(0.16) (0.22) (0.15) (0.20) (0.16)
Uncertainty*GovTrust -0.0036 0.063 -0.056 0.051 -0.056
(0.042) (0.064) (0.038) (0.057) (0.041)
GovTrust -0.031 0.020 -0.060 0.12 -0.15
(0.22) (0.25) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22)
Observations 46,521 23,452 23,069 24,171 22,350
Firms 5,251 2,671 2,580 2,751 2,500
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
F-Stat(βH − βL = 0) 7.91*** 4.17**
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table 2.3 (Continue)
Additional Controls III
Panel D: creditor rights Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.23*** 0.38*** 0.12* 0.31*** 0.18***
(0.066) (0.10) (0.059) (0.091) (0.057)
Uncertainty -6.61*** -9.46*** -4.39** -7.95** -5.56***
(2.17) (3.23) (1.81) (2.87) (1.75)
Trust -0.12 0.0084 -0.28 0.12 -0.35**
(0.16) (0.21) (0.14) (0.23) (0.14)
Uncertainty*CR 0.82 0.92 0.78 1.83 0.054
(1.12) (1.55) (0.89) (1.52) (0.81)
Observations 47,179 23,970 23,354 24,526 22,653
Firms 5,176 2,677 2,536 2,717 2,459
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
F-stat(βH − βL = 0) 8.24*** 3.57*
Panel E: Anti-Self dealing
Uncertainty*Trust 0.24*** 0.38*** 0.12* 0.31*** 0.18***
(0.066) (0.092) (0.060) (0.087) (0.058)
Uncertainty -6.50*** -9.03** -4.53** -7.67** -5.58***
(2.11) (2.94) (1.77) (2.76) (1.74)
Trust -0.15 -0.027 -0.31** 0.049 -0.36**
(0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.19) (0.13)
Uncertainty*AntiSelf 2.16 4.36 0.80 3.81 1.22
(3.41) (4.81) (3.31) (4.39) (3.32)
Observations 47,500 24,020 23,480 24,727 22,773
Firms 5,244 2,682 2,562 2,760 2,484
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
F-stat(βH − βL = 0) 9.95*** 4.05**
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Also, we repeat all these robustness check regressions by assigning the firms into two dif-
ferent groups based on the measures of liquidity needs. In this way, we investigate whether
the heterogeneous effects of social trust still hold after excluding other channels.
We report the results in Table 2.3. The column order of the regressions is the same as
those in Table 2.2. Column (i) provides the results on the full sample, Column (ii) and (iv)
provide the results of the high-liquidity-needs group, and Column( iii) and (v) provide the
results of the low-liquidity-needs group. In panel A, we include the interaction of uncertainty
and the overall level of the economic institution to exclude the impact of institutional quality.
Panel B excludes the impact of the effectiveness of the legal systems, Panel C the impact
of people’s confidence in their government, Panel D the impact of creditor right protections,
and Panel E the impact of the protection on shareholders.
We can see no matter which channel is excluded, the main results in the benchmark
analyses still hold. First, the coefficients on the interactions of uncertainty and social trust
are positive and significant at the 1% level, implying that social trust facilitates firms’ access
to trade credit with an increase in aggregate uncertainty in the EMEs. Second, the coeffi-
cients on the interactions between the high- and low-liquidity-need groups are significantly
different at 10% level at least, and the coefficients of the high group are larger than those of
the low group. Thus, firms which need more liquidity will benefit more with an increase in
uncertainty, if they are in emerging countries with higher levels of social trust.
To gauge the economic magnitude, we use Panel A which excludes the impact of eco-
nomic institutional quality as an example. We still take the high- and low-trust countries
into account. With a one-standard-deviation increase in aggregate uncertainty, compared
to those firms in the low-trust country, the growth rate of account payable experiences a
4.77-percentage-points ((32.5-17.6)*0.32) smaller contraction among firms in the high-trust
country. This magnitude (4.77) equals 19% of the mean value of the growth rate (25.05).
If the firms are in industries with higher levels of liquidity needs, the growth rate is 7.30
((32.5-17.6)*0.49) percentage points larger among firms in the high-trust country.
Other Measure of Uncertainty
In this paper, we focus on the transmission of uncertainty shocks. An appropriate measure
of uncertainty is vitally important in our empirical analyses. Other than the standard devi-
ation of daily stock return, there are several other prevalent measures. The second concern
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Table 2.4
New Uncertainty Measure
Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.29** 0.42*** 0.20*** 0.47*** 0.16**
(0.073) (0.13) (0.059) (0.14) (0.060)
Uncertainty -5.04** -7.27* -3.65* -8.98** -2.44
(2.27) (3.68) (1.79) (3.58) (2.09)
Trust -0.28** -0.25 -0.36** -0.19 -0.41***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39,738 19,885 19,853 20,706 19,032
Firms 4,446 2,260 2,181 2,355 2,086
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
F-Stat(βH − βL = 0) 3.24* 5.20**
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents the
regression results of the empirical specification: tcgri,c,t = β0+β1∗Trustc,t∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+
β2 ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + β3 ∗ Trustc,t + γ ∗ Firmi,t + δ ∗ Macroc,t + ui + ut + i,c,t, where
tcgri,c,t refers to the growth rate of account payable by firm i, in country c, during period
t; Trustc,t represents the measure of social trust in emerging country c over the period
t; and Uncertaintyc,t−1 is the index of uncertainty measured by the standard deviation of
cross-sectional firm-level stock return for country c in the period t − 1. Firmi,t denotes
a set of time-varying firm characteristics such as firms’ size in the corresponding period.
Macroc,t is a vector of time-variant country-level variables (e.g. GDP per Capita, Financial
Development and Capital Account Openness). ui and ut are firm- and time- fixed effects
respectively. Column (i) presents the results on the full sample. Column (ii) and (iv) show
the results on the subsample of “High” liquidity need group and Column (iii) and (v) show
the results on the results on the subsample of “Low” liquidity need group. Here the “High”
group means that the ratio of inventories over sales or the cash conversion cycle is above the
median. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported
in parentheses.
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about our analyses is whether the results are robust to other measures of uncertainty. To
address this concern, we use another measure of uncertainty, the standard deviation of quar-
terly returns across firms, to test the effects of social trust on the propagation of uncertainty
shocks on firms’ access to trade credit in EMEs. We call this measure micro uncertainty,
and also repeat the regressions after dividing the observations into two subsamples based on
liquidity needs.
We report the estimation results related to micro uncertainty in Table 2.4. The order
of the regression is the same as in Table 2.2. Our regression results are robust to the new
measure of uncertainty. First, the coefficient on the interaction of micro uncertainty and
social trust is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. That is to say, firms
get more trade credit if they are in countries with higher levels of social trust with an in-
crease in micro uncertainty. In detail, the growth rate of account payable experiences a
4.32-percentage-point ((32.5-17.6)*0.29) smaller contraction among firms in the high-trust
country. Second, the coefficients of the high-liquidity-needs group are significant at the 1%
level, and larger than that of the low group. Firms with higher levels of liquidity needs
benefit more from the higher level of social trust in EMEs.
Do our results related to micro uncertainty still hold if we control for the impact of
other channels, such as institutional quality? Furthermore, to exclude the effects of other
channels, we control for the interaction of micro uncertainty and the overall level of economic
institution, the effectiveness of the legal system in enforcing contracts, the level of people’s
confidence in their government and the degree to which the formal legal system protects
creditors and shareholders, respectively. These results are shown in Appendix A2.5.
Other Robustness Checks
Finally, we are concerned that uncertainty may hurt social trust. If this were the case,
it might hinder the effectiveness of our regression results from explaining the differential
responses of firms from different emerging countries. To address this concern, we run a
regression to show that uncertainty doesn’t significantly affect social trust in our sample.
The regression equation is as follows:
Trustc,t = α + α1 ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + Γ ∗Macroc,t + ∆ ∗ Firmc,t + vc + vt + vc,t (3)
where Uncertaintyc,t−1 is the 1-year lagged index of uncertainty measured by the standard
deviation of daily stock return. Firmc,t is the country-year mean of Firmi,t. vc and vt
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are country- and time- fixed effects, respectively. Other variables are the same as those in
equation (1). We show the regression results in Appendix A2.6.
2.4.3 Extension
Debt and Equity
Our benchmark results concentrate on the impact of social trust on informal finance (trade
credit) under aggregate uncertainty in EMEs. Existing literature shows that uncertainty
also influences formal finance, such as debt and equity. Alfaro et al. (2018) and Gilchrist
et al (2014) find that uncertainty significantly reduces debt issuance and financial frictions
amplify these negative impacts. Jens (2017) uses U.S. gubernatorial elections as an index
of variations in political uncertainty, and finds that firms postpone issuing debt and equity
before elections. Does social trust also encourage firms in EMEs to issue more debt or
equity when they are in face of uncertainty shocks? In this subsection, we investigate the
role social trust plays in the transmission of uncertainty shocks to debt and equity issuance
by estimating the following empirical specification:
Issuancej,i,c,t = θ0,j + θ1,j ∗ Trustc,t ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + θ2,j ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1
+θ3,j ∗ Trustc,t + γj ∗ Firmi,t + δj ∗Macroc,t−1 + ui + ut + j,i,c,t (4)
where j ∈ {Debt, Equity}. Issuancej,i,c,t refers to debt or equity issuance for firm i, in
country c, during period t. Recall that debt issuance corresponds to the growth rate of the
sum of short- and long-term debt (dlc and dltt, respectively), while equity issuance is equal
to the growth rate of the sum of common/ordinary equity (ceq), deferred taxes (txdb) and
minus retained earnings (re). Other variables are the same as those in equation (1).
To be consistent with our analyses of trade credit, we also divide the sample into two
subsamples based on industry-level liquidity needs, and check whether the effects of social
trust are heterogeneous. We are interested in the coefficients on the interaction term, θ1,j.
The impact of social trust on formal financing channel is not clear. Hasan et al. (2017)
find that social capital helps to lower at-issue bond spreads, and Lins et al. (2017) present
firms with high levels of social capital raise more debt and had higher levels of stock return
during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Levine et al. (2018), however, argue that social trust
doesn’t exert a significant impact on debt or equity issuance during the banking crisis. In our
analysis, if social trust affects firms’ performance mainly through the trade credit channel,
but not the formal financing channel, an insignificant or small β1,j is in favor of our argument.
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Table 2.5
Other Financing I
Panel A: Debt Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.12 0.085 0.14 0.11 0.12
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.12) (0.16)
Uncertainty -1.25 -1.26 -1.31 -1.44 -1.04
(3.48) (3.17) (4.37) (3.12) (4.26)
Trust -0.14 -0.30 -0.052 -0.34 -0.039
(0.25) (0.28) (0.27) (0.30) (0.24)
Observations 46,653 23,543 23,110 24,217 22,436
Firms 5,273 2,689 2,584 2,764 2,509
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. Panel A in Table 5 show
the results of the empirical specification: Debtj,i,c,t = θ0,j +θ1,j ∗Trustc,t ∗Uncertaintyc,t−1 +
θ2,j ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + θ3,j ∗ Trustc,t + γj ∗ Firmi,t + δj ∗ Macroc,t−1 + ui + ut + j,i,c,t.
Debtj,i,c,t refers to debt issuance for firm i, in country c, during period t. Recall that debt
issuance corresponds to the growth rate of the sum of short- and long-term debt (dlc and
dltt respectively). Other variables and the order of the regressions are same as those in
Table 2.2. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are
reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.5
Other Financing II
Panel B: Equity Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust -0.088 -0.061 -0.11* -0.10 -0.076
(0.048) (0.054) (0.057) (0.059) (0.051)
Uncertainty 2.25 1.83 2.65 2.46 2.05
(1.43) (1.56) (1.76) (1.60) (1.76)
Trust -0.18 -0.26 -0.11 -0.25 -0.11
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Observations 46,725 23,574 23,151 24,253 22,472
Firms 5,264 2,677 2,587 2,752 2,512
R2 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.17
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. Panel B in Table 5 show
the results of the empirical specification: Equityj,i,c,t = θ0,j+θ1,j∗Trustc,t∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+
θ2,j ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + θ3,j ∗ Trustc,t + γj ∗ Firmi,t + δj ∗ Macroc,t + ui + ut + j,i,c,t.
Equity issuance is equal to the growth rate of the sum of common/ordinary equity (ceq),
deferred taxes (txdb) and minus retained earnings (re). Other variables and the order of
the regressions are same as those in Table 2.2. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses.
68
We present the results in Table 2.5. Panel A shows the results concerning debt issuance,
and Panel B equity issuance. The column order is also the same as that in Table 2.2. We
can see no coefficients on the interaction term are significant even at the 10% level, whether
using the full sample or the high-liquidity-needs group. The results suggest that social trust
doesn’t have a significant impact on firms’ access to equity or debt when the aggregate
economy suffers a positive uncertainty shock. From this perspective, social trust mainly
affects firms’ performance via the trade credit channel rather than by raising more debt or
issuing more equity that depends more on formal legal arrangements.
Profitability
We have built up the relationship between social trust and firms’ financing channel when
the EMEs come across uncertainty shocks. Firms always adjust their formal and informal
finance to keep their good performance or outcome. Thus, if social trust affects the impact of
uncertainty on firms’ finance in EMEs, it will alter the transmissions of uncertainty shocks to
firms’ performance. In this section, we use firms’ profitability as the representative measure
of firms’ performance to test the interaction of uncertainty and social trust on firms’ outcome.
The empirical specification we use is as follows:
Profitabilityi,c,t = η0 + η1 ∗ Trustc,t ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + η2 ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1
+η3 ∗ Trustc,t + γ ∗ Firmi,t + δ ∗Macroc,t + ui + ut + i,c,t (5)
Profitabilityi,c,t represents the profitability of firm i, in country c, during period t. Recall
that we define firms’ profitability as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (ebit) to
total sales (sale) lagged for one period. Other independent variables are the same as those
in equation (1) and (4).
We are still interested in the coefficient on the interaction of uncertainty and social trust,
η1, which captures the differential responses of firms’ profitability to uncertainty shocks if
firms come from countries with different levels of social trust. We predict that firms in coun-
tries with higher levels of social trust can make more profit than those firms in countries
with lower levels of social trust via using more trade credit. A positive η1 is in favor of
our prediction. In line with the analyses on informal and formal financing, we assign firms
into two subsamples based on the measures of liquidity needs. If social trust helps firms
to keep their profits via receiving more trade credit from their suppliers in face of positive
uncertainty shocks, firms in the high-liquidity-needs group benefit more from the higher level
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of social trust. A larger η1 should enter the regression significantly when testing the inter-
action of social trust and uncertainty on firms’ profitability of the high-liquidity needs group.
We present some preliminary visual results in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5, respectively. We
construct two subsamples following Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3, respectively. Figure 2.4(a)
presents the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and the country-year mean of firms’
profitability in the high-trust group, and Figure 2.4(b) presents the low-trust group. We can
see that in the low-trust group, firms’ profitability declines more as uncertainty increases,
which is in line with our conjecture. Then we divide our sample into two groups based on
industry-level liquidity needs. The observations whose liquidity needs are above the median
are assigned into the high-liquidity-needs group, and others are in the low-liquidity-needs
group. For each group, we construct two subsamples. One is the high-trust group whose
social trust is in the upper quantile, whereas the other is the low-trust group whose trust
is in the lower quantile. Figure 2.5(a) shows the relationship between aggregate uncertainty
and firms’ profitability for the group with high trust and high liquid needs, figure 2.5(b) for
the group with low trust and high liquid needs, figure 2.5(c) for the group with low trust
and low liquid needs, and figure 2.5(d) for the group with high trust and low liquid needs.
We can see for the high-liquidity-needs group, firms in the high-trust countries suffer small
drops in profitability.
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.6. The order of the regressions is still the
same as in Table 2.2. We mainly have three findings. First, as with the regression using
the full sample, the coefficient on the interaction of uncertainty and social trust is positive
and significant at the 1% level. This implies that social trust can facilitate firms’ profitabil-
ity when the aggregate economy suffers an increase in uncertainty, as expected. Second,
the coefficients on the interaction in the high-liquidity-needs group are positive and signif-
icant at the 1% level, no matter we use the ratio of inventory over total sales or the cash
conversion cycles as the measure of industry-level liquidity needs. Third, the coefficients
on the interaction term between the high and low groups are significantly different at the
10% level at least. Thus, firms in the high-liquidity-need group will benefit more as predicted.
To compute the size of the impact which social trust has on the transmission of uncer-
tainty shocks to firms’ profitability, we still consider firms in the high- and low-trust coun-
tries. With a one-standard-deviation increase in aggregate uncertainty, among firms in the
high-trust country, their profitability experiences a 0.30-percentage-point ((32.5-17.6)*0.020)
smaller contraction, compared to firms in the high-trust country. This magnitude (0.30)
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Table 2.6
Firms’ Performance
Panel A: EBIT Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.015* 0.026*** 0.017*
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0083) (0.0065) (0.0085)
Uncertainty -0.33 -0.62*** -0.090 -0.52*** -0.19
(0.22) (0.14) (0.35) (0.14) (0.34)
Trust 0.033 0.0099 0.046* 0.015 0.040
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027)
Observations 46,560 23,559 23,001 24,242 22,318
Firms 5,244 2,681 2,563 2,759 2,485
R2 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.72
F-Stat(βH − βL = 0) 3.29* 1.55
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents
the regression results of the empirical specification: Profitabilityi,c,t = β0 + β1 ∗ Trustc,t ∗
Uncertaintyc,t−1+β2∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+β3∗Trustc,t+γ∗Firmi,t+δ∗Macroc,t+ui+ut+i,c,t,
where Profitabilityi,c,t refers to the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes over total
assets by firm i, in country c, during period t; Trustc,t represents the measure of social trust
in emerging country c over the period t; and Uncertaintyc,t−1 is the index of uncertainty
measured by the standard deviation of daily stock market return for country c in the period
t − 1. Firmi,t denotes a set of time-varying firm characteristics such as firms’ size in the
corresponding period. Macroc,t is a vector of time-variant country-level variables (e.g. GDP
per Capita, Financial Development and Capital Account Openness). ui and ut are firm- and
time- fixed effects respectively. Column (i) presents the results on the full sample. Column
(ii) and (iv) show the results on the subsample of “High” liquidity need group and Column
(iii) and (v) show the results on the results on the subsample of “Low” liquidity need group.
Here the “High” group means that the ratio of inventories over sales or the cash conversion
cycle is above the median. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country
level are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 2.4: Social Trust, Uncertainty and Firms’ Profitability
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This Figure shows the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and firms’ profitability.
We use the total sample and calculate the country-year mean of firm size, return on asset,
book average and firms’ profitability. We call the country-year observations whose social
trust is in the upper quantile the high trust countries (Figure 2.4(b)) and the observations
whose social trust is in the lower quantile the low trust countries (Figure 2.4(a)). The
X-axis is the index of uncertainty and the Y-axis represents firms’ profitability. We exclude
firm size, return on asset, book leverage, macroeconomic vectors, country- and time- fixed
effects from uncertainty and firms’ profitability.
corresponds to 3.9% of the mean value of firms’ profitability (7.60). If the firm is in the
high-liquidity-need group, for example, those in the industry with a relatively high ratio of
inventory over total sales, its profitability is 0.42 percentage point larger. This magnitude
is larger than that of the regressions on the full sample. This finding is consistent with our
prediction that firms which depend on liquid funds more benefit more from high social trust
in face of positive uncertainty shocks.
Finally, to exclude the impact of other country-level characteristics, we add the interac-
tions of uncertainty with the overall level of economic institution, the effectiveness of the
legal system in enforcing contracts, the level of people’s confidence in their government, and
the degree to which the formal legal system protects creditors and shareholders in equation
(5), respectively, to check the robustness of the impact of social trust on the transmissions
of uncertainty shocks to firms’ profitability. We find that the interactions of social trust
and uncertainty keep their symbols and significance. We show these results in the Appendix
A2.7.
72
Figure 2.5: Social Trust, Uncertainty and Firms’ Profitability
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High Social Trust Countries
This Figure shows the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and firms’ profitability.
We divide our sample into two subsamples based on industry-level liquidity needs. The
observations whose liquidity needs are above the median are assigned into the high-liquidity-
needs group and others are in the low-liquidity-needs group. For each group, we calculate
the country-year mean of firm size, return on asset, book average and firms’ profitability.
We call the country-year observations whose social trust is in the upper quantile the high
trust countries (Figure 2.5(b) and 2.5(d)) and the observations whose social trust is in the
lower quantile the low trust countries (Figure 2.5(a) and 2.5(c)). The X-axis is the index
of uncertainty and the Y-axis represents firms’ profitability. We exclude firm size, return
on asset, book leverage, macroeconomic vectors, country- and time- fixed effects from
uncertainty and firms’ profitability.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper argues that social trust can help firms to keep their good performance via re-
ceiving more trade credit when the aggregate economy suffers a positive uncertainty shock
in emerging countries. Our analyses suggest that i) social trust can make firms easier to
get access to trade credit during periods of uncertainty; ii) firms’ profitability suffers smaller
drops in face of uncertainty shocks if they are in countries with higher levels of social trust,
and iii) firms which depend on liquid funds more will benefit more from the greater social
trust. Our findings are robust, if we exclude the impact of other country-level characteristics,
with the overall level of economic institution, the effectiveness of the legal system in enforc-
ing contracts, the level of people’s confidence in their government and the degree to which
the formal legal system protects creditors and shareholders included respectively. Also, our
results still hold, if we use a different measure of aggregate uncertainty.
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2.6 Appendix
Appendix A2.1
Clustered at Country and Year
Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.24*** 0.39*** 0.12** 0.33*** 0.17***
(0.073) (0.097) (0.062) (0.010) (0.060)
Uncertainty -6.67*** -9.50*** -4.50** -8.32*** -5.38***
(2.07) (2.97) (1.72) (2.93) (1.71)
Trust -0.16 -0.036 -0.32** 0.042 -0.37***
(0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12)
Fixed Effect
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 47,782 24,133 23,649 24,834 22,948
Firms 5,323 2,714 2,609 2,790 2,533
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
F-stat(βH − βL = 0) 10.26*** 3.20*
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents the
regression results of the empirical specification: tcgri,c,t = β0 + β1 ∗ Trustc,t ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 +
β2 ∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+β3 ∗Trustc,t+γ ∗Firmi,t+δ ∗Macroc,t+ui+ut+i,c,t. where tcgri,c,t refers
to the growth rate of account payable by firm i, in country c, during period t; Trustc,t represents
the measure of social trust in emerging country c over the period t; and Uncertaintyc,t−1 is the
index of uncertainty measured by the standard deviation of daily stock market return for country
c in the period t− 1. Firmi,t denotes a set of time-varying firm characteristics such as firms’ size
in the corresponding period. Macroc,t is a vector of time-variant country-level variables (e.g. GDP
per Capita, Financial Development and Capital Account Openness). ui and ut are firm- and time-
fixed effects respectively. Column (i) presents the results on the full sample. Column (ii) and (iv)
show the results on the high-liquidity-needs group, and Column (iii) and (v) show the results on the
results on the low-liquidity-needs group. Here, the high group means that the ratio of inventories
over sales or the cash conversion cycle is above the median. Heteroscedasticity robust standard
errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix A2.2
Interactions of Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Variables
Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.23*** 0.37*** 0.11*** 0.32*** 0.15**
(0.063) (0.10) (0.049) (0.093) (0.052)
Uncertainty -6.92*** -9.42** -4.95*** -8.79*** -5.24***
(2.19) (3.51) (1.73) (3.10) (1.84)
Trust -0.11 0.081 -0.31* 0.15 -0.36**
(0.16) (0.20) (0.17) (0.20) (0.16)
Fixed Effect
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 47,782 24,133 23,649 24,834 22,948
Firms 5,323 2,714 2,609 2,790 2,533
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
F-stat(βH − βL = 0) 7.30*** 4.85**
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents the
regression results of the empirical specification: tcgri,c,t = β0+β1∗Trustc,t∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+
β2 ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + β3 ∗ Trustc,t + β4 ∗Macroc,t ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + γ ∗ Firmi,t + δ ∗
Macroc,t + ui + ut + i,c,t, where tcgri,c,t refers to the growth rate of account payable by firm
i, in country c, during period t; Trustc,t represents the measure of social trust in emerging
country c over the period t; and Uncertaintyc,t−1 is the index of uncertainty measured by
the standard deviation of daily stock market return for country c in the period t−1. Firmi,t
denotes a set of time-varying firm characteristics such as firms’ size in the corresponding
period. Macroc,t is a vector of time-variant country-level variables (e.g. GDP per Capita,
Financial Development and Capital Account Openness). ui and ut are firm- and time- fixed
effects respectively. Column (i) presents the results on the full sample. Column (ii) and (iv)
show the results on the high-liquidity-needs group, and Column (iii) and (v) show the results
on the results on the low-liquidity-needs group. Here, the high group means that the ratio
of inventories over sales or the cash conversion cycle is above the median. Heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix A2.3
Interactions of Uncertainty and Firm Variables
Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.20*** 0.38*** 0.058 0.31*** 0.11**
(0.059) (0.083) (0.056) (0.081) (0.053)
Uncertainty -10.11*** -10.15** -10.55*** -10.31** -10.19***
(3.15) (4.76) (2.19) (4.48) (2.54)
Trust -0.15 -0.027 -0.30* 0.061 -0.36**
(0.16) (0.20) (0.15) (0.21) (0.15)
Fixed Effect
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 47,782 24,133 23,649 24,834 22,948
Firms 5,323 2,714 2,609 2,790 2,533
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
F-stat(βH − βL = 0) 17.51*** 8.63***
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents the
regression results of the empirical specification: tcgri,c,t = β0+β1∗Trustc,t∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+
β2∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+β3∗Trustc,t+β4∗Firmi,t∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+γ∗Firmi,t+δ∗Macroc,t+
ui+ut+i,c,t, where tcgri,c,t refers to the growth rate of account payable by firm i, in country
c, during period t; Trustc,t represents the measure of social trust in emerging country c over
the period t; and Uncertaintyc,t−1 is the index of uncertainty measured by the standard
deviation of daily stock market return for country c in the period t − 1. Firmi,t denotes
a set of time-varying firm characteristics such as firms’ size in the corresponding period.
Macroc,t is a vector of time-variant country-level variables (e.g. GDP per Capita, Financial
Development and Capital Account Openness). ui and ut are firm- and time- fixed effects
respectively. Column (i) presents the results on the full sample. Column (ii) and (iv) show
the results on the high-liquidity-needs group, and Column (iii) and (v) show the results on
the results on the low-liquidity-needs group. Here, the high group means that the ratio of
inventories over sales or the cash conversion cycle is above the median. Heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix A2.4
New Measure of Liquidity Needs
Full Liquid Needs
High Low
(i) (ii) (iii)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.24*** 0.34*** 0.14
(0.065) (0.060) (0.091)
Uncertainty -6.67*** -10.28*** -3.12
(2.14) (2.13) (2.56)
Trust -0.16 -0.32 0.024
(0.14) (0.15) (0.19)
Fixed Effect
Time Yes Yes Yes
Firm Yes Yes Yes
Observations 47,782 23,971 23,811
Firms 5,323 2,681 2,642
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11
F-stat(βH − βL = 0) 5.57**
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents the
regression results of the empirical specification: tcgri,c,t = β0+β1∗Trustc,t∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+
β2 ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + β3 ∗ Trustc,t + γ ∗ Firmi,t + δ ∗ Macroc,t + ui + ut + i,c,t, where
tcgri,c,t refers to the growth rate of account payable by firm i, in country c, during period
t; Trustc,t represents the measure of social trust in emerging country c over the period t;
and Uncertaintyc,t−1 is the index of uncertainty measured by the standard deviation of daily
stock market return for country c in the period t− 1. Firmi,t denotes a set of time-varying
firm characteristics such as firms’ size in the corresponding period. Macroc,t is a vector
of time-variant country-level variables (e.g. GDP per Capita, Financial Development and
Capital Account Openness). ui and ut are firm- and time- fixed effects respectively. Column
(i) presents the results on the full sample. Column (ii) and Column (iii) show the results
on the results on the high- and low-liquidity-needs group, respectively. Here, the high group
means that the ratio of short debt to total sales is above the median. Heteroscedasticity
robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix A2.5
Micro Uncertainty and Additional Controls I
Panel A: Institution Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.39*** 0.57*** 0.27*** 0.65*** 0.19**
(0.095) (0.15) (0.076) (0.15) (0.084)
Uncertainty -8.53*** -12.91*** -5.51* -15.25*** -3.43
(3.08) (4.25) (2.74) (3.86) (3.38)
Trust -0.43** -0.37 -0.57*** -0.38 -0.57***
(0.18) (0.25) (0.16) (0.26) (0.14)
Uncertainty*Institution 0.20*** 0.21* 0.17* 0.22* 0.13
(0.064) (0.10) (0.087) (0.11) (0.094)
Institution -0.52** -0.75* -0.39* -0.56 -0.58**
(0.24) (0.39) (0.19) (0.34) (0.21)
Observations 31,994 16,110 15,884 16,551 15,443
Firms 4,071 2,078 1,993 2,131 1,940
R2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
F-Stat(βH − βL = 0) 6.39** 12.83***
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table uses the
following empirical empirical specification: tcgri,c,t = β0 + β1 ∗ Trustc,t ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 +
β2∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+β3∗Trustc,t+β4∗CCc,t∗Uncertaintyc,t−1+γ∗Firmi,t+δ∗Macroc,t+ui+
ut + i,c,t, where CCc,t ∈ {Institutionc,t, Lawc,t, GovTrustc,t, CRc, AntiSelfc}. Institutionc,t
is the overall level of country i’s economic institution in period t. Lawc,t measures the
effectiveness of the legal system in enforcing contracts in country c during year t. GovTrustc,t
represent people’s confidence in their government in year t for country c. CRc denotes the
the strength of the legal rights of creditors and AntiSelfc reflects the degree to which the
legal systems protects small investors from self-dealing by corporate insiders. Other variables
are same with those in Table 4. The column order of the regressions is same with those in
Table 4. Column (i) provides the results on the full sample, column (ii) and (iv) provide
the results of the high-liquidity-needs group, and column( iii) and (v) show the results of
the low-liquidity-needs group. In panel A, we include the interaction of uncertainty and the
overall level of economic institution to exclude the impact of institutional quality. Panel B
exclude the impact of the effectiveness of the legal systems, Panel C the impact of people’s
confidence in their government, Panel D the impact of creditor right protections and Panel
E the impact of the protection on shareholders. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix A2.5 (Continue)
Micro Uncertainty and Additional Controls II
Panel B: Law Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.28*** 0.35*** 0.23*** 0.40*** 0.19**
(0.065) (0.10) (0.060) (0.12) (0.065)
Uncertainty -5.03** -6.26* -3.83** -8.72*** -2.10
(2.10) (3.13) (1.79) (2.86) (2.23)
Trust -0.33** -0.27 -0.40** 0.17 -0.49***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)
Uncertainty*Law 0.0023 0.00050 0.0025 -0.0068 0.0087
(0.017) (0.025) (0.014) (0.029) (0.012)
Law 0.062 0.096 0.038 0.073 0.056
(0.080) (0.11) (0.068) (0.11) (0.074)
Observations 35,798 17,942 17,856 18,717 17,081
Firms 4,392 2,238 2,154 2,333 2059
R2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
F-Stat(βH − βL = 0) 1.62 2.65
Panel C: Government Trust
Uncertainty*Trust 0.29*** 0.40** 0.20*** 0.45*** 0.16**
(0.083) (0.14) (0.062) (0.15) (0.062)
Uncertainty -4.97* -6.53 -3.93 -8.11* -2.97
(2.82) (4.32) (2.36) (4.27) (2.54)
Trust -0.13 -0.045 -0.23 -0.085 -0.20
(0.24) (0.37) (0.180) (0.36) (0.20)
Uncertainty*GovTrust -0.033 0.039 -0.082 0.039 -0.10
(0.063) (0.10) (0.067) (0.097) (0.065)
GovTrust -0.0097 0.034 -0.066 0.15 -0.21
(0.18) (0.21) (0.021) (0.19) (0.22)
Observations 38,966 19,684 19,282 20,266 18,700
Firms 4,390 2,257 2,133 2,324 2,066
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
F-Stat(βH − βL = 0) 2.93* 4.60**
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Appendix A2.5 (Continue)
Micro Uncertainty and Additional Controls III
Panel D: creditor rights Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.29*** 0.42*** 0.20*** 0.47*** 0.15**
(0.074) (0.13) (0.065) (0.14) (0.062)
Uncertainty -4.97** -7.27* -3.52* -8.96** -2.35
(2.28) (3.69) (1.75) (3.63) (2.02)
Trust -0.28* -0.25 -0.35** -0.19 -0.40**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14)
Uncertainty*CR 0.25 0.0079 0.28 0.14 0.20
(0.83) (1.14) (0.84) (1.12) (0.92)
Observations 39,738 19,885 19,853 20,706 19,032
Firms 4,441 2,260 2,181 2,355 2,086
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
F-stat(βH − βL = 0) 2.93* 4.70**
Panel E: Anti-Self dealing
Uncertainty*Trust 0.30*** 0.41*** 0.23*** 0.46*** 0.18***
(0.079) (0.14) (0.056) (0.14) (0.055)
Uncertainty -5.45* -6.88 -4.75** -8.20* -3.87*
(2.79) (4.38) (1.85) (4.33) (2.00)
Trust -0.28* -0.24 -0.37** -0.18 -0.42***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14)
Uncertainty*AntiSelf -2.31 2.59 -5.71 4.82 -7.83*
(5.86) (8.47) (4.20) (8.80) (4.07)
Observations 39,738 19,885 19,853 20,706 19,032
Firms 4,441 2,260 2,181 2,355 2,086
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
F-stat(βH − βL = 0) 2.47 4.39**
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Appendix A2.6
The Relationship between Social Trust and Aggregate Uncertainty
(i) (ii) (iii)
Uncertainty -0.089 -0.15 -0.089
(0.32) (0.39) (0.398)
Size -0.37
(0.30)
Return on Assets -12.19
(12.53)
Book Leverage 2.21
(4.41)
GDPper -1.64 -1.52
(1.39) (1.50)
Financial Development -0.074* -0.084**
(0.040) (0.040)
Stock Market 0.056* 0.055*
(0.030) (0.030)
Capital Openness -0.34 -0.47
(1.67) (1.72)
Liquid 0.0036 0.0044
(0.018) (0.019)
Fixed Effect
Time Yes Yes Yes
Country Yes Yes Yes
Observations 330 330 330
Amount of Economies 26 26 26
R2 0.83 0.84 0.84
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; and *p < 0.1. The estimation is
based on the regression specification: Trustc,t = η0 + η1 ∗Uncertaintyc,t−1 + ∆ ∗Macroc,t +
ut + c,t, where Uncertaintyc,t and Trustc,t refer to aggregate uncertainty in country c and
the social trust in country c during period t . Firmc,t is the country-year mean of Firmi,t.
Macroc,t is the vector of macroeconomic controls. Standard errors are clustered at the
country level.
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Appendix A2.7
Firms’ Performance and Other Factors I
Panel A: Institution Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.021*** 0.037*** 0.0088 0.031*** 0.013
(0.0068) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0077) (0.0086)
Uncertainty -0.36 -1.01*** 0.20 -0.81*** 0.028
(0.24) (0.30) (0.29) (0.25) (0.31)
Trust 0.050** 0.044 0.047** 0.045 0.043
(0.020) (0.029) (0.022) (0.031) (0.024)
Uncertainty*Institution 1.04 0.87 1.08 0.99 1.03
(0.69) (0.77) (0.85) (0.62) (0.99)
Institution -2.75 -2.57 -2.89 -1.77 -3.58
(3.06) (2.57) (4.30) (2.85) (4.19)
Observations 33,893 17,014 16,879 17,483 16,410
Firms 4,574 2,320 2,254 2,379 2,195
R2 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.74
F-Stat(βH − βL = 0) 7.86*** 4.18**
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This ta-
ble presents the regression results of the empirical specification: Profitabilityi,c,t =
β0 + β1 ∗ Trustc,t ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + β2 ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + β3 ∗ Trustc,t + β4 ∗
CCc,t ∗ Uncertaintyc,t−1 + γ ∗ Firmi,t + δ ∗ Macroc,t + ui + ut + i,c,t, where CCc,t ∈
{Institutionc,t, Lawc,t, GovTrustc,t, CRc, AntiSelfc}. Institutionc,t is the overall level of
country i’s economic institution in period t. Lawc,t measures the effectiveness of the legal
system in enforcing contracts in country c during year t. GovTrustc,t represent people’s
confidence in their government in year t for country c. CRc denotes the the strength of the
legal rights of creditors and AntiSelfc reflects the degree to which the legal systems protects
small investors from self-dealing by corporate insiders. Other variables are same with those
in Table 6. The column order of the regressions is same with those in Table 6. Column
(i) provides the results on the full sample, column (ii) and (iv) provide the results of the
high-liquidity-needs group, and column( iii) and (v) show the results of the low-liquidity-
needs group. In panel A, we include the interaction of uncertainty and the overall level
of economic institution to exclude the impact of institutional quality. Panel B exclude the
impact of the effectiveness of the legal systems, Panel C the impact of people’s confidence in
their government, Panel D the impact of creditor right protections and Panel E the impact
of the protection on shareholders. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the
country level are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix A2.7 (Continue)
Firms’ Performance and Other Factors II
Panel B: Law Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.020*** 0.032*** 0.012 0.030*** 0.013
(0.0065) (0.0075) (0.0080) (0.0070) (0.0086)
Uncertainty -0.30 -0.56*** -0.11 -0.49*** -0.15
(0.24) (0.15) (0.36) (0.16) (0.37)
Trust 0.017 -0.0028 0.031 0.0038 0.025
(0.025) (0.023) (0.030) (0.023) (0.031)
Uncertainty*Law 0-0.041 0.14 -0.18 0.015 -0.082
(0.096) (0.094) (0.12) (0.085) (0.14)
Law 1.04 1.47 0.42 1.49 0.39
(0.81) (0.094) (1.09) (0.83) (1.05)
Observations 42,344 21,174 21,170 22,128 20,216
Firms 5,165 2,695 2,560 2,723 2,442
R2 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.74
F-Stat(βH − βL = 0) 4.82** 3.49*
Panel C: Government Trust
Uncertainty*Trust 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.013 0.028*** 0.014*
(0.0065) (0.0073) (0.0079) (0.0072) (0.0079)
Uncertainty -0.28 -0.51*** -0.097 -0.42** -0.18
(0.21) (0.16) (0.33) (0.16) (0.32)
Trust 0.044 0.011 0.063 0.016 0.058
(0.031) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039)
Uncertainty*GovTrust -0.0053 -0.0063 -0.0087 -0.0032 -0.0072
(0.0045) (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0063)
GovTrust 0.018 0.052** -0.013 0.052** -0.018
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
Observations 45,230 22,853 22,377 23,551 21,679
Firms 5,156 2,630 2,526 2,713 2,443
R2 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.72
F-Stat(βH − βL = 0) 5.08** 2.99*
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Appendix A2.7 (Continue)
Firms’ Performance and Other Factors III
Panel D: creditor rights Full Liquid Needs Cycles
High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Uncertainty*Trust 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.015* 0.026*** 0.017**
(0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0080) (0.0067) (0.0080)
Uncertainty -0.34 -0.64*** -0.10 -0.53*** -0.20
(0.22) (0.15) (0.32) (0.15) (0.32)
Trust 0.031 0.0089 0.043 0.015 0.036
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Uncertainty*CR -0.037 0.039 -0.087 0.055 -0.11
(0.082) (0.089) (0.10) (0.075) (0.11)
Observations 46,241 23,366 22,875 24,043 22,198
Firms 5,176 2,639 2,537 2,716 2,460
R2 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.72
F-stat(βH − βL = 0) 3.81* 2.07
Panel E: Anti-Self dealing
Uncertainty*Trust 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.014* 0.025*** 0.017**
(0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0074) (0.0062) (0.0074)
Uncertainty 0.040 -0.27 0.29 -0.21 0.24
(0.21) (0.24) (0.32) (0.21) (0.31)
Trust 0.029 0.0054 0.042 0.011 0.036
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
Uncertainty*AntiSelf -0.70** -0.66** -0.72* -0.58** -0.81*
(0.28) (0.26) (0.41) (0.26) (0.40)
Observations 46,278 23,446 22,832 24,135 22,143
Firms 5,165 2,649 2,516 2,729 2,436
R2 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.72
F-stat(βH − βL = 0) 2.61 1.30
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time&Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Chapter 3
Social Connections and the
Transmissions of Monetary
Contraction Shocks
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3.1 Introduction
Corporate senior managers and board members have wide-ranging social networks, built up
through alumni associations, previous employment, and memberships in clubs. Since Cole-
man’s (1988) work on the relationship between social interactions and economic behaviors,
there has been a growing body of literature that considers the impact of social connections
on areas of corporate finance. There are two primary channels through which social con-
nections can affect corporate financial decision making: they lower the cost of gathering
business-relevant information and they enhance trust between parties. Both of these can
reduce the frictions agents face on the market, which in turn affects the transmissions of
macroeconomic shocks1. However, to date, there has been relatively little empirical evidence
documenting the link between social connections and macroeconomic shocks.
This paper investigates how the existence of social connections between executives of
downstream and upstream firm pairs affects their transactions when they face monetary
contraction shocks. We measure the extent to which a pair is socially connected by whether
the supplier’s senior executives have in the past attended the same university or worked at
the same firm for an overlapping period as senior executives from the customer firm. As
this definition makes clear, like Ishii and Xuan (2014) and Dasgupta et al. (2018), we work
with cross-firm connections. In this paper, we examine the effects of social connections in
the context of relatively large between-firm sales2 because these sales have a sizable impact
on firm performance, and thus usually need a relatively complex decision-making process.
Sales between firms decrease in response to a monetary recession shock due to worse liquid
conditions, however, this is affected by social connections.
We find that sales between socially connected pairs account for a greater fraction of sup-
pliers’ total sales than those of socially unconnected pairs during monetary contractions.
That is, when the economy suffers a monetary contraction shock, suppliers sell more prod-
ucts to those customers to whose executives their executives have at least one education
or employment tie. When the index by which we capture monetary shocks increases by 1
standard deviation, the ratio of the pair-level sales to suppliers’ total sales for the socially
connected pairs will be 4.3% larger than the same ratio for unconnected pairs. Taking pairs
whose sales to suppliers’ total sales ratio is at the median level (0.15), this amounts to a
1For example, Bernanke et al. (1999) see information monitoring costs between lenders and borrowers as
a financial friction. The higher the cost, the more severe the friction
2In our sample, over 99% of the pairs’ sales exceed 1% of the total sales of the corresponding supplier
and almost 95% sales exceed 4%.
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0.65 percentage point increase. For suppliers whose sales are around the median ($311m),
this equals about $2m.
One explanation for this result is that during monetary recession periods, it becomes
more costly for firms to borrow from financial intermediaries like commercial banks. The
financial literature shows that firms will provide more trade credit during periods of tight
domestic credit3. Transactions between upstream and downstream firms will depend on
trade credit to a greater extent when the economy faces a monetary shock. Suppliers sign
trade credit contracts with the customers and such contracts are typically implemented in
the near future. However, there is an asymmetric information problem. Suppliers cannot
fully confirm customers’ ability to repay the debt. Thus, there is a hold-up problem. So-
cial connections between executives can help mitigate this problem, as they can lower the
cost of gathering information about the other party, and enhance the trust between them.
In line with this, Wu et al. (2014) find that suppliers in higher-social-trust regions extend
more trade credit to the private firms in China. Also related, Levine et al. (2018) argue
that highly-liquidity-dependent firms in high-trust countries get more trade credit and social
trust can ease the consequence of banking crises.
We cannot directly test whether this explanation, information-gathering and trust oper-
ating through trade credit, drives our result, as we do not observe within-pair trade credit.
Indirectly, however, we can examine the plausibility of this channel by investigating its im-
plications. First, if during monetary contractions, suppliers extend more trade credit to
customers to whom they are socially connected, then sales between them should increase
when the customers’ account payable increases. That is, the pairs’ sales should be more
sensitive to customers’ changes in the cash flow of account payable. Second, suppliers should
provide more trade credit in total if their main customers are more financially constrained or
have higher levels of trade credit dependence. To implement this, we divide our sample by
customer industry-level external financial dependence or liquidity needs, and check whether
suppliers which have more socially connected customers in our data will extend more trade
credit in response to a monetary shock. Third, if one reason social connections affect the
provision of trade credit and ultimately sales between firms is trust, we should expect the
trust of personal connections to be particularly important when background trust is high.
To investigate this, we divide our sample by state-level social trust and reestimate the main
effects.
3Eg. Lin and Ye 2017; Petersen and Rajan 1997; Fisman and Love 2003; Fisman and Raturi 2004;
Mateut, Bougheas, and Mizen 2006; Nilsen 2002.
89
In our empirical analyses, we find that during periods of monetary contractions, sales of
socially connected pairs are more sensitive to the use of trade credit. If the ratio of changes
in customer firms’ account payable over their current liabilities increases by 1 percentage
points, sales between the pair will on average increase by 0.32%, about 10.3% of the mean
level (3.1%) of the interaction of monetary recessions and social connections on sales. This
result confirms the first implication of the trade credit explanation we described above. For
the second implication, in the sample of high external financial dependence, our finding is
as follows. When the index of monetary policy increases by 1 standard deviation, cash flow
of account receivable (scaled by sales) of socially connected suppliers on average increases
0.63 percentage point more than the cash flow of unconnected suppliers. However, in the
low external financial dependence sample, this impact is not significant. A similar pattern
emerges when we divide the sample not by external financial dependence but by customer
liquidity needs. This is consistent with the trade credit channel. Finally, for the third
implication, when we divide our sample by state-level social trust, we find that the magnitude
of our main effect is larger if suppliers are located in states with relatively high social trust.
3.2 Literature Review
Our paper contributes to the literature studying the impact of social connections on firm
decision-making and performance. This literature studies both within-firm connections and
cross-firm connections, which our paper contributing to the latter. Ishii and Xuan (2014)
identify social connections by one’s education and job network. They find a negative impact
of social ties between acquirers and targets on merger performance. This finding supports
the hypothesis that social ties between an acquirer and a target lead to a weaker critical
analysis, lowering standards or missed opportunities. Using the educational and job social
ties but constructing a different measure of cross-firm connections, Dasgupta et al. (2018)
show that prior social connections between downstream and upstream firms can mitigate the
hold-up problems and foster R&D. Xue et al. (2018) use a sample of U.S. firms and their
IT suppliers and find that the interfirm managerial social ties increase the diversity of firms’
IT component diversity. Our paper also uses the education and job network to identify the
social connections across firms like Dasgupta et al. (2018). However, we focus on the effects
of social connections on the transmission of monetary shocks.
In our analyses, we argue that one reason social connections affect sales is that they affect
trust. This relates our paper to the literature studying the impact of social trust/capital.
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Knack and Keefer (1997) provide strong evidence that trust and civil cooperation signifi-
cantly affect aggregate economic activities. Levine et al. (2018) use the same measure of
social trust, but investigate the impact at the firm level. They find that firms with higher
levels of liquidity dependence suffer smaller declines in employment and profit in the pres-
ence of banking crisis if they are located in the countries with higher levels of social trust,
because they can get more trade credit. Lins et al. (2017) use a different measure, corpo-
rate social responsibility intensity, and find that firms with high social capital had a higher
stock return during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. In all these papers, it is not clear where
social trust comes from. In our work, we argue that personal social connections may be an
origin of trust, as proposed by sociologists. For example, McPherson et al. (2001) argue
that homophily in social networks limits people’s social worlds in a way that has powerful
implications for the attitudes they form. Glanville et al. (2013) use panel data to show that
social ties improve the sense of trust.
Other than enhancing trust, social connections facilitate the transfer of information.
Cohen et al. (2008) identify information transfer in the security market via educational
networks between mutual fund managers and corporate board members. The social network
between analysts and firms also helps sell-side analysts collect superior information about
firms (Cohen et al. 2010). The information-sharing function can help to mitigate the hold-
up problem due to asymmetric information when the suppliers and customers sign a trade
credit contract. This links our work to studies about the relationship between information
advantage and trade credit. Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Biais and Gollier (1997) show
that suppliers which have a comparative advantage in obtaining information about buyers
offer more trade credit to them.
Finally, our paper test the impact of monetary policy shocks on the pair-level sales and
trade credit, which adds to the literature related to the transmission of monetary policy.
This literature is too large to fully review here. To point to some related work, Mateut et
al. (2006) theoretically show that the ratio of bank lending relative to trade credit decreases
when the economy suffers a monetary tightness shock and confirm this finding through
an empirical analysis using UK manufacturing firms. Choi and Kim (2005) use a firm-level
panel and find that both accounts receivable and payable increase during periods of monetary
tightness. The results in our paper are consistent with these results.
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3.3 Data
The main pair-level firm data used in our empirical analyses is extracted from the Compustat
Segment files. Suppliers are required to disclose the identities of customers account for more
than 10% of their sales. The dataset contains detailed information about suppliers’ main
customers and the corresponding sales between them. We exclude generic customers whose
name contains ”vendor”, ”major”, ”foreign”, ”sales”, ”reported”, ”gov” and ”customers”.
We also exclude firm types other than companies. Finally, we also exclude financial services
and utilities using SIC identifiers from 4900 to 4999 and from 6000 to 6999. To mitigate the
effects of outliers and possible measurement errors, we trim our sample by 1%. Our sample
starts from 2000 because the social connection information of most companies is incomplete
before 2000. In the benchmark analyses, our sample extends to 2016. In the robustness
check, we restrict our sample to 2007 to sidestep any concerns associated with the 2008
financial crisis and the zero-lower-bound period.
We obtain suppliers’ and customers’ financial information from Compustat. The dataset
contains details on investment, capital structure, cash flow and balance sheet items. We
match suppliers’ financial information with the pair-level data (Compustat Segment) by the
cik and cusip identifiers. However, as with customers, Compustat Segment doesn’t provide
any identifier which we can use to match customers’ financial information. Customers are
listed by suppliers by the name of the firm as opposed to a unique identifier that would
allow us to obtain their financial information in the data. As a result, we match these
names to firm names in Compustat with the following procedure. First, we pre-process firm
names, removing common strings such as ”corp”, ”Inc” etc. Second, we check for direct
name matches. For company names that remain without a direct match, we follow the nat-
ural language processing literature and find candidate matches by transforming firm names
computing distance measures between them. We find that the Jaccard-distance on sets of
3-grams of firm names works well. We select the match with the greatest similarity (shortest
distance). Finally, we manually check best matches to ensure they refer to the same company.
We divide suppliers and customers at the two-digit levels according to Standard Indus-
trial Classification (SIC). We construct industry-level data based on the Compustat Capital
IQ-North America-Fundamental Annual, which compiles balance sheets and income state-
ments for US-listed firms.
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Table 3.1
Statistical Descriptions
Mean Min Max Median S.D.
Dependent Variable
Pair-Sale/Supplier-Sale 0.20 0.0078 1 0.15 0.16
Suppliers’ Account
Receivable (changes)/Total Assets*100 0.95 -32.32 35.99 0.75 6.40
Independent Variables
social connection dummy 0.34 0 1 0 0.47
weak social connection dummy 0.47 0 1 0 0.50
monetary contraction index 0 -2.42 1.70 0 1
Other controls
log(Suppliers’ asset) 5.88 -5.12 10.62 5.85 1.85
Suppliers’ Profitability 0.054 -3.32 1.39 0.10 0.23
Suppliers’ Asset Tangibility 0.22 0 0.98 0.14 0.22
log(Customers’ asset) 10.21 3.41 13.86 10.37 1.60
Distance 1479.89 0 12756.91 711.69 2279.49
Relationship 0.28 0 21 0 1.20
3.3.1 Social Connections
To capture social connections, we use BoardEx, which has extensive data on the boards of
publicly listed and notable private companies in all regions of the world, including their edu-
cation, prior employment and current role. We link our data to BoardEx using the cusip and
cik firm identifiers. As we want to study the extent to which social connections moderate the
impact of monetary policy, we restrict the set of executives we examine to those that have
important roles. Specifically, we restrict our attention to executives whose role description
contain any of the following words: ceo, cfo, coo, chairman, president, executive vp, general
manager, md, manager, partner, president, senior vp, vice president, owner, leader.
Then we construct our measures of social connections as follows. For each supplier-
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customer pair at a given point in time, we construct a list of executives meeting the above
criteria. Then for each pair of executives from the supplier firm and the customer firm,
we check whether they have studied at the same university (weak educational tie), at over-
lapping periods (educational tie) and whether any of their previous jobs were at the same
company (weak employment tie) at the same time (employment tie). We allow for pairs of
executives to count as multiple social connections if for instance they have both studied at
the same university and worked at the same company prior to their current employment.
We drop the pairs whose social connections are larger than 500.
Finally, we only keep pairs that at least have two-year observations in our sample, as we
need within-pair variation to estimate the effects. We end up with 2,379 pairs of suppliers
and customers which have variations in social connections over time, adding up to 11,990
pair-year observations.
3.3.2 Monetary Policy
To estimate the effect of monetary shocks on firm behaviors, we require a plausibly exoge-
nous measure. In this paper, as pair-level data for firms is used to explore the impact of
monetary policy, identification depends on the assumption that the aggregate variable, mon-
etary shocks, has a considerable impact on individual firm pairs, but that these firm pairs
have little effects on aggregate variables. Central banks do not formulate monetary policy
based on individual firms’ performance.
A usual measure of monetary tightening shocks applied in the financial literature, as in
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), Choi and Kim (2005) and Lin and Ye (2018), is the changes in
the federal funds rate, provided that the federal funds rate is thought of as a good representa-
tive of the Reserve’s policy stance (Bernanke and Blinder 1992, Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans 1996). In the benchmark analyses, we want to use a similar measure. However, our
sample extends from 2000 to 2016, including the recent crisis when the interest rate reached
the zero lower bond (ZLB) and the fed implemented unconventional monetary policies. The
effective fed funds rate can’t represent the monetary stance in the ZLB period. Wu and
Xia (2016) construct a shadow fed funds rate to summarize the overall stance of monetary
policy for the ZLB period. We use the changes in the shadow fed funds rate as the measure
of monetary tightening shocks. We normalize this measure to 0 mean and unit standard
deviation. Figure 3.1 shows that this time series over the period 2000-2016. We can see
that over the period 2004-2006 and 2014-2016, the index of monetary policy is larger than
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Figure 3.1: Monetary Policy
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This figure shows the evolution of monetary policy index over the period 2000-2016.
0, implying a monetary contraction period.
In the robustness section, we restrict our sample from 2000 to 2007 to exclude the impact
of the 2008 financial crisis. We use two alternative measures of monetary policy. These two
measures come from Romer and Romer (2004)4 and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018). The
first measure decomposes the changes in the federal fund rate using the Greenbook forecast,
and the second measure develops the monetary policy index based on high frequency iden-
tification.
4This monetary policy index is extended to 2007 by Wieland and Yang (2019).
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3.3.3 Sales and Trade Credit
In this paper, we mainly focus on the impact of monetary shocks on the transactions between
suppliers and customers. The sales between them are the only pair-level variable available to
us. As mentioned before, we focus on the relatively large sales. The median and mean ratios
of the pair-level sales to suppliers’ total sales in our sample are 0.15 and 0.20, respectively. In
our sample, over 99% of the pair-level sales can account for at least 1% of the corresponding
supplier’ total sales, and almost 95% can account for at least 4%.
We propose trade credit as an important channel through which social connections affect
the impact of monetary shocks on pair-level sales. As previously indicated, we do not observe
trade credit at the pair level, we instead investigate the implications of this channel we would
expect to hold if it is important. In this paper, suppliers’ trade credit is defined as the ratio
of the change in account receivable (rect) to total sales (sale). We multiply this ratio by 100.
Supplier trade credit is positive if more goods are sold than bought and negative otherwise.
Table 3.1 shows that the median and mean values of trade credit provided are 0.75 and 0.95,
respectively, with a standard deviation of 6.40.
3.3.4 Social Capital
Social connections affect decision-making and performance because they can enhance trust
as we discussed in the introduction. This implies that the level of regional social trust may
have a substantial influence on the impact of social connections. Fukuyama ((1995), p. 27)
and Putnam (2000), p. 19) define social trust as the expectation that human beings behave
in a cooperative and honest way within a community and the extent to which reciprocity
and trustworthiness can govern the interactions among humans. Putnam (2000) argues that
an agent’s social capital is more valuable with an increase in overall regional social capital.
Framing this argument in our context, In regions with high social trust, social connections
may become more valuable. We predict that social connections play a more important role
in the transmission of monetary contraction shocks in regions with relatively high social
trust. In our story, suppliers provide more trade credit to their socially connected customers
in response to monetary contraction shocks. Thus, the level of social trust in the state
where the suppliers are located in the key factor. In this paper, we use two measures of
state-level social trust. One is Sen. Mike Lee’s Social Capital Project5 which combines
5For the detail of this index, check the website
https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/scp-index.
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seven dimensions. The other one is from Gallup6, which reflects the degree that Americans
express trust in their neighbors. Besides, we also want to see whether suppliers’ social capital
affects the impact of social connections. This firm-level index of social capital is constructed
based on Lins et al (2017).
3.3.5 Other Controls
Some supplier- and customer-specific time-varying characteristics likely affect sales between
suppliers and customers, and hence should be included as controls in all regressions. First,
firm size has a considerable impact on sales. We capture supplier and customer firm size
by the logarithm of total assets. Second, we also include supplier profitability to capture
supplier differences in generating earnings and implementing efficient management. This
variable is measured by the ratio of operating income before depreciation (oibdp) to total
assets. Third, to control for the effect of suppliers’ asset structures on their sales to the main
customers, we use asset tangibility which is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment
(ppent) to total assets (at). Finally, Mcmillan and Woodruff (1999) and Antras and Foley
(2015) document that relationship length has a particularly important effect on suppliers’
provision of trade credit. As a robustness check, we control for the distance between firms
and their relationship. We use the address provided in the Compustat to calculate the
distance between the suppliers and customers. As with the relationship, we use the number
of years that the supplier and customer have been trading before 2000. To reduce the
effects of possibly spurious outlines, we eliminatie the top and bottom 1% value of pair-level,
supplier-level and customer-level variables.The statistical descriptions of these controls are
also present in Table 3.1.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
We start our analyses by examining how social connections affect the impact of monetary
contraction shocks on the pair-level sales. Then we provide some robustness checks to our
baseline results. Finally, we extend our analyses in two ways. One way is to explain our
benchmark results from the trade credit channel. The other is to check the heterogenous
effects of social connections across regions with different levels of social trust.
6The data is from the website https://news.gallup.com/poll/123986/utah-south-dakota-best-places-lose-
wallet.aspx
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3.4.1 The Effects of Monetary Contractions on Sales
Existing studies show that firms in countries with higher levels of social trust suffer less
during periods of liquidity crisis (e.g., Levine et al. 2018). To see the impact of social
connections between firms on the propagation of monetary policy shocks, we estimate the
following benchmark model:
log
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
= β0 + β1 · dummy sci,j,t ·MPt + β2 · dummy sci,j,t + β3 · c sizej,t
∆ ∗Pairi,j + Γ ∗Xi,t + uis + ujs + ut + i,j,t
(3.1)
Salei,j,t and dummy sci,j,t are the sales and the measure of social connections between
supplier i and customer j in year t, respectively. Our primary social connection measure
is a dummy variable: dummy sci,j,t equals 1 if there is one senior executive at the supplier
firm that attended the same university or previously worked at the same company as at
least one senior executive at the customer firm. Salei,t is the total sales of supplier i at
time t. MPt is the index of monetary shocks in year t. c sizej,t is the time-varying total
assets of the customer firm. Pairi,j is a vector of time-invariant pair-level characteristics.
uic and ujc are supplier’s and customer’s industry-fixed effects, respectively. Xi,t is the time-
varying information set for the supplier. ut denotes time-fixed effects. The interaction term,
dummy sci,j,t ·MPt, captures the extent to which social connections moderate the sales be-
tween suppliers and customers when the economy experiences a monetary contraction shock.
We control for supplier’s and customer’s industry-fixed effects to capture the impact of
time-invariant unobservable industry characteristics. However, firms might interact more, in
sales and in drawing upon the same employees, with those firms that are in their vicinity.
We alter the regression equation to check the robustness of our results by including pair
fixed effects (ui,j). Thus, our regressions exclude the impact of time-invariant unobservable
pair characteristics which may influence sales as well as social connections between suppliers
and customers. The impacts of Pairi,j, uis and ujs are absorbed. We include time-varying
suppliers characteristics plus time fixed effects7 to account for trends and other shocks. For
example, Gulen and Ion (2016) find that news-based policy uncertainty has a strong negative
relationship with firm-level capital investment. Nguyen and Phan (2017) show that firms are
less eager to make mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and spend more time completing M&A
deals in face of policy uncertainty.
7Which is why we do not include MPt separately. Results are unchanged if we omit time fixed effects
and include instead the full interaction of monetary shocks and social connections
98
Figure 3.2: Social Connections
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Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of social connections over 2000-2016. The solid line depicts the percentage of
pairs that have at least one social connection, where employment and work ties must overlap, and the dash
line the percentage of pairs that have a weak social connections, for which employment and work ties need
not overlap.
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In our benchmark analyses, we are interested in the interaction of monetary shocks and
social connections on the sales between suppliers and customers. Appropriate measures of
monetary contractions and social connections are vitally important for our analysis. To ad-
dress these concerns, in the robustness section, we use two alternative measures of monetary
policy and another measure of social connections using a broader definition to check the
robustness of our baseline results. Besides, the social connections between downstream and
upstream firms may just a result of short distance and long corporation duration. We add
the interaction of monetary policy with them to exclude the impact of distance and duration.
Table 3.2 presents the estimated parameters from model (1) investigating whether social
connections have a significant impact on the transmission of monetary shocks. We are in-
terested in the interaction term, dummy sci,j,t ·MPt, which captures the extent to which
social connections moderate pair-level sales when the aggregate economy suffers a monetary
shock. The solid line in Figure 3.2 denotes the percentage of socially connected pairs over
the year 2000-2016. We can see that the fraction of the connected pairs increases from less
than 25% in 2000 to almost 40% in 2016.
In column (i) and (ii), we control for supplier and customer industry-fixed effects. The
only difference between these two columns is that we add time-fixed effects in column (ii).
Thus, the impact of monetary policy is absorbed. We can see that the estimated coefficients
on the interaction of social connection dummy and monetary contraction are positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level. That is to say, sales between the connected pairs
account for a greater share of suppliers total sales than the counterparts for the unconnected
pairs during monetary shocks. We control for pair-fixed effects in column (iii) and (iv), and
thus both industry-fixed effects, as well as Pairi,j, are absorbed. The regression in column
(iv) controls for time-fixed effects like that in column (ii). We can see that the interaction
terms keep their symbols and significance at 5% level at least. Our main results still hold.
Asset tangibility has considerable impacts on their sales according to the finance liter-
ature. To isolate the impact of supplier asset tangibility, we interact it with the index of
monetary policy. For similar reasons, we also include the interactions of monetary contrac-
tions and suppliers’ size, customers’ size and suppliers’ profitability in the regression to check
the robustness of our result. The estimation results are present in the Appendix A3.1. We
find that adding the interaction terms does not alter our result.
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Table 3.2
Monetary Policy and Sales
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
dummy sc ∗MP 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.031*** 0.028**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010)
MP -0.017** -0.010*
(0.0081) (0.0057)
dummy sc 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.0045 0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
CusSize 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.057*** 0.13***
(0.0063) (0.0065) (0.020) (0.023)
SupSize -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.12*** -0.10***
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.013) (0.013)
Profitability -0.10** -0.10** -0.038 -0.035
(0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.048)
Tangibility 0.016 0.014 0.093 0.0020
(0.058) (0.058) (0.10) (0.10)
Distance 0.0049 0.0051
(0.0071) (0.0071)
Relation 0.015*** 0.015**
(0.0055) (0.0055)
Fixed Effect
Supplier Industry Yes Yes No No
Customer Industry Yes Yes No No
Pair No No Yes Yes
Time No Yes No Yes
Observations 11,990 11,990 11,990 11,990
Pairs 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379
Adj −R2 0.08 0.08 0.66 0.66
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents the
results of the following empirical specification: log
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
= β0 +β1×dummy sci,j,t×MPt +
β2 × dummy sci,j,t + β3 × c sizej,t ∗ +∆ ∗ Pairi,j + Γ ∗ Xi,t + uis + ujs + ut + i,j,t, where
Salei,j,t and dummy sci,j,t are the sales and the index of social connections between supplier
i and customer j in year t respectively. We use the dummy variable of social ties between
upstream and down stream firms as the main index of social connections. This dummy
equals to one if there exists at least one of the senior managers and board members from
the supplier ever attended a same educational institution or worked at a same company for
an overlapping period with one of the corresponding customer’s senior managers and board
members. Salei,t is the total sales of supplier i in period t. MPt is the index of monetary
contractions in year t. c sizej,t is the time-variant total assets of customer. Pairi,j is a
vector of time-invariant pair-level characteristics. uic and ujc are supplier’s and customer’s
industry-fixed effects respectively. In our analyses, we also include pair-level fixed effects to
check the robustness, and thus the impacts of Pairi,j, uis and ujs are absorbed. Xi,t is the
time-varying information set for the supplier. ut denotes time-fixed effects. Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair and year levels are reported in parentheses.
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To gauge the economic magnitude of the effects, we use the regression result in column
(i). The coefficient for the interaction term is 0.043. Thus, when the index of monetary
shocks increases by one standard deviation, the ratio of the pair-level sales to suppliers’ total
sales will be 4.3% larger if the pair is socially connected than if not. Using pairs whose sales
over suppliers’ total sales is at the median level (0.15), the increase in between firm sales to
supplier sales amounts to 0.65 percentage points (15× 0.043). For suppliers whose sales are
located at the median level ($311 million), this reflects additional sales worth over $2 million
(311× 0.65%), assuming that total sales are unaffected.
Other than Wu and Xia (2016), Krippner (2016) measures the monetary stance using
shadow interest rate (SSR). This rate is estimated from the shadow yield curve. As SSR
reflects the impact of unconventional monetary policy on the longer-maturity interest se-
curities, it has been an effective and popular index of monetary policy across conventional
and unconventional environment. We use the changes in SSR as the measure to reflect the
monetary stance and repeat our analyses. The results don’t change, and we present them in
Appendix A3.2.
3.4.2 Robustness Check
In this section, we provide three robustness checks to our benchmark results. First, we
construct a weak social connection measure, and examine the impact of these new connection
measure on the transmission of monetary policy shocks. This new measure doesn’t need an
overlapping-period social tie. Next, to address the concern that our results just hold for a
particular measure of monetary policy, we use two alternative measure of monetary policy.
Finally, we isolate the impact of distance and relationships on monetary policy transmissions.
New Social Connection Measure
In our baseline analyses, the suppliers and their customers are identified socially connected
if their senior managers and board members ever attended a same educational institution
or worked at a same third company for an overlapping period. This measure is thought of
as an overlapping social connection measure (Ishii and Xuan (2014)). However, even if the
members from the two parties attend a same educational institution or worked at a same
third company at a different time, they are likely to be socially connected, especially for
the educational network. For example, nowadays there is a lot of university alumni asso-
ciations. People are likely to be interactive via these associations, especially for those who
hold a senior position in one company. Next, we construct a new social connection measure
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Table 3.3: Weak Social Connections
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
wdummy sc ∗MP 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.024** 0.022**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.0097) (0.0097)
MP -0.019** -0.011*
(0.0091) (0.0064)
wdummy sc 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.043*** 0.047**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Fixed Effect
Supplier Industry Yes Yes No No
Customer Industry Yes Yes No No
Pair No No Yes Yes
Time No Yes No Yes
Observations 11,990 11,990 11,990 11,990
Pairs 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379
Adj −R2 0.08 0.08 0.66 0.66
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents the
results of the following empirical specification:log
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
= β0 +β1×wdummy sci,j,t ·MPt +
β2×wdummy sci,j,t+β3×c sizej,t+∆∗Pairi,j +Γ∗Xi,t+uis+ujs+ut+i,j,t, where Salei,j,t
and wdummy sci,j,t are the sales and the index of social connections between supplier i
and customer j in year t respectively. We use the dummy variable of social ties between
upstream and down stream firms as the main index of social connections. This dummy
equals to one if there exists at least one of the senior managers and board members from
the supplier ever attended a same educational institution or worked at a same company
with one of the corresponding customer’s senior managers and board members (weak
connections). Salei,t is the total sales of supplier i in period t. MPt is the index of monetary
contractions in year t. c sizej,t is the time-variant total assets of customer. Pairi,j is a
vector of time-invariant pair-level characteristics. uic and ujc are supplier’s and customer’s
industry-fixed effects respectively. In our analyses, we also include pair-level fixed effects to
check the robustness, and thus the impacts of Pairi,j, uis and ujs are absorbed. Xi,t is the
time-varying information set for the supplier. ut denotes time-fixed effects. Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair and year levels are reported in parentheses.
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where we only require that members from the suppliers and their customers ever attended
at a same educational institution or worked at a same company. This measure is called the
weak social connection measure. In our sample, we can see that the mean value of weak
social connection dummy is 0.47, implying that 47% of the observations are weakly socially
connected. The dash line in Figure 3.2 denotes the percentage of socially connected pairs
over the year 2000-2016. We can see that the fraction of the connected pairs increases from
less than 35% in 2000 to around 50% in 2016.
We present the regression results with respect to the weak measure of social connections
in Table 3.3. They are ordered as that in Table 3.2. We can still find that the coefficients
on the interaction of weak social connection dummy and monetary contractions are positive
and significant at the 5% level at least. Weak social connections can still facilitate the sales
between supplier and customers when the aggregate economy comes across a monetary con-
traction shock.
To gauge the size of the impact of weak social connections on the propagation of monetary
contraction shocks, we use the regression result in the first column as an example. When
the economy suffers a one-standard-deviation increase in the index of monetary policy, the
ratio of the pair-level sales over suppliers’ total sales for the socially connected pairs will be
3.6% larger than that of the unconnected ones. Using the pairs whose sales over suppliers’
total sales are in the median level (0.15) as an example, the sales for these pairs can account
0.54(0.015*3.6) percentage point more if the corresponding suppliers and customers are so-
cially connected. For suppliers whose sales are located in the median level ($312 million),
this means that they can sell $1.68 (312*0.54%) million more to their customers if they are
socially connected. We can see that the impact of social connections is quite apparent and
large. The fact that social connections facilitate sales in the presence of monetary recession
shocks is robust to the weak social connections.
Alternative Measure of Monetary Contraction
This paper focuses on the social connections’ impact on the transmissions of monetary policy.
An appropriate measure of monetary policy is very important. In the baseline analyses, we
construct the monetary policy shock using the shadow fed funds rate. In this subsection, we
use two alternative measures of monetary policy to check the robustness of our results. These
two measures come from Romer and Romer (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018). The
first measure decomposes the changes in federal fund rate using the Greenbook forecast, and
the second measure develops the monetary policy index based on high frequency identifica-
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tion. To avoid the zero-lower bound issues, following Ottonello and Winberry (2018), we use
these two measures from 2000 to 2007.8 The evolution of the new measures is shown in Fig-
ure 3.3. The aggregate economy suffers a monetary contraction over the period 2004-2006.
The correlations between the three measures are listed in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4
Correlation between Different Measures of Monetary Policy
Shadow Rate Romer&Romer Nakamura&Steinsson
Shadow Rate 1
Romer&Romer 0.90 1
Nakamura&Steinsson 0.92 0.78 1
This table shows the correlation between the monetary policy measures from shadow rate,
Romer and Romer (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2018).
Then we use these new measures to repeat the benchmark analyses to check whether
the regression results are robust to different measures. The results are present in Table 3.5.
The first two columns use Romer and Romer’s measure, and the rest two use Nakamura and
Steinsson’s. We control for supplier- and customer- industry fixed effects in all regressions
and add time fixed effects in column (ii) and (iv). We present the results controlling for pair-
fixed effects in the Appendix A3.3. The interactions of the new monetary policy measure
and social connection dummy keep their significance at least at the 5% level. Thus, the
sales between the upstream and downstream firms account more in the supplier’s total sales
if they are socially connected when the aggregate economy suffers a monetary contraction
shock. Taking the results in column (i) into consideration, when the economy suffers a one-
standard-deviation increase in the index of monetary policy, the ratio of the pair-level sales
over suppliers’ total sales for the socially connected pairs will be 5.1% larger than that of the
unconnected ones. Using the pairs whose sales over suppliers’ total sales are in the median
level (0.15) as an example, the sales for these pairs can account 0.77(15*5.1%) percentage
point more if the corresponding suppliers and customers are socially connected. For suppliers
whose sales are located in the median level ($212 million)9, this means that they can sell $1.62
8During the ZLB periods, these two measures can’t captures firms’ responses to unconventional monetary
policy shocks.
9In this section, our sample extends from 2000 to 2007. Thus, the median level of suppliers’ total sales
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Table 3.5
Alternative Measure of Monetary Policy
RR NS
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
dummy sc ∗MP 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.053** 0.054**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
MP -0.022** -0.024**
(0.010) (0.011)
dummy sc 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.096*** 0.099***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Fixed Effect
Supplier Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,551 5,551 5,551 5,551
Pairs 1,407 1,407 1,407 1,407
Adj −R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents
the results of the following empirical specification: log
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
= β0 + β1 × dummy sci,j,t ×
MPt + β2 × dummy sci,j,t + β3 × c sizej,t + ∆ ∗ Pairi,j + Γ ∗ Xi,t + uis + ujs + ut + i,j,t,
where Salei,j,t and dummy sci,j,t are the sales and the index of social connections between
supplier i and customer j in year t respectively. We use the dummy variable of social
ties between upstream and down stream firms as the main index of social connections.
This dummy equals to one if there exists at least one of the senior managers and board
members from the supplier ever attended a same educational institution or worked at a
same company for an overlapping period with one of the corresponding customer’s senior
managers and board members. Salei,t is the total sales of supplier i in period t. MPt
is the index of monetary contractions in year t. The first two columns use Romer and
Romer’s index, and the rest two use Nakamura and Steinsson’s. c sizej,t is the time-variant
total assets of customer. Pairi,j is a vector of time-invariant pair-level characteristics.
uic and ujc are supplier’s and customer’s industry-fixed effects, respectively. Xi,t is the
time-varying information set for the supplier. ut denotes time-fixed effects. Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair and year levels are reported in parentheses.
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Figure 3.3: Alternative Measures of Monetary Policy
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This figure shows the evolution of two alternative measures of monetary policy over the period 2000-2007.
The solid line is constructed by Romer and Romer (2004), while the dash line monetary policy time series
comes from Nakamura and Steinsson (2018).
(212*0.77%) million more to their customers if they are socially connected. Here, we only
repeat the results with respect to the social connection dummy. If we use the new measure
of monetary policy to repeat the regressions with the weak social connection dummy, the
results are much similar to the results in Table 3.3. We show these in Appendix A3.4. The
coefficients on the interaction term are still positive and (weakly) significant. In conclusion,
social connections help to facilitate the transactions between the upstream and downstream
firms during periods of monetary contractions.
changes.
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The Role of Distance and Relationship
One concern may bias our benchmark results is that social connections may be just a result
of short distance or long relationship. For example, the suppliers are likely to admit the
graduates from a same university or employ the staff from a same third company with the
customers located near them. The suppliers may share a similar preference in the graduate
with their long-period customers. The social ties are then probably related to the distance
between the upstream and downstream firms and the duration that the two parties have
interacted with each other. In this subsection, we want to exclude the impact of pair-level
distance or relationship to see whether social connections still have an impact on the trans-
mission of monetary contraction shocks. We add the interactions of monetary contractions
with the index of distance and relationship, respectively, in the empirical specification (1):
log
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
= β0 + β1 · dummy sci,j,t ·MPt + β2 · dummy sci,j,t + β3 · c sizej,t + Γ ∗Xi,t
+Θ ∗MPt ∗Pairi,j + ∆ ∗Pairi,j + uis + ujs + ut + i,j,t
where Pairi,j ∈ {distancei,j, relationshipi,j}. distancei,j is the distance between the
headquarters of the supplier and customer, and relationshipi,j denotes the number of years
that the supplier and customer have been trading before 2000. Other variables are the same
as those in the empirical specification (1).
The estimation results are present in Table 3.6 where the first two columns add the inter-
action of monetary contractions and distance and corporation duration, respectively. And
the last column excludes the effects of relationship and distance at the same time. We can
see after isolating the impact of distance between the supplier and customer, the coefficients
on the interaction terms are still significant at the 1% level. This implies that the sales
within the connected pairs, on average, account more in the corresponding supplier’s total
sales, compared to the counterpart for the unconnected pairs. In detail, when the economy
suffers a one-standard-deviation increase in the index of monetary policy, the ratio of the
pair-level sales to suppliers’ total sales for the socially connected pairs will be 4.4% larger
than that for the unconnected ones. Using the pairs whose sales over suppliers’ total sales are
in the median level (0.15) as an example, the sales for these pairs can account 0.66(0.15*4.4)
percentage point more if the corresponding suppliers and customers are socially connected.
For suppliers whose sales are located in the median level ($311 million), this means that they
can sell over $2 (312*0.66%) million more to their customers if they are socially connected.
Column (ii) shows that if we add the interaction of monetary transactions and relationship
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Table 3.6
Distance and Relationship
(i) (ii) (iii)
dummy sc*MP 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.44***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.14)
dummy sc 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.075***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
MP -0.017** -0.018** -0.019**
(0.0081) (0.0084) (0.0084)
Distance*MP 0.0070 0.0070
(0.0072) (0.0071)
relationship*MP 0.0047 0.0048
(0.0064) (0.0065)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect
Supplier Industry Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,990 11,990 11,990
Pairs 2,379 2,379 2,379
Adj −R2 0.08 0.08 0.08
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.This table presents the
results of the following empirical specification: log
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
= β0 + β1 × dummy sci,j,t ·MPt +
β2×dummy sci,j,t +β3× c sizej,t + Γ∗Xi,t + Θ∗MPt ∗Pairi,j + ∆∗Pairi,j +ui,j +ut + i,j,t,
where Salei,j,t and dummy sci,j,t are the sales and the index of social connections between
supplier i and customer j in year t respectively. We use the dummy variable of social
ties between upstream and down stream firms as the main index of social connections.
This dummy equals to one if there exists at least one of the senior managers and board
members from the supplier ever attended a same educational institution or worked at
a same company for an overlapping period with one of the corresponding customer’s
senior managers and board members. MPt is the index of monetary contractions in year
t. Salei,t is the total sales of supplier i in period t. c sizej,t is the time-variant total
assets of customer. Pairi,j denotes the distance between the supplier and customer or the
duration that the downstream firms become the main customers of the supplier. Xi,t is the
time-varying information set for the supplier. ut denotes time-fixed effects. Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair and year levels are reported in parentheses.109
to control for the impact of relationship, our results doesn’t change. Besides, controlling for
pair-fixed effects doesn’t alter the results. We report these results in the Appendix A3.5. In
conclusion, our benchmark results are robust to the model with the impact of distance and
relationship excluded.
3.5 Extensions
In this section, first, we explain the benchmark results from the trade credit channel. Second,
we exploit regional variations in social trust to explore the heterogenous effects of social
connections.
3.5.1 The Trade Credit Channel
Why do social connections affect the transmission of monetary recession shocks to the trans-
actions between suppliers and customers? And via which channel do social connections affect
the impact of monetary policy on the sales within each transaction pair?
In face of monetary contractions, firms may come across more difficulties and cost more
to borrow from financial intermediaries like commercial banks. Trade credit from the sup-
pliers can be an important substitute of credit for the downstream firms. The transactions
between suppliers and customers will rely on trade credit more during periods of monetary
recessions. The customers can choose to sign trade credit contracts with their suppliers,
and the contract should be implemented in the near future. The asymmetric information
problem between the two parties will incur a hold-up problem. The suppliers are not sure
about customers’ ability to repay the debt, as they don’t know their customers’ profitabil-
ity, management, and other financial conditions completely. Social connections will help to
mitigate the hold-up problem by improving the efficiency of information transfer and lower-
ing the cost of gathering information. Thus, suppliers are more likely to trust the socially
connected customers, which makes suppliers have more incentives offer more trade credit to
their customers.
Motivated by the arguments above, we expect that suppliers will extend more trade
credit to their connected customers in face of monetary recession shocks, as they know the
connected ones’ financial conditions better and trust the connected customers more. To
test this hypothesis directly, we should know the trade credit within each pair over time.
Unfortunately, we have no information about the pair-level trade credit. We will test two
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indirect conjectures instead. First, if the connected pair uses more trade credit in face of
monetary contractions, customers will accumulate account payable more. Thus, the sales
should be more sensitive to customers’ changes in account payable for the connected pairs.
We estimate this conjecture by estimating the following regression specification:
log(
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
) = θ0+θ1∗dummy sci,j,t∗MPt∗apchj,t
lctj,t
+θ2∗dummy sci,j,t∗MPt+θ3∗dummy sci,j,t∗apchj,t
lctj,t
+θ4 ∗ apchj,t
lctj,t
∗MPt + θ5 ∗ dummy sci,j,t + θ6 ∗ apchj,t
lctj,t
+θ7 ∗ sizei,t + θ8 ∗ c sizej,t + ui,j + ut + i,j,t (2)
where apchj,t is supplier j’s changes in account payable, and lctj,t denotes supplier j’s
total current liabilities. Other variables are the same as those in equation (1). We also
further control time-fixed effects and use a weak social connection dummy to check the ro-
bustness. The triple interaction term, dummy sci,j,t ∗MPt ∗ apchj,tlctj,t , reflects the sensitivity
of the connected pair’s sales to the corresponding customer’s trade credit payables during
periods of monetary contractions. A positive value of the coefficient (θ1) is consistent with
our prediction.
Table 3.7 present the estimation results. We concentrate on the triple interaction term,
dummy sci,j,t∗MPt∗ apchj,tlctj,t , which reflects the sensitivity of the pair-level sales to the changes
in corresponding customers’ account payable in face of monetary contractions. In the first
two columns, we use the social connection dummy in Section 3.4.1, while social connections
in the rest two columns refer to weak social connection dummy used in the robustness check.
The only difference between the first two columns is that we control for time-fixed effects
in the second column. The impact of monetary policy is absorbed in the second column.
First, we can see that the coefficients on the interaction of social connection dummy and
monetary contractions are still positive and keep their significance at 5% level. This implies
that when we keep suppliers’ ratio of changes in account payable scaled over total current
liabilities at the mean level10, the socially connected pairs’ sales will account more in the
corresponding supplier’s total sales compared to the unconnected ones’ when the aggregate
economy when the aggregate economy comes across a monetary contraction shock. These
estimation results are consistent with our benchmark results. More importantly, we can see
10In Table 3.7, we normalize the changes in account payable scaled by total current liabilities to 0 mean.
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Table 3.7
Trade Credit Channel I
Dummy Weak Dummy
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
dummy sc ∗MP ∗ apch
lct
0.32** 0.32** 0.29** 0.30**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
dummy sc ∗MP 0.031*** 0.028** 0.024** 0.022**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
dummy sc ∗ apch
lct
0.24 0.21 0.25 0.22
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
MP ∗ apch
lct
-0.029 -0.036 -0.020 -0.029
(0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.068)
dummy sc -0.0082 -0.0017 0.035** 0.039***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
apch
lct
-0.087 -0.063 -0.093 -0.067
(0.074) (0.076) (0.074) (0.076)
MP -0.0089 -0.010
(0.0061) (0.0068)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect
Time No Yes No Yes
Pair Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,004 11,004 11,004 11,004
Pairs 2,212 2,212 2,212 2,212
Adj −R2 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This ta-
ble presents the results of the following empirical specification: log(
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
) =
θ0 + θ1 ∗ dummy sci,j,t ∗MPt ∗ apchj,tlctj,t + θ2 ∗ dummy sci,j,t ∗MPt + θ3 ∗ dummy sci,j,t ∗
apchj,t
lctj,t
+
θ4 ∗ apchj,tlctj,t ∗MPt + θ5 ∗ dummy sci,j,t + θ6 ∗
apchj,t
lctj,t
+ θ7 ∗MPt + γ ∗Xi,t + ui,j + i,j,t, where
apchj,t is supplier j’s changes in account payables and lctj,t denotes supplier j’s total current
liabilities. Other variables are same as the one in Table 3.2. In the first two columns, the
social connection dummy is same as that in Table 3.2. The weak social connection dummy
in the rest two columns refers to the one in Table 3.3 (weak connections). Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair and year levels are reported in parentheses.
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that the coefficients on the triple interaction term are positive and statistically significance at
the 5% level, consistent with our expectation. For the connected pairs, when the customers
use more trade credit, the pair-level sales will account more compared to the unconnected
pairs when there exists a monetary contraction shock. Customers will ask for more trade
credit from their connected suppliers to pay their transactions. Our estimation result is
robust if we use weak social connection dummy as the explanatory variable. The estimation
results are shown in the rest two columns.
We use the regression result in the first column to understand the extent to which cus-
tomers’ apch
lct
increases the sales within the connected pairs when the economy suffers a one-
standard-deviation monetary contraction shock. The sales within the connected pairs will
account 3.1% more in the supplier’s total sales than the unconnected ones during periods of
monetary recessions when customers’ apch
lct
stays at the mean level. If the customers’ changes
in account payables occupy 1 percentage point more total current liabilities, the interaction
of social connection dummy and monetary recession will increase by 0.32%, corresponding
to 10.3% of the mean level of the interaction on the sales (3.1%). We have that the sales of
the connected pair are quite sensitive to the customers’ apch
lct
.
Next, we use suppliers’ total trade credit instead of pair-level trade credit to explore
whether social connections affect suppliers’ provision of trade credit in total when they
suffer a monetary recession shock. We construct a supplier-level index of social connections
by calculating the mean of pair-level social connections for one supplier in the corresponding
year. That is:
sci,t = Meani,t(dummy sci,j,t)
sci,t reflects customer i’s ratio of connected customers during period t.
Existing studies suggest that firms will issue more trade credit to their customers when
they suffers a monetary contraction shock.11 We conjecture that social connections amplify
this impact and test this conjecture by estimating the following regression equation:
Rechi,t/salei,t = α0 + α1 ∗ sci,t ∗MPt + α2 ∗ sci,t
+γXi,t + ui + ut + i,t (3)
11Choi and Kim (2005) find that both account receivable and payable increases with monetary contractions.
Mateut et al. (2006) find that firms use more trade credit than bank credit in response to a monetary
contraction shock.
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Figure 3.5: Suppliers’ Change in Account Receivable
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The solid line is the evolution of monetary policy index. The dash line is the difference
of the mean value of suppliers’ changes in account receivable between the “connected” and
“unconnected” group over 2000-2017. Here “connected” means that at least one senior
managers or board member of the supplier even attended the same educational institutions or
worked at the same company for an overlapping time with the counterparts of the customer.
Rechi,t is changes in supplier i’s account receivable in year t. salei,t denotes supplier i’s total
sales.
Other variables are same as those in estimation equation (1). We also control firm- and
time-fixed effects. The key variable of interest is the coefficient (α1) on the interaction term
between the social connections and monetary policy. According to the above argument,
during periods of monetary contractions, the suppliers will extend more trade credit in total
if they are socially connected with their main customers. Thus, a positive coefficient (α1)
would be in favor of our predictions.
Some preliminary evidences are shown in Figure 3.5. We call suppliers’ changes in to-
tal account receivables scaled by their sales TradeCredit. The solid line is the evolution
of monetary policy, while the dash line denotes the difference of TradeCredit between the
connected and unconnected ones. We can see that the difference co-moves with monetary
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policy and the correlation between them are high (0.45). Using the empirical equation (3),
we investigate whether suppliers’ TradeCredit increases more in response to a monetary
contraction shock if they are socially connected with their main customers. The estimation
results are present in the first two columns of Table 3.8. We add time-fixed effects in the
regressions and thus the level effects of monetary policy are absorbed. In the second column,
pair fixed effects are controlled. We construct a supplier-level index of weak social connec-
tions by calculating the firm-year mean of weak social connection dummy, and then repeat
the analyses. The results are in Appendix 3.6.
We are interested in the coefficients on the interaction term, sci,t ∗MPt, which captures
the extent to which social connections affect the transmissions of monetary policy shocks
to suppliers’ TradeCredit. We have that the coefficients on the interaction term are both
positive and weakly significant at the 10% level at least. Thus, as expected, suppliers pro-
vide more trade credit if they are socially connected with their main customers when coming
across monetary contractions. Use the estimation result in the first column as an example.
When the aggregate economy suffers a one-standard-deviation increase in monetary contrac-
tions, the suppliers will on average extend 0.33 percentage point more trade credit to their
customers if the suppliers are socially connected with one of their main customers. This
economic magnitude corresponds to 35% of the mean of the ratio of the change in account
receivable to total sales (0.95). Social connections have a considerable influence on the sup-
pliers’ provision of trade credit. Our result is robust to the weak social connections.
However, due to the shortage of pair-level account receivables, there exist limitations to
our arguments. The supplier may think that the sales to the connected customers are stable
even if they suffer a credit contraction shock and providing more trade credit won’t get much
marginal benefit. They pay much attention to the transactions to the unconnected ones and
provide more trade credit to them. Thus the increasing trade credit may be incurred by the
increasing trade credit extended to suppliers’ other customers.
To deal with the limitations and identify the impact of social connections on suppliers’
trade credit, we impose another examination. If suppliers which have tighter social connec-
tions provide more trade credit to their customers in face of credit contractions, suppliers
should provide more trade credit in total if their main customers depend on more external
finance or have a higher liquidity need. To check this prediction, we divide our sample into
two subsamples by customers’ industry-level external financial dependence or liquid needs.
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Table 3.8
Trade Credit Channel II
External Financial Dependence Liquidity Needs
Connections High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
sc*MP 0.33** 0.32* 0.63** -0.052 0.57** 0.057
(0.16) (0.17) (0.27) (0.18) (0.29) (0.18)
sc 0.45*** 0.29 0.61** 0.25 0.58** 0.28
(0.16) (0.23) (0.26) (0.19) (0.27) (0.19)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Supplier Industry Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Supplier No Yes No No No No
Observations 9,335 9,335 4,629 4,726 4,285 5,070
Supplier 1,473 1,473 780 693 731 756
Adj −R2 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. The regression equation is: Rechi,t/salei,t =
α0 + α1 ∗ sci,t ∗MPt + α2 ∗ sci,t + γ ∗Xi,t + ui + ut + i,t. Rechi,t is changes in supplier i’s account receivables in year t. salei,t
denotes supplier i’s total sales. The first two columns use all observations in our sample. In the median two columns, we
divide the whole sample into two subsamples based on customers’ industry-level external finance dependence. In the last two
columns, we divide the whole sample into two subsamples based on customers’ industry-level liquid needs which is equal to the
ratio of short-term debt over sales. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair and year levels are reported
in parentheses.
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The constructions of industry-level external financial dependence and liquid needs will
be discussed in the following section.
We use regression equation (3):
Rechi,t/salei,t = α0 + α1 ∗ sci,t ∗MPt + α2 ∗ sci,t
+γXi,t + ui + ut + i,t
We expect that the value of α1 for the subsample which has a higher external financial de-
pendence or a higher liquid need is larger than the counterparts which need less external
financing or liquids.
We describe the process related to trade credit dependence in detail and the one with
respect to liquidity needs follow the same procedure. First, we construct an industry-level
index of trade credit dependence following Rajan and Zingales (1998)12. Next, we define
supplier-level customers’ external financial dependence using the mean of all customers’
external financial dependence for each supplier. That is:
EFDi = Meani(EFDi,j)
where EFDi is supplier i’s customer external financial dependence and EFDi,j is customer
j’s industry-level external financial dependence.
The observations in the original sample are divided into two groups based on customers’
industry-level external financial dependence. We call the group whose customers’ depen-
dence is above the median value “High” external financial dependence group and the other
one “Low” external financial dependence group. Third, we repeat the regression with respect
to suppliers’ TradeCredit for both groups and see whether the coefficients on the interaction
term are significantly different. Fourth, I construct the industry-level liquidity needs13 and
repeat the three steps above.
12We use the data from Compustat-U.S. First, we calculate the sum of firms’ external financing and
capital expenditures over the relevant periods and then computes the ratio of external financing and capital
expenditures. Second, we use the median level of the distribution of this ratio within the corresponding
industry as the industry-level external financial dependence. In our exercise, we restrict the sample from
1979 to 1999 because the sample we use in the regressions starts from 2000. If the sample is extended to 2009
or 2017 and we construct the measure using the same procedures as before, we find that the former measure
is highly correlated with the latter two. In this paper, we divided manufacturing firms into 20 industries
based on two-digit SIC code.
13Here we define liquidity needs as the ratio of short-term debt over sales.
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The estimation results are shown in the last four columns of Table 3.8. Column (iii)
and (iv) present the regressions for the high and low external financial dependence groups,
respectively. We can see the coefficient on the interaction for the high group is 0.63, strongly
significant at the 5% level. The socially connected suppliers whose customers depend on
trade credit more will extend 0.63 percentage point more trade credit in total when the
economy comes across a one-standard-deviation monetary contraction shock. As for the
group with low trade credit dependence, the impact is not significant. When we divide the
original sample in accordance with industry-level liquidity needs, the results are similar. The
effects of social connections in the group whose customers have a relatively larger liquidity
need are stronger than the group with a low liquidity need.
In this section, first, we find that when customers use more trade credit in the trans-
actions, the socially connected pairs’ sales will increase more during monetary contraction
periods. Second, if the customers are located in the industry which needs more trade credit
or liquidity, the corresponding connected suppliers provide more trade credit in total. These
two findings help us to confirm the argument that social connections can increase suppliers’
provision of trade credit in the presence of monetary contractions. Thus the trade credit
channel works to explain why social connections facilitate the pair-level sales during periods
of monetary recessions.
3.5.2 Heterogeneous Effects in Social Capital
In our analyses above, we argue that social connections help to mitigate the negative effects
of monetary contractions on sales between suppliers and customers via trade credit channel.
Next we depend on the empirical specification (1) to test an additional implication of this
point. Putnam (2000) argues that an agent’s social capital is more valuable with an increase
in overall regional social capital. Based on this point, Lins et al. (2017) show that high-CSR
firms in states with higher levels of social trust have higher stock returns when the overall
trust suffers negative shocks. Framing the argument in our analyses, social connections work
by enhancing the sense of trust, which implies that social connections may have larger im-
pacts in regions where the trust between different agents is high. As our mechanism works
via suppliers’ provision of trade credit, the social trust of the state where the supplier is
located is important because it can affect firms’ decision on trade credit provided. We test
this implication using a similar procedure in the argument for the trade credit channel. First,
we divide our sample into two subsamples according to the social trust of the state where
118
the supplier’s headquarter is located. The two measures of social trust come from Sen. Mike
Lee’s Social Capital Project and Gallup, respectively. We call the group whose suppliers’
state-level social trust is below the median value the “Low” trust group, and the other one
the “High” trust group. Second, we repeat the regression using the empirical specification
(1) and see whether the coefficients on the interaction term are different. According to the
discussion above, social connections should decrease the negative effects of monetary con-
tractions more in the group with higher social trust. A larger β1 for the high group is in
favor of our prediction.
The estimation results are present in the first four columns of Table 3.9. In the first two
columns, we divide the sample into two subsamples based on the suppliers’ state-level social
trust from Sen. Mike Lee’s Social Capital Project. We get that the coefficient on the inter-
action term for the group where the suppliers are located in states with higher social trust
is 0.045, significant at the 1% level. This means that the sales of the pairs whose suppliers
are in the high-social-trust state will account 0.68 (15*0.045) percentage point more to their
socially connected customers than that of the unconnected ones. As for the suppliers located
in states with lower social trust, the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.011, smaller than
the counterpart for the high-social-trust group but not significant. These results are con-
sistent with our prediction. Furthermore, if we divide our sample according to the index of
social trust from Gallup, the results still stand by our predictions. In conclusion, social con-
nections can ease the negative impact of monetary contraction on pair-level sales, especially
for the suppliers who are located in states with higher levels of social trust.
In the above analysis, we consider the heterogeneous effects of social connections from the
angle of suppliers. Next we test whether the impact of social connections is heterogeneous
in customers’ social capital. According to our argument, social connections enhance the im-
pact of social capital. Thus, social connections should have a larger impact if the customers
have higher levels of social capital. To test this hypothesis, we construct suppliers’ social
capital based on Lins et al. (2017). Then we divide our sample into two subgroups. We call
the group whose customer-level social trust is below the median value “Low” trust group
and the other one “High” trust group. Finally, we repeat the regression using the empirical
specification (1), and see whether the coefficients on the interaction term are different. The
estimation results are shown in the last two columns of Table 3.9. We can see that the
coefficient on the interaction term for the group where the suppliers have higher social trust
is 0.034, significant at the 5% level. This means that the sales of the pairs whose suppliers
have higher social trust will account 0.51 (15*0.034) percentage point more to their socially
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Table 3.9
Heterogeneous Effects
Trust1 Trust2 Trust3
Low High Low High Low High
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
dummy sc ∗MP 0.011 0.045*** 0.0096 0.046*** 0.016 0.034**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
dummy sc 0.025 -0.0033 0.024 -0.0024 -0.0023 0.029
(0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.025)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pair Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,663 6,327 5,649 6,341 5,846 5,840
Pairs 1,152 1,227 1,153 1,226 1,149 1,151
Adj −R2 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.This ta-
ble presents the results of the following empirical specification: log(
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
) =
β0+β1∗dummy sci,j,t∗MPt+β2∗dummy sci,j,t+β3∗MPt+β4∗csizej,t+γ∗Xi,t+ui,j+i,j,t,
where Salei,j,t and dummy sci,j,t are the sales and the index of social connections between
supplier i and customer j in year t respectively. We use the dummy variable of social
ties between upstream and down stream firms as the main index of social connections.
This dummy equals to one if there exists at least one of the senior managers and board
members from the supplier ever attended a same educational institution or worked at a
same company for an overlapping period with one of the corresponding customer’s senior
managers and board members. Salei,t is the total sales of supplier i in period t. MPt is
the index of monetary contractions in year t. c sizej,t is the time-variant total assets of
customer. In addition, we add suppliers’ vector of controls (suppliers’ size, profitability and
asset tangibility) in the regression to check the robustness of our result. We control for
pair-fixed effects, ui,j and time-fixed effect ut. We divide the sample into two subsamples
based on the state-level social trust. Here “Low” means that the suppliers are located in a
state with low social trust while “High” means that the suppliers are in the state with high
social trust. In the first two columns, “Trust1” denotes the social trust constructed from
Sen. Mike Lee’s Social Capital Project and “Trust2” represents the social trust constructed
by Gallup in 2009. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair and year
levels are reported in parentheses.
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connected customers than that of the unconnected ones. As for the customers with lower
social capital, the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.016, smaller than the counterpart
for the high-social-trust group but not significant. These results are consistent with our
prediction.
If we consider the heterogenous effects of weak social connections across regions with
different levels of social trust, our results still hold other than the results related to customers’
social capital. We present these results in Appendix A3.7.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of social connections between upstream and downstream
firms on the transmissions of monetary contraction shocks. Using the transaction data be-
tween suppliers and customers, we first find that monetary policy contraction shocks have
a negative impact on the pairs’ sales between suppliers and customers, and social connec-
tions can reduce these negative effects. And this result is not only robust to the empirical
specifications where more controls or time-fixed effects are included, but also robust to an
alternative measure of monetary policy and social connections.
We argue that social connections work via adjusting firms’ trade credit. Because we have
no access to the pair-level data about trade credit, we test two indirect conjectures instead.
First, the pair-level sales are more responsive to the changes in customers’ account payable
if social connections can affects the sales via the trade credit channel. The regression shows
that the coefficients on the triple interaction of customers’ trade credit received, monetary
contraction and social connection dummy are statistically significant and positive, which is
consistent with our first conjecture. Second, suppliers whose customers have a higher trade
credit dependence or liquidity need extend more trade credit in total. To test this conjec-
ture, we divide our sample into two groups based on suppliers’ industry-level trade credit
dependence and liquidity needs. When we use the ratio of changes in suppliers’ account
receivable over total assets as the dependent variable, the coefficients on the interaction of
social connection dummy and monetary contractions for the group with higher trade credit
dependence or liquidity needs will be larger than the counterparts for the other group. This
confirms our second conjecture.
Finally, we build on our benchmark results to assess an additional implication of the
view that social connections affect the transmission of monetary contraction shocks because
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these connections can enhance the sense of trust. Social connections have a larger impact
in the state with higher social trust. We divide our sample into two subsamples based on
two measures of social trust. The coefficient on the interaction of monetary contractions and
social connections for the group with higher social trust is significant and larger than the
counterpart with lower social trust. This result is in favor of our predictions.
In conclusion, the sales between suppliers and their main customers will decrease when
the aggregate economy suffers a monetary contraction shock and social connections between
the two parties can help to mitigate the negative impact via increasing suppliers’ provision
of trade credit.
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3.7 Appendix
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Appendix A3.1
Monetary Policy and Sales
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
dummy sc ∗MP 0.039** 0.040** 0.032*** 0.030***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011)
MP -0.015* -0.0091
(0.0082) (0.0061)
dummysc 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.0043 0.0098
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Fixed Effect
Supplier Industry Yes Yes No No
Customer Industry Yes Yes No No
Pair No No Yes Yes
Time No Yes No Yes
Observations 11,990 11,990 11,990 11,990
Pairs 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379
Adj −R2 0.08 0.08 0.66 0.66
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents the results
of the following empirical specification: log
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
= β0 + β1 × dummy sci,j,t × MPt + β2 ×
dummy sci,j,t + β3 × c sizej,t ∗ +∆ ∗ Pairi,j + Γ ∗Xi,t + β4 ∗ c sizej,t ∗MPt + β5 ∗Xi,t ∗MPt +
uis + ujs + ut + i,j,t, where Salei,j,t and dummy sci,j,t are the sales and the index of social
connections between supplier i and customer j in year t respectively. We use the dummy variable
of social ties between upstream and down stream firms as the main index of social connections.
This dummy equals to one if there exists at least one of the senior managers and board members
from the supplier ever attended a same educational institution or worked at a same company
for an overlapping period with one of the corresponding customer’s senior managers and board
members. Salei,t is the total sales of supplier i in period t. MPt is the index of monetary
contractions in year t. c sizej,t is the time-variant total assets of customer. Pairi,j is a vector of
time-invariant pair-level characteristics. uic and ujc are supplier’s and customer’s industry-fixed
effects respectively. In our analysis, we also include pair-level fixed effects to check the robustness
and then the impacts of Pairi,j , uis and ujs are absorbed. Xi,t is the time-varying information set
for the supplier. ut denotes time-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the pair and year
level. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair and year levels are reported
in parentheses.
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Appendix A3.2: Alternative Shadow Federal Funds Rate
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
dummy sc ∗MP 0.029** 0.028*** 0.024** 0.021**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.0099) (0.0099)
MP -0.016** -0.012**
(0.0080) (0.0055)
dummy sc 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.0046 0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Fixed Effect
Supplier Industry Yes Yes No No
Customer Industry Yes Yes No No
Pair No No Yes Yes
Time No Yes No Yes
Observations 11,990 11,990 11,990 11,990
Pairs 2,379 2,379 2,379 2,379
Adj −R2 0.08 0.08 0.66 0.66
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents
the results of the following empirical specification: log
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
= β0 + β1 × dummy sci,j,t ×
MPt + β2 × dummy sci,j,t + β3 × c sizej,t ∗ +∆ ∗ Pairi,j + Γ ∗Xi,t + uis + ujs + ut + i,j,t,
where Salei,j,t and dummy sci,j,t are the sales and the index of social connections between
supplier i and customer j in year t respectively. We use the dummy variable of social
ties between upstream and down stream firms as the main index of social connections.
This dummy equals to one if there exists at least one of the senior managers and board
members from the supplier ever attended a same educational institution or worked at
a same company for an overlapping period with one of the corresponding customer’s
senior managers and board members. Salei,t is the total sales of supplier i in period
t. MPt is the index of monetary contractions in year t. Here we use the changes in
Krippner’s SSR. c sizej,t is the time-variant total assets of customer.Pairi,j is a vector
of time-invariant pair-level characteristics. uic and ujc are supplier’s and customer’s
industry-fixed effects respectively. In our analysis, we also include pair-level fixed effects to
check the robustness and then the impacts of Pairi,j, uis and ujs are absorbed. Xi,t is the
time-varying information set for the supplier. ut denotes time-fixed effects. Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair and year levels are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix A3.3
Alternative Measure of Monetary Policy
RR NS
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
dummy sc ∗MP 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.030* 0.031**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
MP -0.018** -0.021***
(0.010) (0.0080)
dummy sc 0.072** 0.084*** 0.073** 0.084***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Fixed Effect
Pair Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,551 5,551 5,551 5,551
Pairs 1,407 1,407 1,407 1,407
Adj −R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents the
results of the following empirical specification: log
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
= β0 +β1×dummy sci,j,t×MPt +
β2 × dummy sci,j,t + β3 × c sizej,t + ∆ ∗ Pairi,j + Γ ∗Xi,t + ui,j + ut + i,j,t, where Salei,j,t
and dummy sci,j,t are the sales and the index of social connections between supplier i and
customer j in year t respectively. We use the dummy variable of social ties between upstream
and down stream firms as the main index of social connections. This dummy equals to one
if there exists at least one of the senior managers and board members from the supplier ever
attended a same educational institution or worked at a same company for an overlapping pe-
riod with one of the corresponding customer’s senior managers and board members. Salei,t
is the total sales of supplier i in period t. MPt is the index of monetary contractions in year
t. The first two columns use Romer and Romer’s measure, while the rest two use Nakamura
and Steinsson’s. c sizej,t is the time-variant total assets of customer. Pairi,j is a vector
of time-invariant pair-level characteristics. ui,j is pair-fixed effects respectively. Xi,t is the
time-varying information set for the supplier. ut denotes time-fixed effects. Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair and year levels are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix A3.4
Weak Social Connections
RR NS
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
dummy sc ∗MP 0.042** 0.042** 0.042** 0.044**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
MP -0.023* -0.027**
(0.013) (0.012)
dummy sc 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.080***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Fixed Effect
Supplier Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time No Yes No Yes
Observations 5,551 5,551 5,551 5,551
Pairs 1,407 1,407 1,407 1,407
Adj −R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. This table presents the
results of the following empirical specification: log
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
= β0 +β1×dummy sci,j,t×MPt +
β2 × dummy sci,j,t + β3 × c sizej,t + ∆ ∗ Pairi,j + Γ ∗ Xi,t + uis + ujs + ut + i,j,t, where
Salei,j,t and dummy sci,j,t are the sales and the index of social connections between supplier
i and customer j in year t respectively. We use the dummy variable of social ties between
upstream and down stream firms as the main index of social connections. This dummy
equals to one if there exists at least one of the senior managers and board members from
the supplier ever attended a same educational institution or worked at a same company
with one of the corresponding customer’s senior managers and board members (weak
connections). Salei,t is the total sales of supplier i in period t. MPt is the index of monetary
contractions in year t. c sizej,t is the time-variant total assets of customer. Pairi,j is a
vector of time-invariant pair-level characteristics. uic and ujc are supplier’s and customer’s
industry-fixed effects respectively. Xi,t is the time-varying information set for the supplier.
ut denotes time-fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair
and year levels are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix A3.5
Distance and Relationship-Pair-Fixed Effects
(i) (ii) (iii)
dummy sc ∗MP 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.31***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.10)
dummy sc 0.0045 0.0045 0.0044
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
MP -0.010* -0.0096** -0.0096
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058)
Distance*MP 0.0091* 0.0091*
(0.0051) (0.0050)
relationship*MP -0.0012 -0.0012
(0.0033) (0.0034)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect
Pair Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,990 11,990 11,990
Pairs 2,379 2,379 2,379
Adj −R2 0.66 0.66 0.66
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.This table presents the
results of the following empirical specification: log
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
= β0 + β1 × dummy sci,j,t ·MPt +
β2×dummy sci,j,t +β3× c sizej,t + Γ∗Xi,t + Θ∗MPt ∗Pairi,j + ∆∗Pairi,j +ui,j +ut + i,j,t,
where Salei,j,t and dummy sci,j,t are the sales and the index of social connections between
supplier i and customer j in year t respectively. In the first three columns, we use the
dummy variable of social ties between upstream and down stream firms as the main index
of social connections. This dummy equals to one if there exists at least one of the senior
managers and board members from the supplier ever attended a same educational institution
or worked at a same company for an overlapping period with one of the corresponding
customer’s senior managers and board members. MPt is the index of monetary contractions
in year t. Salei,t is the total sales of supplier i in period t. c sizej,t is the time-variant total
assets of customer. Pairi,j denotes the distance between the supplier and customer or the
duration that the downstream firms become the main customers of the supplier. Xi,t is the
time-varying information set for the supplier. ut denotes time-fixed effects. Heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair and year levels are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix A3.6
Trade Credit Channel II-Weak Connections
External Financial Dependence Liquidity Needs
Weak Connections High Low High Low
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
wdummy sc*MP 0.40** 0.41** 0.69*** 0.015 0.64** 0.14
(0.15) (0.16) (0.25) (0.19) (0.27) (0.17)
wdummy sc 0.54*** 0.36 0.73** 0.31 0.63** 0.45**
(0.16) (0.22) (0.25) (0.20) (0.26) (0.19)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Supplier Industry Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Supplier No Yes No No No No
Observations 9,335 9,335 4,629 4,726 4,285 5,070
Supplier 1,473 1,473 780 693 731 756
Adj −R2 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. The regression equation is: Rechi,t/salei,t =
α0 +α1 ∗wdummy sci,t ∗MPt +α2 ∗wdummy sci,t +γ ∗Xi,t +ui +ut + i,t. Rechi,t is changes in supplier i’s account receivables
in year t. salei,t denotes supplier i’s total sales. Here, in the last four columns, we use weak connection dummy in Table 3.3.
The first two columns use all observations in our sample. In the median two columns, we divide the whole sample into two
subsamples based on customers’ industry-level trade credit dependence which corresponds to the ratio of account payable over
total sales. In the last two columns, we divide the whole sample into two subsamples based on customers’ industry-level liquid
needs which is equal to the ratio of short-term debt over sales. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the pair
and year levels are reported in parentheses.
129
Appendix A3.7
Heterogeneous Effects
Trust1 Trust2 Trust3
Low High Low High Low High
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
wdummy sc ∗MP 0.012 0.030*** 0.011 0.031** 0.021 0.020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
wdummy sc 0.051** 0.043** 0.051** 0.042** 0.015 0.078***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effect
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pair Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,663 6,327 5,649 6,341 5,846 5,840
Pairs 1,152 1,227 1,153 1,226 1,149 1,151
Adj −R2 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66
Note: Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.This table presents the results
of the following empirical specification: log(
Salei,j,t
Salei,t
) = β0 + β1 ∗ wdummy sci,j,t ∗ MPt + β2 ∗
wdummy sci,j,t +β3 ∗MPt +β4 ∗ csizej,t + γ ∗Xi,t +ui,j + i,j,t, where Salei,j,t and wdummy sci,j,t
are the sales and the index of social connections between supplier i and customer j in year t
respectively. We use the dummy variable of social ties between upstream and down stream firms
as the main index of social connections. This dummy equals to one if there exists at least one
of the senior managers and board members from the supplier ever attended a same educational
institution or worked at a same company with one of the corresponding customer’s senior managers
and board members (weak connections). Salei,t is the total sales of supplier i in period t. MPt is
the index of monetary contractions in year t. c sizej,t is the time-variant total assets of customer.
In addition, we add suppliers’ vector of controls (suppliers’ size, profitability and asset tangibility)
in the regression to check the robustness of our result. We control for pair-fixed effects, ui,j and
time-fixed effect ut. We divide the sample into two subsamples based on the state-level social
trust. Here “Low” means that the suppliers are located in a state with low social trust while
“High” means that the suppliers are in the state with high social trust. In the first two columns,
“Trust1” denotes the social trust constructed from Sen. Mike Lee’s Social Capital Project and
“Trust2” represents the social trust constructed by Gallup in 2009. Heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors clustered at the pair and year levels are reported in parentheses.
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